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i.

PREFACE

Feminist scholars have just begun to
develop a
comprehensive understanding of the state's
relationship
to patriarchal power relations.

My dissertation will con-

tribute to this understanding through
original historical
research
women's labor history and through an informed

m

tneoretical assessment of this research.

Throughout this dissertation
"patriarchy" to refer to

a

I

will use the term

constellation of social rela-

tions in contemporary society whereby males are
endowed

with economic, political, and social power and privilege
by the simple virtue of their gender.

Neither historically

fixed nor universal, the specific content of gender-based

power relations must always be understood within
cally specific context.

a

histori-

It is important to distinguish,

therefore, between an understanding of patriarchy as "father-

rule"--a social system characteristic of precapitalist
social formations in which a

f ami

lially-based paternal

authority formed the model for economic and political
relations--and

a

more contemporary understanding of gender

relations within our liberal capitalist and racially stratified society.

But despite the historical transformations

patriarchy has undergone, the use of term remains important
IV

as an indication of the unfortunate
historical continuities

embedded in gender relations:

though taking different

forms, gender relations remain characterized
at a fundamental
level oy inegalitarian power relations.
As a

s ocial

relationship, patriarchy should not

be understood as trans-historical or
biologically determined,

but as a social system which uses biological
differences
as a basis for social inequalities.

As a dynamic social

system, therefore, patriarchy does not automatically
or

easily reproduce itself.

Part of the purpose of this study

will be to assess the role the state has played in
stabilizing and reproducing these relations.

Within the context of contemporary U.S. Capitalism,

patriarchy has come to be characterized by

a sexual

division

of labor whereby women are primarily associated with the

private sphere of the home and men with the public spheres
of work and formal politics.

tion with private life,

I

Women's primary identifica-

will argue throughout the disser-

tation, is one important basis for her secondary economic

and political standing in the public world.

The development

of this sexualized public/private distinction will be the

subject of my first chapter.
Chapter one will first address the development
of the distinction between the "privatized family" and

"public politics" in classical liberal theory.
v

In brief,

Will address the questions of
how and why family life
came to be associated with
private life, as well as how
the liberal definition of
politics came to exclude familial
relations.
This discussion will lead me to
an assessment
of the role of the public/private
distinction not only
in classical liberal theory but
in contemporary liberal
feminist analyses which adopt this
distinction. Through
this discussion I will draw important
conclusions about
the limitations of a definition of
politics which grows
out of this public/private distinction.
I

My second and third chapters will address
the history
of state policy in regard to working
women, with a focus

on labor policy in New York State during
the Progressive
Era.

First,

I

will document the existence of a heretofore

unknown sector of the labor

f orce--homeworkers

,

or women

who were employed to produce or finish goods at home.
The exemption of these working mothers from all
forms of

state regulation during this time period will stand in

contrast to the development of protective labor legislation

during the same time period for women working outside the
home in industrial occupations.
argue,

Such legislation,

I

will

limited women's options for work in the public market-

place while reasserting women's primary identification

with the private sphere of the home.

The juxtaposition

of these two case studies will form the basis of my assessvi

inent of

the role of the language of public
and private

life in the formation of state policy.

As much of the

legislation enacted during this time period
in New York
served as a guidepost for long-standing
federal legislation,
the implications of my study will reach
beyond this specific
state and time period.
My concluding chapter will explicitly
address the

problems associated with the development of a feminist
theory of the state.

After reviewing the major liberal,

reformist, and marxist models of political power,

advance

a

I

will

perspective that can take into account the dynamic

process by which state policy is developed and assess the
role not only of organized political organizations but
of a dominant "ideology of motherhood" in the policy process.
In short,

will argue that the state has played a crucial

I

role in mediating the conflicts internal to a historically

dynamic patriarchal social system.
I

wish to thank the Woodrow Wilson National Fellow-

ship Foundation Program in Women's Studies and the American

Association of University Women's Educational Foundation
Program for their generous support of my dissertation
research.

I

would also like to thank, for their help

and support, my committee members:

Jean Elshtain, Joyce

Berkman, John Brigham, and my "unofficial" member, Kenneth

Dolbeare
Vll

An array of people stuck with me
through countless

editions of this dissertation.
and dedicated patience,

Albelda

,

I

For their incisive criticisms

would like to thank: Randy Pearl

Sandy Blanchard, Louise Brown, Maryann
Clawson,

Libba Moore, and Beata Panagopoulos
Finally,

I

d like to thank Bob Higgins for his

endless patience and wisdom; my mother, Margaret
Daniels,
for teaching me both independence and stamina;
and my

homeworking sister, Andrea Scott, who remains

a

constant

reminder of the contemporary importance of my historical
work
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ABSTRACT

WORKING MOTHERS AND THE STATE
(September 1983)

Cynthia R. Daniels, B.A.

,

University of Massachusetts

Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Professor Jean Bethke Elshtain
Through original historical research in women's
labor history and an informed theoretical assessment
of
this research, this dissertation addresses the
question
of the ways in which state policy has reinforced
women's

primary association with the private sphere of the home
and secondary standing in the public spheres of politics
and economics.

The dissertation begins with an assessment

of the development of the public/private distinction in

classical liberal thought and addresses the question of
how the liberal definition of "public" politics came to

exclude "private" familial relations.

Women's primary

identification with this private sphere,

I

argue,

is one

important basis for her secondary standing in formal politics
and in the public marketplace.

Chapters two and three

address the history of state policy in regard to working

women with

a

focus on labor policy in New York State

during the Progressive Era.
ix

First,

I

document the existence

Of a heretofore unknown sector
of the labor force-home-

workers, or women who were employed
to produce or finish
goods at home.
The exemption of these working
mothers
from all forms of state regulation during
this time period
is then contrasted to the development
of protective labor
legislation during the same time period for
women working

outside the home in industrial occupations.
lation,

I

argue,

Such legis-

limited women's options for work in the

public marketplace while reasserting women's primary
identi-

fication with the private sphere of the home.

As an out-

growth of my historical research, my concluding chapter

explicitly addresses the problems associated with the

development of a "feminist theory of the state."

After

reviewing the major liberal, reformist, and marxist models
of political power,

I

advance

a

perspective that can take

into account the dynamic process by which state policy
is developed and assess the ways in which the state mediates

the conflicts internal to a historically dynamic patriarchal

social system.

x
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CHAPTER

I

PUBLIC POLITICS AND THE PRIVATIZED
FAMILY
At a basic level, various liberal
thinkers such
as Locke and John Stuart Mill have
shared a view of family
life which stresses its private and
non-political character.

Family relations have been viewed as
naturally-based and
ideally empty of the individualistic and
competitive power
relations that predominate in the public world

of politics.

Liberal feminists have been forced to challenge
this rather
strict distinction between public politics and
the privatized family as they have come to view family life
as imbued

with patriarchal relations of dominance and subordination.

Recognition of the sexual division of labor in the home,
the importance of child-rearing practices, questions about

the control of women's reproductive capacities and sex-

uality, all of these have pushed feminists to a reestimation
of traditional definitions of politics--to one that can

explain these complex and crucial dimensions of gender
relations
But the question remains whether liberal feminists

can succeed in understanding the political underpinnings
of private relations while retaining their commitment
to liberalism.

In order to answer this question it is

1

2

necessary to understand the
roots of the public/private
distinction in liberal theory and
the definition of politics
that has grown out of it.
One of the main questions
I
will address in this chapter,
therefore,
will be:

is the

depoliticized status of family life
essential to liberal
theory and, if so, does it
necessitate an implicit acceptance
of patriarchal power relations
in the private sphere of
the family? The answers to these
questions are crucial,
because insofar as the liberal tradition
sees family life

in non-political terms,

it is unable to address women's

dependent status within family life as
one important foundation of women's economic and political
inequality.

And

also,

insofar as liberal theory renders these
private familial relations invisible or immune from
critical analysis,

it

l egitimates

patriarchal relations in that sphere, helps

to deflect critical attention away from
these relations,

and by doing so acts to perpetuate women's
secondary political, economic and social position.

This chapter will be divided into three sections.
First,

I

will explore the origins of the public/private

split in liberal theory.

How and why did family life come

to be associated with private life?

How did the liberal

definition of politics come to exclude familial relations?
Also, how is the public/private distinction connected,
in liberal theory,

to views of human nature, epistemology,

and views of the state?

In addition,

I

will address the

3

question of whether the liberal
version of the public/private
split inherently undervalues the
relationships and characteristics traditionally associated
with women's work in
the private sphere.
In other words, is there an
inherent
alUatlve distinction between the public
and private spheres
in liberal theory?

-

John Stuart Mill will provide the model
for the
liberal paradigm in this first section.

Mill, as a pro-

gressive liberal thinker, provides us with

a

good illustration

of both the strengths and limitations
of liberal theory.

As a liberal thinker who rejected the
strict Utilitarianism
of James Mill and Bentham,

and who modified more pessimistic

Lockean views of human nature, he probably best
represents
the spirit of Contemporary progressive liberalism.

Finally,

this section will conclude with an assessment of Mill's

liberal feminism.
The second section of this chapter

feminist revisions of liberalism.

Betty Freidan

s

I

v/ill

examine

will focus here on

latest work, as she is one of the most

visible and influential contemporary liberal feminists.

Throughout this section

I

will address whether it is possible

to critically analyze the social foundations of family

life and understand the interconnections between women's

dependent status in both public and private life while
retaining a fundamental commitment to the liberal paradigm.
Insofar as such an understanding of family life is necessary

4

to any; feminist analysis,
this question will raise the
issue of whether a distinctly
liberal

feminism is viable

for an adequate analysis of
women's position in contemporary society.

The third section of this chapter
will address
the strategic implications of the
liberal feminist analysis.
Liberal feminists, by uncritically
accepting the liberal

dichotomy between the public and private
realms and thus
the definition of politics that grows
out of this distinction, have focused their attention on
the legislative road
to equality.

By doing so they have implicitly accepted

the conception of the state as "sex neutral"
and have

limited their analysis of sexual inequality to
those power

relations visible in the ’public’ world of politics.

While

many liberal feminists are skeptical of state power,
insofar as they are true to the classical liberal perspective,

many also continue to rely on state-sponsored solutions
to women's inequality.

A clarification of this dilemma

is important for a more complete understanding of the
role

the state has played in the maintenance of patriarchal

power relations, as well as for the question of whether
the state can or should be used as a vehicle for progressive

social change.

This section will conclude with an assess-

ment of both the insights and limitations of the liberal

feminist understanding of state power and the strategies
for change that are an outgrowth of this understanding.

5

Finally

will raise some questions
that can only
be answered through my
historical research: What
,

I

is the

relationship between women's
identification with the private
sphere (specifically her primary
identification as "mother")
and more public manifestations
of women's inequality in
the marketplace and in her formal
legal
status?

What role

has the state played in relation
to patriarchal power

relations?

And, what role has public/private
ideology

played in the formation of state policy,
particularly as
it effects women?
Such questions will serve as guides
to the historical case studies which
will follow this chapter.
John Stuart Mill and the Classical
Liberal Paradigm

Liberal philosophy, as articulated by Locke, and

reasserted by J.

S.

Mill, grew out of a reaction against

the absolute monarchy of late feudalism.

Feudal relations

relied on the patriarchal family as the model for its
inter-

woven economic, social, and political organization.

These

relations were characterized by notions of duty, obligation,

obedience to paternal authority, and
on birthright.

a

hierarchy based

In order to dismantle the existing system

of rewards and privileges based on feudal ties,

liberals

sought to limit divine right by establishing a separate

political sphere where the legitimacy of the state was

grounded in the free consent of the governed.

And,

indi-

vidualism supplanted paternalism as the ruling paradigm

6

for both economic and political
life.
Two closely related fundamental
commitments grew
out of the liberal critique of
patriarchalism.
First,

liberalism asserted a very specific
notion of individualism
and invoked a view of this individual
as independent and
rational.
Liberal philosophy asserted
an ’’abstract indi-

vidualism" which posited an inherent
conflict of interest
b etween individuals and between
individuals
and society.

As aggressive and competitive by
nature, we exist in conflict

with others in the pursuit of our
distinct self-interests.
Each individual is rational, in the
sense that each is
the oest judge of his or her self-interests
and each is

capable of determining the best instrumental
means to satisfy
those interests.
In contrast to the feudal idea
that we

have inherent and natural obligations to others
in the

political order, the liberal atomized individual has no
a

priori obligations to others in this liberal "state of

nature" save those that are explicitly contracted for.
As Richard Krouse has argued,

the liberal rejection of

the patriarchal state rested on "a decisive lowering of

the ends and purposes of political society ."

1

The idea

of the state was transformed from an "ethical association

for the attainment of virtue" and based on obligations

imposed from above (from the will of God or the purposes
of nature)
of life,

to an "instrumental association for the protection

liberty, and property" and based only on the will

7

ot

free and equal Individuals.

This "voluntaristic" view

of state power was based on
the liberal definition of

individualism and required the strict
limitation of state
authority
The second commitment that grew
out of the liberal
critique of patr iarchalism involved
a profound skepticism
of state power.
Liberal individualism was marked by
a

fundamental distrust of the collective power
of the state
which required the establishment of strict
limitations
to state interference in private
affairs.
In an important
way,

the tension between the individual and
society in
liberal thought became identified with the
tension between

p rivate individuals and the collective power of public
citizens.

Individual freedom was based on one's freedom

from constraint or interference from both other
individuals

and from the organized political power of the state.

Though our association with others in civil society is

necessary for the fulfillment of our needs and interests,
it also poses a threat to individual freedom.

In other

words, the social bonds we form with others in the public

world are double-edged: while

they enable us to further

our self-interest, they also potentially threaten indi-

vidual freedom and autonomy.

The protection of individual

rights and freedoms from arbitrary state power necessitated
the establishment of an inviolable private sphere of life,
a

sphere in which individual differences would be allowed

8

to flourish and in which
the individual would not
be held
accountable to the judgements of
others or the state.
As Mill states, "the
individual is not accountable
to society
for his actions insofar as
these concern the interests
of no person but himself ." 2
For Mill the independence
of the individual from
the authority of the states
was

absolute.

"Over himself, over his own body
and mind, the
individual is sovereign ." 3 This
redefinition of the nature
Of individuals led Mill to
strictly limit the legitimate
purpose of state power. As he states,
"the only purpose
for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member
of a civilized community, against
his will,

harm to others ." 4
Of what is "good

is to prevent

The state can not intervene on the
basis
"

for the individual, what "it will be

better for him to do" or what will make him
"happier."

Self-protection of the individual and the protection
from
the interference of others replaced
traditional moral con-

cerns as the raison d'etre of state power.
One of the most vexing problems Mill was to
confront

would be defining the boundary between the individual
and
society.

In On L iberty he asserts,

"To individuality should

belong that part of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to society, the part which chiefly

interests society.

But what distinguishes that part

of life which concerns only the individual and "does not

affect the interests of others."?

The liberal depoliti-

9

cization of family life provided
(for Mill and other early
liberals) one important part
of the answer to this
question.
The family, once the
paradigmatic organizing principle
Of public life, retreated
from public view into a newly
created, specifically private
sphere.
Not only was the
polity stripped of its familial
basis;
the family, by

necessity, was also "depoliticized.

"

And this meant that

the development of a rather
strict division between public
politics and the private family was
one fundamental building
block of liberal thinking.

Wnile the break between private family
relations
and public politics was essential
to the liberal critique
or patriarchal ism
it would be misleading to assert
that
family life was rendered completely
immune from liberal
discourse.
While marriage, for instance, would come
to
,

oe conceptualized within the terms of
a "free" liberal

contract, familial relations remained, for
most liberal

philosophers, characterized by traditional hierarchical
relations.

In addition, most liberal thinkers,

such as

Rousseau, Hegel, and Locke, recognized the important
political functions family relations should perform,
most notably
in the "proper" education of children.

But while the

privatized family might serve certain political ends
remained, in

and.

of_

itself

,

,

it

immune from the voluntarist

critique of hierarchical and authoritarian power relations.
In sum,

the liberal definition of human nature,

Which was founded in an
antagonistic division between
the
individual and society, required
a strict differentiation
between public and private life
in order to demarcate
the
limits to state power.
While the drawing of this
boundary
has always been problematic
and controversial in

liberal
theory and practice, the division
between family life and
politics has consistently informed
the definition of this
boundary.
The threshold of the home provided
one important
limit to the authority of state
power and was one basis
from which liberals argued against
the arbitrary
use of

state power.

Liberal feminists, including Mill,
have run
up against this theoretical
commitment in their attempts
to view family relations in
political terms.
For

not only

was the family protected from governmental
interference;
it was also excluded from the language
of a critical polit-

ical analysis.

As such,

family life virtually "disappeared

from the public political vocabulary.

With the exception of Mill'

s

later works, the family

relations of the traditional patriarchal family were
viewed
by classical liberals as both natural and necessary.

As

such they were rendered immune from the liberal critique
ol au t. hor i t ar ian power in political life.

Also, many

liberal thinkers, such as Locke, viewed the family as a

relatively autonomous unit which provided the essential
moral and educational training for good citizenship, but

which remained immune from the liberal egalitarian language

Of public politics.

Specifically, the interest of
women
"disappeared" as they were assumed
to converge with the
interest of the father/husband.
As Susan Okin states,
"Whereas the liberal tradition
appears to be talking about
individuals, as components of
political systems,
it is

in tact talking about
male-headed families ." 6

Conflicts

internal to family life were to
be resolved not according
to the voluntary and contractual
rules of the liberal polity
but according to the traditional
and obligatory laws of
nature.

This is precisely the point that
Mill disputed

in his treatise on women's
subordination— and a point that

contemporary liberal feminists must still
contend with.
For the moment, I will reserve
critical judgement

on this

point and move on to another aspect of
the liberal public/
private split that holds important implications
for a fem-

inist analysis

— its

association with the reason/emotion

dichotomy
One characteristic of the public/private
split
that is crucial for an understanding of a feminist
analysis
is its association in liberal thought with
the division

between reason and emotion.

This section will elaborate

the liberal characterization of public reason and
private

passion and discuss the ways in which the reason/emotion
split helps to define the issues and concerns we see as

appropriate for public debate.
As stated previously,

the liberal redefinition

of the state required the
assertion that individuals
have
the capacity for rationality.
The authority of the state,
no longer based on arbitrary
power and a

natural hierarchical

order, required the consent of
free and rational individuals.
Reason, therefore, was to replace
obligation or force as
the foundation of political
legitimacy.
The liberal view of human nature
is based not only
on a division between the individual
and society, but on
an alleged division, internal to
us all, of reason and
emotion.
As Jean B. Elshtain states, liberal
epistemology

divides us into public minds and private
desires: "The
public realm and "public mind" exist as
defenses against
the private sphere in which desire,
conceived as uncontrolled
and arbitrary, is held to rank supreme.
Private life, as the repository of our baser
instincts,
is characterized as the site of emotions,
morals, and values.

Our non-rational urges, our passions in life--both
good
and bad--are seated and flourish inside that private
sphere.
The private realm of feeling, sentiment and morality
is
not and should not be subject to the same laws of reason
as public relations are,
ftot

in reason,

because private morality is based

but in non— rational individual "preference."

Our private desires, therefore, are not mediated by "law"
or the rules of instrumental rationality, but by subjective

teachings about what is 'right' and 'wrong'.

While relations in the private
sphere are theoretically characterized by relations
of affection, mutuality
and dependence, and a sensitivity
to the needs
of others,

relations in the public sphere of
politics are characterized
as abstract and instrumental.
To bring the instrumental
language and logic of public
relations to bear on personal
relations would be first to tyrannize
individual freedom
(by legitimating government
interference in private life)
and second to apply standards of
behavior inappropriate
to private activity.
This view of public and private life
supported
a

sentimentalized vision of the family and

politics as stripped of morality.

In fact,

a

view of public
this de-moral-

ization of public politics was necessary to
the ideal of
the liberal state as a neutral arbitor of
individual interests.

Only by containing our private passions so, and

restricting the entrance of moral considerations into
public
politics can we create the preconditions for the establishment of

a

be treated

sphere of politics in which all can be said to
equally.

Ideally, we enter politics as abstract

individuals and are treated "blindly" under the law.
R.

P.

As

Wolff characterizes it, human differences and inequi-

ties of the private world should not "enter into the contrac-

tual arrangements of the public world.

When they do, as

they frequently do, liberal theory tells us that an injustice
has been worked which it is the function of the laws to

correct

The association of reason
with the public
sphere, or more specifically
with public politics, is
the
foundation on which the claim can
be made that the law is
neutral, that the state balances
all interests equally.
It is not the purpose of the
state to determine what is
"good" for people or what is "just",
or to establish "justgoals for the social order.
The state merely establishes

battleground where each individual, or
groups of individuals, can meet and negotiate
settlements between conflicting interests and ends.
Politics has to do
a

with the estab-

lishment of fair and proper means
(procedural democracy)
and not with the just or unjust ends
of politics (substantive
democracy
)

The distinction between public reason
and private

passion is important to understand, for as we
shall see
in the next section,

dill

s

it forms an important foundation for

liberal feminism and continues to inform the thinking

of contemporary liberal feminists.

In some sense, Mill

"reelevated" our conception of public life, not by reintro-

ducing moral or ethical concerns into his view of politics,
but by painting public life as the only realm in which

individuals develop their capacity for rationality as well
a_s

their sociality.

Independence and self-development

were not developed by a hermetic retreat into the private
sphere (as the logic of the argument so far might lead
one to believe), but by the active engagement in the battle

for rights and interests
in the public world
of politics
Public discourse and
debate, freedom of both
thought and
speech as unquestionable
rights, and freedom of
action
us a qualified right,
allow for the

intellectual debate

and stimulation necessary
for the development
of rationality
and the cultivation of
our sociality.
But that socialtythe participation of
individuals in the civil world
for
the protection of rights
and interests-is a veneer,
in
a sense, over our more
deeply rooted essential
individualism
irrational 1 cy
The calculating intelligence
fostered
by our participation in the
public world of politics
serves
to check and redirect toward
more constructive purposes
our more irrational, emotional
natures.
Sociality and
rationality must be cultivated,,
from this point of view,
and are not viewed as "first
nature."
.

Mill could make this argument
only because of his
evaluative association of the private
world withour baser
non-rational instincts, and the public
realm with our
capacity for rationality.
In private life, to which women
were confined, our actions and beliefs
tend to reflect
our most narrow and immediate interests,
desires, and fears,
and our judgements tend to be unref
lective
In public
.

life, on the other hand, we are forced
to take opposing

points of view into account and therefore to
subject our

beliefs to question; we develop our capacity to
transcend
our immediate self-interests as we recognize the
long-term

common social interests of all.

m

this process we exercise

and develop a self -ref lective
capacity for calculation
and intelligence- -in short, we
become reason able.

Elshtain characterizes the split
between reason
and emotion and its concurrent
identification with the
private and public spheres when she
states

that "the split

in Lockean epistemology between
reason as formal rationality

and passion as scarcely contained
desire, and the notions
of human personality erected upon
it, require a publicprivate split of a particular kind, one
that allows human
beings to exist in two divergent sphere." 9
The problem
for feminists, including Mill, was
that while men participated in both spheres, women were ostensibly
relegated
to one.

As such women were subject to a theoretical
catch

22 in classical liberal theory:

they were denied the capacity

for reason at the same time they were denied
access to

the means (according to the liberal viewpoint) by
v/hich

instrumental rationality is developed--that is, participation
in the public world.

As Zillah Eisenstein states,^

9

In liberal patriarchal ideology, woman has no
political lire.
Her life in the home is her
life.
Whereas the family is differentiated
rrom political life for men, these spheres are
still equated for women.
In the end she is
excluded from political life. Men are freed
from familial patriarch rule; women are relegated to it.
.

.

.

While in important ways women have always played an important
role in public life, primarily through community and reli-

gious organizations, it was
precisely the formal exclusion
of women from public
politics that Mill f irst
protested,
and which formed the foundation
for his liberal feminism.
Mill's characterization of the
private sphere as
the seat of non-rational
emotions is explicit in his
feminist
argument.
He states that women's
"social position allows
them no scope for any feeling
beyond the family except
personal likings and dislikes, and
it is assumed that they
would be governed entirely by these
in their judgements
and feelings in political matters ." 11
For Mill, the only
way to correct this tendency to
look upon all political
questions as "personal questions" is to
grant women the
suffrage.
Only through their participation in
the public
v/orld can women transcend the narrow
view of life that
their confinement to private life has
engendered.
Mill

s

characterization of private life is revealing.

Women's minds, he argues, are occupied by the
management
of "small but multitudinous details ." 12

"The general bent

of their talents is towards the practical ." 13

he argues,

"a woman",

"seldom runs wild after an abstraction" because

"her more lively interest (is) in the present feelings
of persons which makes her consider first of all... in
what

manner persons

v/ill be

affected" by government policies.

1

^

While these characteristics are an asset inside
family life, they are a hindrance to women from this rationalist liberal perspective.

Given this "bent," women may

be unable to transcend their
"sympathies and antipathies"
in the grave affairs of
politics 15 In On The Subjection
of Women Mill argues that
women's development of "sentiment"
at the expense of "understanding"
has led them to see only
the "immediate effects on person,
and not (the) remote
effects on classes of persons" of
state policy.
This,
he argues, blinds women to "the
ultimate evil tendency
of any form of charity or philanthropy
which commends itself
to their sympathetic feelings ." 16
.

Women's uncritical

support for charity for the poor is in
fact a product of
"unenlightened and shortsighted benevolence"
which "saps
the very foundations of the self-respect,
self-help, and

self-control which are the essential conditions
both of
individual prosperity and of social virtue ." 17

Mill implic-

itly expresses an evaluative distinction
between public

and private life when he argues that "unless
women are

raised to the level of men, men will be lowered to
18
theirs ."
Women, he argued,

lacked a sense of public-spiritedness

and failed to develop intellectual aspirations because

they were primarily concerned with the "immediate and

material needs of the family ." 19
My point here is not to deny that there is an element
of truth in Mill's arguments or to underrate the importance

of his arguments in challenging classical liberal assump-

tions about women's nature.

Indeed, Mill's arguments were

powerful in leading his contemporaries to question naturalist

assumptions about women's "nature,"
for he argued that
these characteristics were the
product not of nature but
of women’s circumstance.
What I do wish to demonstrate
here is that Mill's analysis
was limited in important
ways
by his acceptance of a
particular public/private split.
Human relations can only be
viewed as political
relations if they are raised from the
level of
"natural"

to the level of "social" relations,
that is,

seen as voluntary rather than
necessary.

if they are

This is precisely

the transformation that allowed
for the liberal critique
of the "natural" power relations
embodied in the paternalistic state.
But this thinking did not extend
to private
family relations in classical liberal
thought, in part
because of the liberal need to exempt private
life from

public power, but also because relations in
private life
were viewed as qualitatively different than
public relation;
As Susan Okin states 20
,

intrafamilial relationships--no matter how much
power or authority they involve are perceived
as being outside the sphere of the political....
(Liberals) have perceived human relationships
within families as totally and qualitatively different from relationships between actors in the
political realm.

—

.

Though Mill recognized relations of dominance and
suoordi nation in family life he never fully transcended
the split between public politics and the private family,

between public reason and private passion.

For instance,

the liberal equation of reason with instrumental rationality
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led Mill to either
systematically undervalue or
ignore
the skills, or what one
might call alternative
forms

of

reason and understanding,
that women develop in
familial
relationships. A keen sensitivity
to the often unspoken
needs of others, a judicious
ability to mediate interper
sonal conflicts in the interests
of long-term family sta
bility, the life-long patience
and forethought required
by parenting, the ability
to negotiate the short-term

immediate desires of children with
the long-term effects
Of childrearing practices,
all of these belie a form of
rationality that blurs the boundary
between reason and
emotion.
They embody a form of reason
that has not yet
been stripped of moral concerns,
and as such they fall
1

outside of liberal definitions of
rationality.

Mill's

characterization of the private sphere, above,
clearly
demonstrates his acceptance of this dichotomy.
i4y

argument here is not to deny the ill-effects

of life-long confinement to the
domestic sphere, but to

point to the ways in which this particular
conceptualization
of public and private life denigrates
or misunderstands

characteristics traditionally associated with private
life
and, by extension, women as guardians of that
sphere.

Given Mill's point of view it seems ironic that
he argues in the end that women can achieve equality
while

retaining their primary identification as mothers.

In

the end, Mill failed to advocate women's actual integration
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into the public world «of
either politics or work,.
he maintains that 22
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While he recognizes women's
right and capacity to participate in public life he falls
short of offering the means
by which she can actually do
so.
For Mill, the opportunity
to participate in the public
world is sufficient 23
It does not follow that a
woman should actually
support herself because she should
be caoable of
doing so: in the natural course
of events she
win
:

not.

This failure on Mill's part,
of nerve,

I

think,

is not simply a failure

as Richard Krouse has suggested 24
.

Rather

I

think it is an outgrowth of some
fundamental liberal assumptions.
While Mill brings the critical language of
politics
to bear on family relations he still
maintains, implicitly,
as acceptance of family relations as
rooted in nature and
as operating according to a qualitatively
different standard
of behavior than public relations.

Though he is critical

of the language of "nature" throughout his
feminist analysis,
in the end it is the only language that can
make sense

of his argument that women remain the guardians
of children

and home.

As Susan Okin argues 25
,

By the time he wrote The Subj ection of Women,
Mill clearly (recognized) the invalidity and
fraudulence of identifying the natural with the
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This identification of
private relations as natural
in some sense is evident
also in Mill's explanation
of
why men dominate women.
As Elshtain argues, "he
speaks
of an original 'law of force'
and 'law of superior strength'
as the basis of human society
and the relations between
the sexes."
She continues, "Mill's explanation
of what
motivates man to dominate women in
the first place is the
sheer desire of males for power
over females--a monocausal
theory of human thought and action ."^ 0

Even as Mill recognized inequalities
inside family
relations, he still maintained that
these relations were
qualitatively different than those in the
public world,
for they were based on passionate and
selfish instincts

rather than on calculated and rational
self-interests.

While relations based on the rule of force
or natural status
had been rooted out of public politics they
remained
the

basis of relations in the private sphere.

Relations of

dominance and subordination in family life were, for Mill,
nonrational, for they were still based in

instinct and not reason.

a

rather primordal

It is because of this epistem-

ological undercurrent that associates private life with

non-rational emotionalism that Mill falls short, in the
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end, of fully coming to
grips with the interconnections

between more visible 'public'
social structures and
family relations.
Such an understanding would
have
Mill to a perspective that
more fully developed the
nections and interrelations between
women's primary
tification as mother in the home
and her status

'private'
led

coniden-

in the

marketplace and in formal political
rights.
B_etty Friedan and Contemp
o rary Liberal Feminism

From John Stuart Mill to contemporary
liberal
feminists the liberal paradigm has
stood in sharp contrast
to the systematic exclusion of
women from formal political
rights.
Liberal feminists, beginning with Mill,
were quick
to point out the contradiction
between liberal principles
of individualism and equal treatment,
and the sex-class
exclusion of women from participation in
public politics.
Once women were 'granted' the capacity for
reason,
just

like men, their exclusion from full citizenship
could not
be upheld without a fundamental violation
of the principles

upon which liberalism was built.
are,

These were, and still

the grounds upon which liberal feminists base their

fight.

The question

I

will address in this section will

be whether or not women can be "absorbed" into the liberal

paradigm without
mises.

a

fundamental alteration of liberal pre-

Is the inclusion of women into the liberal concep-

tion of puolic politics a sufficient answer to
women's

24

inequality in society?

In order to address these
questions

it is first necessary to
understand the distinctly liberal

underpinnings of liberal feminism.

will focus here on

I

the latest work of Betty Friedan’s,
as the most recent
and self-conscious statement of
liberal feminism, after
a brief review of the liberal
feminist framework.

Liberal feminists adopt the basic
assumptions and
principles of liberalism and seek to
extend those principles
to women.
Underlying liberalism is the antithesis
between
the individual and society, and a
related division between
the public and private spheres of
life.
According
to this

point of view, "society", both in its laws
and its collective
opinion has unfairly relegated women to the
private sphere,
has defined women politically by her
maternal functions,

and has therefore restricted her participation
in repre-

sentative government, education, and
and discourse.

a

public life of debate

As Stanton argued, women have been defined

not as individuals, but in relation to others:^
It is only the incidental relations of life,
such as mother, wife, sister, daughter, which
may involve some special duties and training.
In the usual discussion in regard to women's
sphere... her rights and duties as an individual,
as a citizen, as a woman (are uniformly subordinated) to the necessities of these incidental
relations, some of which a large class of women
may never assume.

When feminists such as Mill and nineteenth century
suf rragists launched their first attacks on women's inequal-

ity they did so primarily within the established terms
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of the debate.

Given that women has been
systematically

excluded from the liberal
individualist revolution this
was certainly a necessary
first step.
Though
some

fern-

inists challenged a strict
division between public and
private life through attempts to
bring the moral concerns
of private life to bear
on the public world of
politics
(a point I Will
discuss in chapter 4), most
simply called
for the removal of barriers
to women's full participation
in the public realm of politics.
Women, suffragists demanded,
should simply be allowed to enter
the outside world
in

full stride with men and be accorded
the same rights as
any other free individual in liberal
society.
As Stanton,
again, forcefully argues in her "Solitude
of Self", 28

The isolation of every human soul
and the
necessity of self-dependence must give each
individual the right to choose his own surroundings.
he strongest reason for giving women
all the
opportunities for higher education, for the full
development of her faculties, her forces of mind
and body; for giving her the most enlarged
freedom
of thought and action; a complete
emancipation
from all forms of bondage, of custom, dependence,
superstition; from all the crippling influences
of fear; is the solitude and personal responsibility for her own individual life. The strongest
reason why we ask for woman a voice in the government under which she lives... is because of her
birthright to self-sovereignty...

While these concerns were not exclusive of all
feminists, they represent the primary characteristics of
of a dominant liberal discourse which continues to inform

feminist politics.

Classical liberal concerns are clearly

evident in contemporary liberal feminism, where the fight
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for suffrage has been
superceded by the fight for
the equal
rights amendment
Feminist calls for abortion
rights based
only on a principle of
possessive individualism reflect
Mill s concern with the
"sovereignty of the individual"
over mind and body.
"Contract" marriages reflect
the classical liberal conception of
conceptually distinct individuals
who have no inherent obligations
to each other or to the
social order save those which
are explicitly agreed upon.
The call to government to negotiate
and enforce discrimination suits reflects the conception
of the state as the
.

neutral arbitor of individual rights
and liberties.
Calls
for women's economic and personal
independence are reminiscent of the suffragist

s

insistence on freedom of oppor-

tunity, freedom of choice and freedom
for women to develop
their natural capacities through education
unfettered by

artificial social conventions which judge
them to be inferior
to men by simple virtue of their sex.
From the liberal perspective, the achievement
of

individuality and a self -development for men and
women
requires an essential freedom from social constraint,
pro-

tection of individual rights and the maintenance of an

inviolable private sphere.

In short,

liberal principles

should be sex-blind.

Contemporary liberal feminists define the goals
of the movement in the same terms as their historical

sisters.

As Betty Friedan characterizes the women's movement
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of the 70 's:

pation,

-In the first stage, our
aim „ as full participower and vorce in the
mainstream, inside the party,

the political process,

the professions, the
business world,

1,29

women were not to challenge
the terms of the debate,
but
be included in them:
"The first stage of the
women's
movement did not involve a new
mode of thought. Once we
broke through the feminine
mystique and said that women
were people, we merely applied
the abstract values of all
previous liberal movements ... and
(demanded) an equal share
of its rewards as previously
wielded and enjoyed by men." 30

Fnedan echoes the concerns

of Stanton that women

be treated as individuals rather
than by their "incidental"

relations to others when she demands
that women be allowed
"to find their own identity as separate
from men,

marriage,

and childrearing" so that they could
"take their own place,
as individuals in society." 31

Once recognized as free liberal individuals
women

could "demand equal opportunity with men, power
of their
own in corporate office, Senate chamber,
spaceship, ballfield, battlefield..." and fight "for our
equal opportunity
to participate in the larger work and decisions
of society

and the equality in the family that such participation

entails and requires." 32
While the forceful language of individual rights
to self-sovereignty has always provided the fuel for liberal

feminist analyses, the liberal framework has also limited
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feminist analysis in important
ways.

An internal tension

in liberal feminist analysis
became evident when feminists

turned their attention to
the family.
Liberal feminists,
from Mill to the present,
tested the limits of liberal
analysis when they turned an eye
to the politics of the
family and personal life.
The importance of family
relations to women's subordination
has been acknowledged throughout the development of feminist
thought.
For instance,

Mill damns oppressive family
relations throughout The
Su bjection of Women and argues
that "the superstructure
of free government cannot be
based upon a legal basis of
despotism on one side and subjection
on the other" in the
33
family
And in a letter to Susan B. Anthony,
Stanton
wrote, "I feel this whole question
of women's rights turns
on the point of the marriage relation,
and sooner or later
it will be the topic of discussion ." 34
Friedan's Feminine
My stique perhaps the most catalytic
work of the early
.

,

70 s,
'

targeted family relations as the primary trap
that

kept women from pursuing their independent
self-identities
in the public world.

But recognizing the unequal nature

of family relations and developing an adequate
analysis

and prescription for change are two different matters.

Once liberal feminists recognized family relations
as political,

that is, as important in the establishment

and maintenance of patriarchal power relations, they were

compelled to develop

a

strategy that could eradicate this

fundamental aspect of women's
oppression, within the
liberal framework, their
most logical strategic
option
was to hope that changes in
women's
legal status-such

as equitable divorce laws
and affirmative action
legislation-would have the power to transform
repressive familial
relations.
But recognition of the
politics of the family

without a concurrent redefinition
of politics and political
strategies for change have led
liberal feminists down a
difficult path.
From the early 70'

on feminists of all varieties

looked to the private dimensions
of women’s inequality
in psychological studies, sex
role socialization literature, consciousness-raising groups.
Indeed, a new sexual
politics developed that spoke to the
core of feminine
identity and to Fnedan’s "feminine
mystique".
How was
this sexual politics reconciled with
the classical liberal
view of the family as depoliticized?
In some important ways it hasn't been
reconciled

and this disjuncture has led many feminists
to cast aside
the liberal framework.

For others this dilemma led to

the extension of liberal values of contract
relations and

individualism into family life in what some have called
the

rationalization

of family life.

this internal tension in liberal

The resolution of

f eminism--between

the

need to view family relations as an important part of

women

s

oppression and the liberal commitment to

a

view
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of the family as ideally
depoliticized-will hold important
implications for liberal feminism
in both theory and
practice

The difficulty of comprehending
a sexual politics
Of the family through the
liberal lens is recognized,
however
dimly, by triedan in her
newest manifesto for the
women's
movement, The Second Stage.
Frie dan is frustrated
by the

movement's concentration on what
she calls "sexual politics"
for she feels that sexual
issues are diversionary

and battles

over them fruitless.

In drawing her critique she
illus-

trates well her acceptance of
the liberal division between
public and private life and a
liberal definition
of

politics—

and also shows the limitations
these commitments impose
on a feminist analysis.

Friedan posits

a

sharp distinction between "private"

sexual politics and the real battle
for women's equality.
The women's movement, she argues,
must avoid "getting locked
into obsolete power games and irrelevant
sexual battles
that can never be won..." 35 She goes on
to argue that
even in the 70 's, 36

many of us saw the extremist rhetoric or sexual
P°litics as a pseudo-radical cop-out from the
real and difficult political and economic battle
for women in society which would provide a
new basis for equality in the family.... We never
thought this revolution could be won in the bedroom.
The sexual politics was an acting-out of
rage that didn't really change anything. When
women's position in society changed, sex would
take care of itself.

—
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How does Friedan define
sexual politics?

She goes on: 37
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It is clear what

Friedan views as the "real"
battleground for women's equality.
She defines it always
in

opposition to sexual politics: 38
ier t0 fulminate
the male
chauvin?^ pig in your own against
chauvinist
bedroom and liberate
S
hS
issionar y Position than to
take
k
the
f
f°r ^
la
sc hool, get the union to
light
a t for
r parenting ?
leave, or lobby the state
-gislature to ratify the Equal Rights
Amendment.
Friedan can posit such a sharp
distinction between public
and private politics, and elevate
the former at the expense
of the latter, only because of
her complete acceptance
of the liberal definition of
politics and
power.

Real

power is found only in the public sphere
and is acquired
through formal legal rights. Women's
climb up the economic
ladder is dependent on winning this real
political power
and enacting laws to protect equal opportunity.

Because she sees formal legal rights as the key
to equal opportunity Friedan has a hard time
deciding whether

or not we've won "the first stage."
if we have,

won,

She often writes as

while paying lip service to battles not yet

like the E.R.A.

For instance, she fears that young

women will take our feminist victories for granted and
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risk losing the™ by not
taking threats from the
New Right
seriously enough.
it is interesting to
note that she never
warns these young women
that they may face
discrimination
or simple job market
segregation that laws, as
yet, have
not been able to touch.

Friedan's denigration of sexual
politics is indicative of the liberal inability
to understand the interconnections between private power
relations and public power
relations.
Indeed, we get the sense that
the private
battles that women fought in the
"bedroom" were more "games"
than struggles for real power
and control over our lives.
If Friedan is an easy target
it is only because

she states explicitly what is
implicit in most liberal

arguments: real politics and power
is equated with formal
legal rights and formal government.
Even as she recognizes
the inequities involved in family
relations, they remain,
the end, outside of the sphere
of politics, and as such
fade into the background when strategies
for change are
considered.
For Friedan, or more correctly from
the liberal

m

perspective, there truly is nothing to be won
"in the bedroom"
simply because power is located, by definition,
in the

public world.

As Zillah Eisenstein writes,

The definition of politics as government activity
makes it impossible for (Friedan) to view the
structural relations of women's lives--the family,
the sexual division of labor, sex-class oppression-as part of the political life of a society
The
liberal equation between publ i c power and po 1 i t ic
excludes the family from political analysis ...( and
excludes daily life activity from political analysis.
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Friedan argues that in the
second stage „e must change
the terms of the debate
and focus on "the larger
economic
and political situation
which affects both women
and men,
and which women now as
persons can actively affect ." 40
She calls for a redefinition
of the relationship between
home and work life" so that we
may achieve true "personhood
in society."
No longer should women or men
be forced
to

choose between family and career
or be expected to excel
at both in "superwoman" fashion.
In this sense she moves
beyond Mill by questioning women's
primary identification
as mother.
For Friedan, we have already
swung too far
in the opposite direction: women
have sacrificed the family
for careers and are now suffering
for it.
The problem with Friedan'

s

argument is that she

wants to change the terms of the debate
without challenging
the foundation upon which it is built.
She wants to transform our thinking about the private home
and the public
work without altering the conditions that
created this

division and then reified it as natural.
Rather than analyzing the foundations of this split
in the structural needs of both patriarchy as
well as

capitalism, she tends to view the problem of women's oppression as an ideological problem, or in other words, as a

problem of simply changing values and our ideas about home
and work.

The first stage involved a "quantum jump in

consciousness."

In the second stage,

from Friedan'
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point of view, the solution
is not so difficult:
"stripped
of polarizing rhetoric,
the practical problems
of restructuring home and work may
not be as difficult as
they now
42
seem."
The problem with Friedan's
analysis is two-fold.
First, while she wants to
recognize the afamilial and
sexual aspects of women's
oppression-in issues such as
abortion, rape, pornography,
sexual preference, and violence
against women- she always regards
these issues as secondary.
The reason for this, 1 believe,
is that she defines
politics
and power in traditional liberal
terms.
These issues simply
fall through her strict
categorization of "real" politics
and are viewed by her as secondary
or derivative of hierarchical relations in formal legal
rights and in the economy.
The second problem with Friedan's
analysis is that,
because she adopts a rather strict
distinction between
public and private life, she misunderstands
the connections
between women's formal political and economic
inequality
and women’s privatized position of
dependence in the family.
On the relationship between these two
sites of inequality

Friedan herself is unclear.

At times she implies that

formal equality can be achieved without

formation of private family relations.

a

fundamental trans-

At others she implies

that these private relations will "take care of themselves"

after women have won full political and economic
with men.

equality

This lack of clarity is rooted in her failure

to draw important
connections between

relations of inequality.
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assumption that women
wrll be unpaid primary
child-rearers then a full
and equal
integration of women into
the labor force will
never be
possible until a fundamental
transformation of family
relations takes place.
But rather than engage
in a "chicken and
egg" debat
with Fnedan, my more
important point is that
she will
be unable to understand
the dynamic relationship
between
public and private elements
of women's oppression
while
She holds to a public/private
distinction that views relations in the private sphere
as fundamentally
non-political
'

AS

—familial

relationships, no

matter how much power or
authority they involve, are
still
viewed as falling outside the
sphere of the political 43
Friedan's analysis is fettered
not by her own failures
but by the liberal definition
of public and private life
which pushes her, in the end,
towards a view of women's
position in the family as severed
from the "real" politics
of the public world.
.

Conclusions
Liberal theory's strict categorization
of public
politics and the private family masks
certain realities
about the nature of human beings in
general, and the nature

Of male/female power
relations in particular.

First

,

the liberal emphasis
on individualism and

the simultaneous
identification of the private
sphere as
3 " haVen " a9alnst
Which
power should not be exercised blinds us to the
fundamental sociality of
all human
beings.
Only as long as the
individual is conceived
of
as "conceptually distinct"
from or "logically prior
to"
society, could liberals
continue to talk about limiting
social interference into
private life, or protecting
the
individual from the intrusions
of society and other
human
beings.
If „ e come to view human
beings as social beings
by nature then we can no
longer maintain such a sharp
distinction.
If the formation of our
very identities as
individuals is based on and infused
with social relations
then it makes little sense to
talk about protecting the
individual from the interference of
others, for we are,
from the start, "interfered with."
As Jean Elshtain state:
"it is only in a private sphere
of highly charged intimate

relationships persisting over time that
the possibilities
for understanding are the greatest
and the greatest understanding is possible ." 44
By conceptually burying these social
relations
in the less visible private world
of the family we serve

to mask or mystify our fundamental
sociality.

Indeed,

our capacity to participate in a public world
of politics,
to negotiate and reason with others is based
in and created

37

by the relations of

Mutual reception and
intersub, active

understanding" that „e establish
first in f am il y U fe.«
The liberal emphasis on
individualism has also
mystified the ways in which
public social relations
affect
us even
our most private moments.
Feminists

m

have moved
towards a greater understanding
of this point as they
have
explored the depths of women's
subordinate in the psychological development of men
and women.
As we come

to understand how inequities in
women's legal and economic
status
inform our most intimate
relations we are pushed
toward
a view that can
understand the dynamic relation
between
public and private life, and
between the development of
individual identity and autonomy
and our collective identities.
We can draw the connection
between individual lives
and the impediments of our
social history.

In addition,

the public/private split devalues

those human characteristics that
are most closely associated
v/ith
women's nature" and the nature of
family relations.
Relations of mutual dependence and
nurturance, of a non-

instrumental sensitivity to the needs of
others, are relegated to private life and viewed as
somehow less important
than the worldly concerns of the public
sphere
(as if the

reproduction of the species was not a "worldly
concern"!).
In other words, liberalism elevates
the competitive
indi-

vidualism that is the hallmark of public activity in

a

liberal capitalist society as it denies the social
relations
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Of the Private world
that are the bas s
£or that
ualism.
It is exactly these
hinds of pr i vate
concernsm° rallty
to the needs of
others, non-instru.

'

mental relations of
mutuality
aiity

fhat- have
n
that
ostensibly been

out of liberal, and
Often feminist, politics.
Finally, the liberal
public/private split holds
important strategic
implications for liberal
feminists
because it i mp l les a rather
narrow view Qf poUtiog
political strategies. The
liberal feminist focus
on legal
rights as the hallmark of
political freedom and
equality
meant that once liberal
feminists recognized the
political
nature of family relations,
their strategies for
change
were inadequate.
Recognition of a politics of
the family
Without a simultaneous
redefinition of political
strategies
for change have led liberal
feminists down a conflictridden path.

^

AS Jo Freeman states,

in her implicit recognition

limits to legalistic solutions
to women's oppression 46
,

mi

lnOVe," ent

haS several significant
issues chnd
ld care
abor
tion, and especially
?
ihf k
00
f SeX ~ role stereotypes
and the
tradition
?
traditional
roles-on
which there are no civil
rights precedents.
Here the movement ... will
n °t find the going so easy.
,

'

i

^

The idea that women's primary
responsibility for childrearing and traditional sex roles
could be transformed
through the establishment of "legal
precedent" displays
a

distinct unself-consciousness about the
resistance liberal
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thought would pose to state
"interference" into private
life (in the service of
women's equality,
no less) and

naivete about the neutrality
of the liberal state.
In important ways we
need to expand our
definition
Of politics in order to
be able to comprehend
and critically
analyze some of the most
important and personal
aspects
a

of women's inequality.

politics

By expanding our
definition of

am not suggesting that we
simply enlarge our
idea of what areas of life
should legitimately be
regulated
by the state.
Such a proposal is the target,
rightfully,
of advocates of the New
Right, who often claim that
the
I

inevitable extension of liberal
feminist politics would
be the direct government
regulation of family affairs (the
establishment of a Department of the
Family??).

The problem is that there is a
kernel of truth
to the New Right accusations.
If we simply remain within
the liberal definition of politics
then we may well end
up with extension of government
power into areas of life

traditionally reserved for women.

By failing to challenge

the liberal definition of politics—
with its emphasis on

legalistic solutions to social problems— and by
failing
to question the sex neutrality of the
state liberal feminists

have ended up advocating mechanistic solutions
to women's
inequality.

By dismissing too easily the heart-felt fears

of women active in the New Right--fears of state
control
of intimate relations

— liberal

feminists have failed to
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learn a healthy skepticism
of state power
a highly organized
bureaucratic

especially of

state.

Very often the solutions
put forth by liberal
feminists simply extend the
instrumental rationality of
the public world into the
home.
This should hardly represent feminism's vision of
the future.
Friedan recognizes
the threat to personal
freedom that mechanistic
strategies
for change pose and here
I think she is
worth quoting at
length for both her insights
and her limitations 47
The founding fathers of this
wrong when they wrote into therepublic were not
Bill of Rights
°f certain basic areas
o? privacy
for
V1
conscience, exempt from the
staterss control,
state
^oni ? even if, in the
guaranteed such rights of privacy beginning thev
only fo?' people
who were men.
Surely it is politically unwise
°.seem to threaten that area of
inviolate sexual
C
S
°f
eff ° rt t0 S
the^e
bas!c riaht;
igt ? or women. Tactics that smack of
s exuai exhibitionism,
like the lesbians' balloons
at th e National Women's Conference
at Houston..
Sl ° ganS * ike " sexua l preference",
distort
the blVi
PrinC1P 67 thSy SSem to invade th at very
right ofr privacy for which we fight.
:

K?

/

^

™

.

Though Friedan 's concerns are legitimate,
the very serious
problem here is that she throws the baby
out with the bath
water because she lacks the conceptual

tools to do otherwise.

If feminists fail to address seemingly
private issues such

as sexuality and reproductive freedom
(in all its variations)

then we will end up with purely symbolic
victories.
It is important to note that improvements
in women's

legal status have come hand in hand with increases
in vio-

lence against women in their homes and on the streets,

With continued destructive
objectification of women's
sexuality in the media, with
what now seems like a
tripleday of work for most working
mothers, and with the
psychological damage engendered by
women's conflict-ridden
P osit
between traditional sex role
requirements and the new
corporate image of the "free"
woman.
Changes
in the legal

status of women and strategies
aimed at state-sponsored
solution to women's oppression
will at best be inadequate
and will at worst lend itself
to cooptation and/or the
potential for repressive state
policies that further in-

stitutionalize women's inequality.

There is a lesson to

be gleaned from liberal theory
and it is one that feminist
of all varieties have not taken
seriously enough: the

repressive potential or organized state
power should make
any progressive movement skeptical
of state-sponsored
solutions for change. My point here is
not to argue that

the state represents only the interests
of rich white males
or that the state is incapable of
supporting progressive

social policies for women, but to argue
that liberal feminists in particular have all too often
uncritically accepted
a

view of the state as "sex neutral."
vVhat

is needed is not just a rethinking of liberal

assumptions about human nature, the nature of politics
or the state, but a comprehensive historical study of
the

relationship of the state to women's oppression.
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The case studies that follow
this chapter will
be the beginnings of such
a study.
My case study Qf
workers will be important,
for instance, because
it points
to the tension between
the classical liberal
commitment

^

to non-interference in the
private realm of family
relations

and feminist analyses that
have come to view relations
inside that private sphere as
one foundation of women's
oppression. On the other hand my
study of protective
legislation will question whether
the liberal state has
fact kept to the cultural
commitment to the public/private
split.
Both studies will, I believe,
provide an opportunity
to view the relationship between
liberal theory and practice,
and to understand the state's
interest, if indeed

m

it has

an interest,

in regulating familial relationships
and women's

labor both inside and outside of the
home.

The "thread"

that will guide my research will be the
question of what
place the language of public and private
life has played
in state policy and what effect this
has had on women's

subordinate position in society.
IS complete will

I

Only after such research

be able to assess the role the state

has historically played in regard to patriarchal
power

relations

CHAPTER

II

BETWEEN HOME AND FACTORY:
HOMEWORKERS
OF NEW YORK,

1900-1914

While contemporary analysts are
busy documenting
women's recent entrance into
the workforce, scholars of
women's labor history are busy
proving that we have always
been there.
Labor historians have traditionally
underplayed— or simply neglected-the role
of women in the paid
labor force.
Recent revisions of women's labor
history
have gone far to right this neglect,
but still have some
distance to go. One important area,
for instance, that
remains relatively unexplored is the
employment of married
women.
I believe that this is
partially due to
the fact

that an important source of employment
for married women-homework- -remains "hidden from history."

Homework- - the industrial employment of women
at
home to produce or finish goods for a
manufacturer or con-

tractor— was one of the main forms

of employment for married

women at the turn of the twentieth century.

Recent evidence

has indicated that it still may be a significant
source
of income for married women.

Yet contemporary homeworkers

like their historical sisters, remain virtually invisible.
If we are to construct an accurate history of women's
42
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participation in the labor force
(or for that matter,
an
accurate account of women's

lives in general) then
we must
explore in depth the employment
of women as homeworkers.
addition, because these industrial
workers cross
the line between the home
and the factory, they can
provide
us with a unique look
at the interaction of
family and
work life and provide new insights
into recent debates
about the relationship of patriarchy
to industrial capital-

m

ism.

Introduction
According to the thirteenth U.S.
Census there were
over one and a half million immigrants
living
in New York

City in 1910.
were women.

Roughly 770,000 of this immigrant
population
Yet only 280,000 of these women were
recorded

by the census as being

gainfully employed" in 1910.^

Labor historians have always assumed that
the remaining

women— nearly half

a rnillion--survived on the incomes
of

their fathers or husbands and were not a formal
part of
the paid labor force.
My research has led me to believe

otherwise.

Rather, many of these women earned a wage through

the homework system and formed an integral part
of the

labor force.

The purpose of this chapter will be to doc-

ument the existence of this large yet unacknowledged sector
of the labor force; to trace its development in key indus-

tries in New York City; to examine the relationship of
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homeworkers to organized iabor,
social reform movements
and state policy of the
time; and to understand
the implications of my research for
women's
labor history.

Between 1907 and 1909, nearly
600,000 southern
Italian immigrants settled in
New York City's manufacturing
district below 14th Street. 2
Many manufacturers employed
this immigrant population to
produce or finish goods outside
the factory.
This kind of employment was
known as "homework."
involved the industrial employment
of married women
and their children in their
tenement homes.
The homework
was handed out at the factory,
taken home and worked on,
and returned to the factory the
following day where it
was paid for by the piece.
This work primarily involved
the sewing of garments, making
of artificial flowers and
feathers, sorting and cleaning of coffee
beans and nuts,

^

the making of human hair wigs,
hat-making, cigar-rolling,
and lace and embroidery work.
But in all, over one hundred

different items were produced (under contract
from

a manu-

facturer) by these women and children in
their tenement

homes

2

Because the historical data on homeworkers is at
best partial,

I

have had to approach my research from

number of different angles in order to gain

a

a

clear picture

of how many women were engaged in this type of work,
the

conditions under which they labored, and the reasons why
they chose this type of work.

While City, State, and Federal
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reports contain statistics
on women gainfully
employed
outside the home, no category
existed for recording
data
on piecework done in the
"sanctity" of the home.
Many
of the sources I have
used only incidentally
provide infor-

mation on homeworkers.

For instance, following
the Triangle
fire, studies made by the
State of New York into
factory
health and safety conditions
contain sections on tenements
occupied by homeworkers.
Because it was feared that
tubercuosis and other infectious diseases
were being spread to
the wealthier classes through
contact with artificial
flowers, fancy nuts, coffees,
garments, and other articles
worked on in the tenements, the
Consumer Protection League
investigated the health of some of the
home manufacturers
of these goods. The National
Child Labor Committee, in
their campaign for protective child
labor legislation,

documented widespread employment of children
as homeworkers.
Labor unions, such as the Cigarmakers,
Capmakers, and

Garment workers, saw homework as cheapening
the standard
of labor for organized factory workers
and therefore engaged
in their own investigations of homework.
Authors
specif-

ically interested in working women of the time,
such as

Mary VanKleek and Edith Abbott, make mention
of homeworkers
in their larger studies of the condition of
working women.

Collectively, these sources provide rich evidence of the

predominance of homework during this time period.
My research has led me to believe that over 250,000
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immigrant women were employed
as homeworkers in New
York
City in 1911.
My estimate was established
as follows
in 1911

there were 13,268 tenement
buildings licensed by
the city for homework. 4
Each of these tenements
contained
a (conservative) average
of ten families.
It
is safe to

assume that at least one woman
in each licensed dwelling
(or tenement apartment) was
engaged in homework.
All

investigative reports on homework
for this time period
indicate that only about half of
the tenements visited
by investigators were licensed.
I have attempted
to correct
for the number of unlicensed
tenements by doubling the
official number. My very conservative
estimate is that
26,536 tenement buildings contained
homeworkers with approximately ten families occupying each
tenement.

This gives

me a rough total of 265,360 women
engaged in homework in
New York City alone in 1 91
it should be noted here that
this figure does not include the children
who often worked
with their mothers.
1

In addition,

.

the licensing system (which will be

explained later) seriously underestimated the
number of

homeworkers because the
homework.

lav/

did not cover all forms of

While only forty-one articles were covered by

the licensing system,

investigators found that over one

hundred items were worked on by homeworkers in New York
City.

For instance, embroidery and lace work--one of the

largest employers of homeworkers

— did

not require licensing.
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While there exists no
irrefutable empirical data
on homeworkers for this
period, there are a number
of ways
of verifying my figures.
Elizabeth Watson,
in a 1912 in-

vestigation in New York City,
documented the existence
of 51 500 homeworkers in
the embroidery
,

trade alone and

estimated that the number might
be twice that if all
manufacturers of embroidery had been
registered with the city.
She estimates, also, that the
total number of homeworkers
would be at least 125,000 in
New York. 6
a related
report, Felix Adler, then chairman
of the National Child
Labor Committee, stated, "in the
embroidery trade alone
there are 61,000 out-workers.
Sixty-one thousand in one

m

trade.

In the crochet trade one
manufacturer gives work

outside of this factory to 2,000,
another to 600, and so
on, so that Miss Watson estimates
that it

would be conser

vative to say that there are 125,000
out-workers in the
city.

7

Wmle
a

exact figures may evade us, my research
makes

number of important trends immediately
clear.

homeworkers constituted

a

First,

very large and important part

of the labor force during this period.

Perhaps no other

major sector of the labor force has gone so
unnoticed by
labor historians.

I

will explore the reasons for this

negligence in depth later.

For now,

it need only be noted

that, whatever the exact figure, homework was a primary

source of employment for married women and formed the

foundation of many major
industries in New York City
at
this time.
Second, my figures challenge
fundamental myths
about the employment of
women and in particular,
the employ
mSnt ° f marrled Italian
«»en during this time period.
My figure doubles the
commonly accepted number of
working
immigrant women in New York City
in 1910 and increases
by 50% the total number
of working women.
As Louise
Odencrantz pointed out in 1919,
contrary to popular belief,
Italian women ranked second as
contributors to the family’
budget among all immigrant
nationalities in 1910. 8 And
married Italian women were employed
more often than Poles
or Russian Jewish wives and
were just as likely to be employed (outside the home) as German
or Irish wives,
in
1911

at least one-third of all Italian
wives in New York

City were employed outside the home.

9

These figures, taken

together with my figures on the employment
of women as
homeworkers- -which were not included in
the above calcu-

lations— paint

a

picture of the work life of the Italian

woman quite different from popular belief.
As noted above, most homeworkers were
married

immigrant women.

Most were also between the ages of 25

and 45 and had young children to care for. 10

In addition,

almost all of these women had husbands who lived
at home.
Many of these men, entering the city around the turn
of
the century, could find work only as day-labourers
on city
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construction sites, railroads,
streets, or sewers.
The
tremendous influx of i mm i
grants lnto the clty
before
created a labor market where
competition was heavy

^

and

work was scarce.

Work for a day-labourer
was sporadic,
and no work due to bad
weather, lay-offs,
injuries, or

illness all meant no pay.

As the husband of one
homeworker

stated in 1913, "when the
weather is not too cold,
or the
sun too hot, or the rain
too wet, then there is
work." 11
While these men could earn a
subsistence wage when employed,
often they were unemployed
for at least one-third of
the
year.
In general, this meant
that the family could not
survive by the father's work
alone.
As a consequence,
their wives and children found
employment as homeworkers
in order to ensure that the
family could survive throughout
the year.
M ajor Characteristi c s of the
Homework System

By far, the largest number of
homeworkers were

found in the men's ready-made clothing
industry.

The garment

industry itself employed one-fourth of
all industrial workers
in New York City in 1905. 12
And this industry was
one

of the largest employers of women in
New York. 13

While

the machine operating work, and the basting
and pressing
of garments was done in the factory,

the more labor-intensive

process or hand-finishing was done by homeworkers.
Garment finishers primarily worked on men's coats
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and pants.

Coat finishing involved
turning under and
stitching the lining to the
cloth of the garment
at the
armholes, bottom, and neck,
and sewing on the
undercollar.
Usually the finisher had
to pull out the basting
threads.
This simple part of the
work was often performed
by the

younger children of homeworkers.
ishing coats varied from two
and

The price rate for fina

half to twenty-five

cents per coat. 14

The finisher of pants had
to line the
pants at the waist, stitch the
lining at the top, tack
it at the pocket, fell the
pocket to the seam, turn up
and baste the bottoms, and
since they had no zippers,
she
had to sew on the buckles and
the buttons.
The average
pay rate for pants was five
cents a pair. The homeworker,
therefore, could make an average
of 23 cents per suit,

Which would then sell at retail for
$20 to $25.
An entire
family could rarely earn more than
70 cents a day at garment
finishing.
While the garment industry in New York
was dominated
by Jewish and Italian workers in
the factory, Italian women
monopolized the finishing of garments at home.
One U.S.
Senate investigation of the time reported
that 98% of all

finishing of garments was done by Italian
homeworkers and
their children.
A New York State report confirms that
the Hebrew

trade.

and.

the Italian" are predominant in the garment

"The Italian woman working in her tenement has

absorbed ninety-five percent of the so-called home finishing

in New York Ci ty

.

.

.

Finishing amounts tQ
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^

Of the work on a garment
but owing to the low
wages paid
in this class of work
the price
h -Lf-e is aoout
about- „„
one-seventh of
the price for the entire
garment.
The Italian home
finisher
works for about two-thirds
of the price which
other nationalities formerly received
for the same work and,

where
formerly ten to fourteen
cents was paid for finishing,
the Italian does the same
work for five to seven
cents." 17
In the garment industry,
therefore, we find both
an ethnic and sexual
division of labor. As one
investigator
stated, despite the prevailing
tendency "for the employees
to be recruited from the
same race as the foreman,"
in
the clothing industry Jewish
foremen tended to hire Italian
women exclusively for homework.
As the report states,
no matter how great the poverty,
the Hebrew men seldom
allow the women of their family
to do the (clothing) work
at home, even though they may
have been shop workers before
marriage." 18 Prior to 1900, apparently,
Jewish women did
predominate in garment homework, but
after that time, with
the lowering of wages and the
immigration of large numbers
of Italians, Italian women
predominated.
For instance,
in one canvass of almost 500
homeworkers made in 1908,
no Russian Jews were found.

1

9

Because of the seasonal nature of the industry,

garment finishers worked an average of 220 days

a year.

These women had to make the most of the busy
season, and
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took as many garments as
they could secure and
worked unlimited hours during the
seven months when they
could find
work.
As the Report on Women
and Child ^earners
of

states 20

1911

ihus to say that a certain
per cent of
women worked eight hours pe?
dav
per day, means that some
Sme
bliween the ?ime
of rising and going to
bed thev out -in in'
manY
hours sewing on garments.
In more than n^n
out of ten the work is
S
interrupted by the prepar-

i Lk

H

»

r

eight hours a day' on the work
For the homeworker who has these duties,
part of the work is
generally perrormed after the
point of J-arigue
fatigue
has been reached...
As this quote illustrates,

the homeworker was subject
to

the most extreme form of the
"double day."

imagine what

a

One can only

day was like for the many women
who put

in fourteen to sixteen hours
a day at homework.
As in all forms of homework,
wages differed dra-

matically between those working at home
and those in the
factory.

On the average, women in the garment
industry

earned $6.00
$3.60.

a week,

while homeworkers could earn only

It should be noted that this figure
represented

the work of more than one labourer, for many
children worked

with their mothers at home.

21

The justification for paying

homeworkers 60% of what factory workers earned will
be

discussed later.
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Clearly homeworkers could
not survive only on
this
meager income— and most
did not.
More than
88% of home-

workers in the garment
industry had husbands who
were
present in the home. As
noted earlier, these men
were
unemployed for one-third of
the year.
But when employed
rhey could earn between
ten and twelve dollars
a week.

While homeworkers were also
unemployed for one-third of
tne year, due to the
seasonal nature of the
industries
they worked for, the combined
income of the husband and
wife kept most families from
starvation.
Although the
wages of homeworkers were small,
it would be misleading
to think of their income
as simply "supplementary"
to their
band s income.
Rather, wages from homework
provided
a basis for subsistence
that was necessary for the
material
survival of the family. Moreover,
the presence of these
women at home played an important
role in maintaining
the

psychological and cultural stability
of the family.
Another large group of immigrants,
98% of them
Italians, found work making artificial
flowers for hat

manufacturers who used the flowers to decorate
ladies'
hats and Easter bonnets.
The starching,

dyeing, cutting,

and the final process of branching
(or designing) the

artificial flowers was done in the factory.

Over 75% of

all the artificial flowers made in the U.S.
in 1910 were

produced in New York City; at least half of these
were
produced by flower homeworkers. 22

The flower maker first
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pulled the pre-cut patterns
of rose,
rose violet,
v ioW
or poppy petals
apart.
This was the simplist
part of the wort and
often
Children as young as four
years old oould help with
this
wort.
The petals were then
slipped up the stem and
oinehed
lnt ° Place abOUt the "***>"
or bud which forned the
center
Of the flower, and
sometimes leaves were also
pasted on
the stem.
One investigator found the
Rapallo family at work
on artificial flowers in
their two room apartment.
Their
rate of work and pay represent
the average for a flowermaking family.
The Rapallo's made 18,000
violets in a
week for which they were paid
$4.50.
Mrs. Rapallo was
30 years old, had seven children,
and was from southern
Italy.
As she said to the investigator,
"We get 15 cents
a bunch for this kind of
flowers and we can make five
bunches
a day (1440 flowers) if they
(her children) all
work.

But 75 cents a day's not much,
with rent $11.00 a month,
and seven children who always
want to eat." Her husband,
she said, "had no work for two
years." 23
As another homeworker said,

we want to earn anything." 24

"We all must work if

The rate of work and the

flexibility" of the wages paid in this industry
are well

illustrated by the following quote from one
experienced

homeworker in the flower trade: 23
You can't count home work by the day, for a day
is really two days sometimes, because people
oiten work half the night. When the boss asks me

55

how many flowers
cannot tell, but

can make in a dav I
T
know how many I can do
°
U
SOI " e .9irls are so
foolish?*"^*,
heard them
the praising themselves
and belli™ in
boss that they did the
work in a day ^he
ashamed to say they worked
half the
tnn®
u
tney only hurt themselves,
for the hoc
that ™ uch iA *
I
I

•

^

sk

izvn:

On the average, flower
makers could earn between
sixty
cents and one dollar a
day-for a woman working with
the
help of at least three
26
children.

Like that of so much other
homework, the demand
for artificial flowers was
seasonal.
From April to October
there was no work.
In the busy season, a family
with more
than three workers could earn
$4.90 a week, which was
approximately 60% of what a factory
worker doing exactly
the same work could earn. 27
Invariably, children did homework
with their mothers,
primarily because the low rate of
pay required many busy
hands.
In almost every form of homework
boys worked with
their mothers until they were eleven
or twelve; then they
would get jobs as errand or newspaper
boys
on the street.

Girls, on the other hand, continued
doing homework until
they could find work in a factory,
usually when they turned
sixteen or seventeen. Many of these older
daughters, once

employed outside the home, would help with the
homework
when they got home or would bring additional
homework with
them when they returned at night.

In this way,

employers

could avoid prosecution for working girls overtime in
the
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factory, for work done in
the home was exempt
from labor
regulations.
This form of overtime
work occurred in any
trade adapted in any of
its processes to homework.

Milliners also used feathers,
as well as flowers,
to decorate ladies' hats.
The sweeping artificial
ostrich
feathers (up to four feet
long), which were the
fashion
around 1910, were made in
tenements located
in the Italian

districts of the Upper East
Side.
was from March to June, and

The season for feathers

from September to December.

The feather maker was employed
at "willowing" which
consisted
Of tying to every flue or
filmy strand of a good ostrich

feather two strands stripped from
inferior ostrich feathers. 28
In 1907, when the trade
started in New York City, few
knew
how to willow and fifteen cents
was paid per inch of knots.
The following season, as more
workers learned the trade
and as Italians began to dominate
the industry, the price
went down to 13 cents an inch.
It successively dropped
to 11 cents, 9 cents, 7 cents, 5
cents, and
in 1910,

3

cents an inch.

One plume bringing

tained 8,613 knots. 29
from $8.50 to $25.00.

3

to

cents an inch con-

The feather sold at retail anywhere

One homeworker reported that she

had to work one and a half to two days
in order to earn
72 cents for one finished plume.

In one newspaper,

during a two week period in 1911,

there were 205 advertisements for women to take work
home--

almost fifteen ads per day.

Contrary to what one might
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expect, finishers of clothing
were never advertised
for,
and flower makers were
rarely advertised for.
According
to Elizabeth Watson, who
made this survey, "The
absence
of advertisements for
workers in the predominating
tenement

trades indicates, significantly
enough, that these trades
are well established in
the homes, the source of
supply
for such work is well known
to the workers and the
applicants
f ° r W ° rk are more than
ec3 u al to the demand
for workers." 31
A pattern begins to emerge
as to the life/work
cycle of these immigrant women.
As a young child, one
would be expected to contribute
to the family income through
homework.
As a 16-20 year old woman,
one could look forward
to employment in a factory.
And, as one approached marital
age, the chances of remaining
in the factory dropped dramatically.
As The Report on Women and Child
Wage-Earners
indicated, "Between 18 and 22 the changes
in the force are
so rapid that less than half of
the number of females employed at the age of 18 are found employed
at 22

.

T^e

findings of this five-city survey of the
garment trade
are significant, for they corroborate
surveys which indicate
that most homeworkers were between 25 and
45 years old.

Presumably at marriage, these women would drop
out oi public view as wage-earners and continue
to earn
a

wage as homeworkers.

This also indicates that the peak

wage-earning power of most women was concentrated in the
few short years from age 16 to 20.

Once married, the new-
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found social status of
these women as mothers
served to
drive down their earning
power as homeworkers.

m

addition, the low pay-rate
for homework, coupled
with the wife's new-found
responsibilities for care of
the family, could not have
provided the same sense of
"independence" women in the factory
might experience by
earning a wage. As one author
states. 33

unlike many of her sisters of
other races the
WOman by going to work does not
achieve
that^ec
n e endenCe Whl ° h iS
° ften thought
to be the°rtief 1 ? e lm
P ellin 9 the modern woman
to take up
no a^ gainful
?
occupation
in this wav
fhp
P ara<J °*ical position o/
simul tane
simultaneous
wage-earning and dependence.
Homeworkers- -as the name itself
implies-were literally
caught between the home and the
factory— fulfilling both
the needs of the traditional family
for a "proper" mother
and the demands of industrial
capitalism for cheap and
"flexible" labor.

h

^^^

The high turn-over rate indicated
by the above

figures certainly worked to the advantage
of manufacturers—
in employing women both in the
factory and at
home.

one manufacturer frankly admitted,

As

"I want no experienced

girls (to work in my shop), they know the pay
to get... but
these greenhorns ... they cannot speak English and
they don't

know where to go and they just come from the old
country
and

I

let them work hard,

like the devil, for less wages." 34

Older women in the factories might demand fairer wages;
older women at home could not.

Scattered throughout the
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tenements of New York, hired
on a day to day basis,
and
caught between the need
to earn a living and
demands of
Childcare, these women had
little option but to
accept
whatever wage was offered.
As Rheta Childe Dorr
stated
in
homework "exists because the
manufacturer finds
it economical to spread
his finishing processes
through
thousands of kitchens. .. .They
get their work done for
P actically nothing.
That is why homework
exists.

While paying homeworkers an
average of 6* an hour,
manufacturers could also save the
expense of renting,
heating and lighting a workplace.
The expense of direct
supervision of workers was easily
replaced by the discipline
enforced by circumstance. Competition
for homework
was

enough to insure high rates of
return for manufacturers.
In addition, factory owners
could subvert almost every
form of labor protection through
the use of homeworkers.
When shop workers went on strike,
homeworkers could be
employed to make up the slack. While
labor regulations
prohibited the employment of children under
14 and the

overtime work of women, homework could be
given out at
unregulated rates.
During the busy season, homeworkers
could be employed by the thousand, only to be
dismissed
at the slightest downturn in trade.

The insecurity fos-

tered by irregular work compelled the homeworker to
produce
at a rate Lhat often exceeded human endurance,
during the

busy season.

tempts to Regul a te Homework
bocial Reform Movements

ij t

—

The

evils" of the homework
system were well-documented by social reformers
of the time.
It is telling
the main concerns
expressed in every investigation
made daring this time period.
Without exception, two
main
concerns infused the study
of homework: the concern
over
labor and the rear of
spreading infectious disease.
Both concerns, while worthy
in and of themselves,
demonstrate an essential lack of
sensitivity to the condition
Of homeworkers themselves,
and a level of analysis
that
failed to reach the true causes
of these conditions.

Homeworkers lived in the crowded
tenement districts
located near the factories and
workshops on which
they

depended for a livelihood.

In 1894,

New York's East Side

included thirty-two acres on which
32,000 people lived—
a density of one thousand
people per acre.
Even Prague,
known for the worst ghettos in Europe,
had only 485 people
per acre at its worst. 36 The usual
living apartment
in

the New York tenement had two or
three small rooms; in

these lived families with as many as
eight or nine children
It is estimated that 95% of the
immigrant families lived

with more than three people in a room,
while six in one
room was not uncommon.
There were at least 100,000 tenemen
rooms in New York City with no window, even
onto an air
shai.L or an

adjoining room; only one in four had any direct
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sunlight; the rest had
windows which opened onto
an alley
or stagnant air shaft. 33

Maintaining good health in
these cramped, dark,
and unsanitary living
quarters was difficult
at best.

Infectious diseases spread easily
under these conditions,
and ordinary childhood
diseases often brought death.
Italian children had a death
rate almost five times
that
of the entire city as a
whole from measles, and the
highest
mortality rate from scarlet fever
38
and whooping
cough.

Overall, the death rate of
children under five years of
age in double decker tenements
ran up as high as 204 per
thousand. 39

Tuberculosis reached almost epidemic
proportions
under these circumstances.
It has been estimated that
homeworkers living in the Italian
district of New York
City were fourteen times more likely

to die from tubercu-

losis as people living in the upper
income neighborhoods
across from Central Park. 40
In addition to garment finishing,

flower and feather

making and lace, and embroidery work,
homeworkers also
orten earned a wage picking through coffee

beans and shel-

ling and cleaning nuts for fancy restaurants
in Manhattan.

Members of the Consumer's League of New York were
particularly appalled, and rightfully so, to find homeworkers
with infectious diseases cracking nuts with their teeth.

Accounts of infectious homeworkers using the coats sent
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home for finishing as bed
covering at night abound
in eyewitness accounts reported
by horrified investigators.
Time and again, scrupulously
detailed reports of "diseaseridden" homeworkers are
attested to in State and City
reports
The following excerpt is
typical:
"One home finisher had
a little boy suffering
from whooping cough, when
he had
a coughing spell the
mother thrust her finger
down his
throat in an effort to relieve
him... the mother wiped her
fingers, covered with mucus,
on the pants on which
she

was at work." 41

While social reformers documented
the unhealthy
conditions under which homeworkers
lived, they did so most
often from the point oi view of
the consumer.
Rarely did
reports recognize the hazards to
homeworkers themselves
rrom working on infected garments
or foods.
What one finds
instead is concern over the unsanitary
nature of the "work
room" where the goods were produced,
without any recognition
or the fact that these same places
were the homes of workers.
When these reports are not expressing
concern
for the

infection of the consumer, they are bemoaning
the degraded
state of the child homeworker.
The Child Labor Committee of New York often
joined

with the Consumer's League in attempts to
eliminate homework.

These organizations characterized the Italian
homeworker

m

particular as the worst offenders of child labor laws.

One 1912 article entitled "The Child Who Toils At Home"

63

leveled sweeping criticism
at hcmeworkers who
benefited
from the work of their
42
children:
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By attacking the symptom
rather than the cause
Of these conditions,

social reformers often
threatened

the economic survival of
these families.

They failed to

see that children were employed
because their families
could not survive on such low
wages without them.
Furthermore,

the point of view expressed by
many of these accounts
demonstrates an ethnocentrism common
among social workers
of the time.
American social workers accustomed
to the
"modern" conception of childhood could
hold no sympathy
for those who believed that children
were responsible for

contributing to the economic survival of
the family under
anY circumstance. Such an idea was common
among rural

southern Italian immigrants, and was reinforced
by necessity once these immigrants had settled in
43
New
YOrk

Attempts to Regulate Homework
Organized Labor
At the turn of the century, a growing number of

factory workers were organizing themselves into unions.
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union members saw homeworkers
as cheapening labor,
or worse,
as scabs.
When factory workers
struck for higher wages
and oetter conditions,
manufacturers could simply
continue
production through the use of
homeworkers. The difficulty
Of organizing homeworkers
is indicated by the
strike of
cigar homeworkers in 1877.
Samuel Gompers notes in
his
memoirs the disastrous failure
of this strike.
Not only
aid the striking workers
lose their jobs.
They also lost
their homes, for the manufacturers
who employed them also
owned the buildings in which they
lived and quickly evicted
over one thousand families,
replacing them with new immigrants who would work for even
lower wages. 4 4

Beginning in
Union waged

1

874,

the Cigaririakers International

public campaign decrying the evils
of homemade cigars, stressing the unsanitary
quality of cigars
rolled in "TB-ridden" tenements, and
condemning the widespread use of child labor in homework. 45
This campaign
resulted
the passage of the first piece of
legislation
prohibiting homework in 1884. But the law
was quickly
a

m

cnallenged by cigar manufacturers in the
courts and within
four months ruled unconstitutional in the
Jacobs Decision
of the New York State Court of Appeals. 45

The act would

have prohibited the manufacture of tobacco
products in

tenement houses in cities with

a

population of 500,000

or more on the basis that such production was a
threat
to public health.

The court decision ruled that "the health
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of the tenement population
is not Jeopardized by
the manufacture of cigars in those
houses"” and therefore
declared
that the act exceeded the
police powers of the state
of
New York.
The legislation and the
court decision were
significant, for they marked
the beginning of a fifty
year
period in which no legislation
would be judicially upheld
that directly prohibited
homework £er se.
instead, legislation would be limited to
issues of public health,
and
homework laws took the form of
sanitary and health regulations

Finding the courts unsympathetic
to their cause,
the Cigarmakers turned to
direct economic action as a
way
of eliminating homework in
the cigar
industry.

They contin-

ued their public campaign against
the "infectious" cigars
and instituted the first union
label campaign to distinguish
home-made from factor-made cigars.
Playing on the fear
or tuberculosis, the cigar-makers
greatly reduced the number
of cigar homeworkers.
In addition, the union also made
the abolition of homework a demand
in their strikes and

boycotts.

As evidenced by state and city reports,
by 1912

almost all cigar-making was strictly confined
to formal

manufacturing.
The United Garment Workers of America soon
joined
the fight against homework.

Like the cigar workers, their

first line of attack was to institute the union label
and
to incorporate the abolition of homework into strike
demands.
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While legislation had been
effectively employed to
reduce
the number of sweatshops
in New York, this
legislation
did not formally apply to
homeworkers.
Anti-sweatshop
legislation made sharp distinctions
between the workshops
located in tenements and the
living quarters of
homeworkers.
The latter were subject only
to sanitary and health
regu-

lations 48

The garment workers were not
as successful as the
Cigarmakers in their campaign to
eliminate homework.
The
specialized division of labor in
the garment trade-which
broke the production of a garment
into almost 150 different
operations- -made the industry particularly
suited to the

emloyment of home finishers.

m

As noted earlier, homeworkers

this industry performed only a
fraction of the labor
on each garment.
This made it exceedingly difficult
to

distinguish between shop-made and home-made
garments, unlike
the production of cigars.
Often, clothing produced in
a union shop could be sent out
to homeworkers
for final

finishing and then sent back to the shop
to be labeled
"union made."

One investigator who found homeworkers

working on pants reported that "the pants bore
the label
of a prominent Broadway firm.
a

Each pair had, in addition,

white cotton label sewed in, bearing the name of the

clothing union.

The introduction of machinery into

the clothing trade served to increase, rather than
decrease,
the number of home finishers a manufacturer might employ.
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With increased production
in the shoo
Pr factory owners
required
from two to four homeworkers
to finish the work of
one
machine operator
The very nature of the
production
process itself-that is, the
increase in production
rates
with the introduction of
machinery and the very
specialized
division of labor in this
industry— worked against the
garment
workers in their attempts to
eliminate homework.

Abolition of homework in

a

particular industry

generally reflected the level of
organization and militancy
Of its unionized workers.
The only effective way of
limiting homework was through
direct economic
action.

The first

union to successfully demand the
elimination of homework
was the United Cloth Hat and
Capmakers Union. After a
thirteen-week strike in the Winter of
1904-1905 in New
York City, the union won an
agreement with the owners to
eliminate all trade with sweatshops
and homeworkers.
The

International Ladies Garment Workers, after

a

1910 strike

in New York City, were able to win
elimination of homework
in the women’s clothing industry.
This provision was then

incorporated into every subsequent strike
settlement.
For this reason, I found little evidence
of homework in
the women's clothing trade.

By contrast,

in the men's

ready-made clothing industry, where unionization wasn't
achieved until 1914 (with the establishment of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers), homework continued to flourish
openly.

Save for restrictions imposed by these few strongly
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unionized industries, homework
remained alive and largely
51
unregulated.

Attempts to Regulate HomewnrV__
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Under pressure from social
reformers and organized
abor, New York State established
the homework licensing
system in 1892.
The New York Tenement House
Homework Law,
which set up this licensing system,
was concerned primarily
with health and sanitary conditions
and required
that any

tenement in which homework was carried
on be licensed by
the state.

Tenements would be inspected to ensure that

they met the standards set by the sanitary
code and building
law.
Any building that housed tenants with
infectious
or contagious diseases could not be issued
a license.
As noted earlier,

the licensing system covered only forty-

one of the more than one hundred items worked
on by horne-

workers.
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The licensing system, because it applied to

buildings rather than to individual homeworkers, or even
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individual apartments

often worked to the
detriment of
individual homeworking
families.
!f a homeworker
contracted
a contagious disease,
landlords could simply
evict them
and maintain their good
standing with the state.
,

And,

like most welfare state
regulations, the licensing
system
itself was almost completely
ineffective anyway, because
SO few inspectors were
assigned the enforcement
duties
of watching over the
3,000 licensed New York City
tenements.
With the National Child
Labor Committee in the
lead, social reform
organizations attempted to at
least
restrict homework by having child
labor laws and restrictions
on women's work extended
to include homeworkers.
In terms
of child labor, two primary
tactics were employed.
First,
1

compulsory education laws often
came into conflict with
the need of homeworkers to employ
their children during
school hours.
The Education Laws of New York
required
the attendance of children at
school between

the ages of

six and fourteen.

All investigative reports documented

the high truancy rates of school-age
children of homeworkers.
But these laws were nearly impossible
to enforce.
Also,

compulsory education laws could do nothing
about the employment of children at home under the age
of six or over fourteen
A second tactic was to apply child labor
laws to

work done at home.

In New York,

children under the age

of sixteen were prohibited from working "in
connection

With any factory" before
8:00 a.m. and after 5:00
p.m.
addlti ° n theY C ° Uld not
ployed for more than eight
hours a day, six days a
week. 55
Ironically, parents who
complied With the compulsory
education laws were often
forced by necessity to
violate labor laws by having
their
Children work before 8 o’clock
and after 5 o’clock,

^

'

in

order to make up for piecework
"lost" during school hours.
During the busy season,
homeworking families often
worked
up to sixteen hours a
day--children
included.

Similarly, with the approval
of the 54-hour work
week for women in 1912, women
could not be employed for
more than nine hours a day, or
before 6:00 a.m. or after
9:00 p.m., six days a week. 56

There were two basic difficulties
in attempting
to use laws restricting the
work of children and women
to eliminate homework.
First, reformers were required
to prove that children were actually
employed by their
parents.
Since parents never paid a real wage
to children,
they could not be said to be formally
employed.
Pay in

the form of remuneration--clothing,
shelter, and food--

could not be considered as evidence of wage
labour.
The second and more profound difficulty lay
in

trying to conceptualize the home as

a factory.

The key

to using such legislation was to convince
legislators and

the courts that the home constituted a "factory"
under
the law.

Here the liberal ideological distinction between
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the public and private
spheres held fast.
Time and again
the efforts of social
reformers and labor organizers
would
be thwarted by the
ideological difficulty of
this distinction
As one New York state
report stated, "A home in
which manufacturing is carried on is not
a factory.
The 54-hour
law, therefore, does not
apply to work done in the
home." 57
The conceptual difficulty
of this issue is witnessed
in the following exchange
between members of the New
York

State Commission investigating
homework and the Chief Counsel
to the Commission as they
attempt to reconcile the contradiction between liberal ideology
and the reality of homework:
Chairman (Robert F. Wagner
Q.
Do you think now Commissioner,
that
obstacle against your interfering in there is a legal
any way with
a child under 12 from helping
the mother or father
in working in a tenement house?
)

'

A.

We have no authority under the
existing law.

Commissioner Phillips: You cannot say that
the child
is working for hire.
The Chairman: Why not? The mother
gets the pay
child contributes toward the labor.

but the

The Witness (John Williams): In whose
hire is the child?
By Mr. Elkus: Q. What difference does
that make? We will
say he is in the hire of the manufacturer.
I say in
other words suppose the manufacturer said, "I
will
employ you and your child, and I will pay you
five
dollars a week for your work, including your child's
work that would make the child an employee, would
it not?
A.

Of the manufacturer?

Q.

That would be a Factory?...

A.

I

wish

I

could agree with you, Mr. Elkus, but

I

really

d

therfund^ any°ex“tS q W ?a haVe ^ nY
ractory,

ri9ht to
.

C
1S n0t a
and you cannot by
any stre^f
etch of the
imagination make it a factor^/
even though the
woman gets work from th<=
"anufacturer; he does
not pay the rent

Q*

%

It is a factory if
thprp
Gre 13~ ° ne P ers °n
for hire?
employed there
i?
h

A.

As a matter of fact--

Q.

you a way out
Y
anything.
is a factory if one n Pr5nrias easv
it
f
1S ernplo
isn't it, am I right? °
Y ed f or hire,

A.

Yes,

1

can show

^

if employed for hire,

Q

sir.

“^Toff

for thf manufacturer^
A.

yes,

3

garment

Supposing it is by contract?

'

deflniti °"

"for
'contract
A.

But the difficulty lies
here.

Q.

Will you answer my question?

^omm issioner Dtp pr
goes elsewhere to work!
•

i

Mr.

°

^

n0t rlght beoause she

Elkus: That does not make any
difference1306 WhSre
°r
labor^

=.

-re^ers^^mploy^

Commissioner^Phillips: Must be a
manufacturing or business
Mr
‘

Any mil1 workshop, or other
manufacturingJ
or ousiness establishment.
'

.

Commissioner Phillips: Business
establishment must be
the predominating idea of the
thing.
Mr.

Elkus: No,

it is not.

(and so on 58
)
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This exchange unwittingly
provides us with a
unique
loot at liberal ideology
in action.
Little did Mr. E i kus
hnow that in his attempt
to violate the
distinction between
ho me and factory he
was destined to lose
his battle by
half a century of
well-entrenched liberal thinking.
Despite
the powerful evidence
before them, it is not
surprising
that they could make little
headway into the issue
at hand.
is it a home or a factory?
why „ as this distinction
important? Lioeral ideology
posited a fairly strict
distinction between the public
and private worlds, and
assigned economic relations
to the former and normative
emotional relations to the latter.
Women, as part of the
private sphere of the home, were
supposed to stand outside
of, or be immune from,
contractual public relations.
Work
that women did at home-whether
it was unpaid domestic
labor or manufacturer's homework—
was not thought of as
ork proper —work that had real
economic value.
This
very definition of work was
based in the distinction (and

separation) of the public and the
private, the home and
the factory.
Homework violated this presupposition
by

iterally introducing economic relationships
into the heart
of the family.
To admit this reality, then, meant
that
l

the ideological distinction between
the public and private

worlds might also be called into question.
Furthermore, an admission of this sort could also

justify the idea that the State had

a

responsibility to
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directly regulate the
private relations of the
family,
One social worker aptly
characterized this perspective
as

the old sentimental theory
of the i„» a t a sacredness of The Home.
There probahlv
lsts ln the
human mind no stronaw
J
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the ideological distinction
between

public work and privatized family
„ as based in real
material
transformations in the nature of
social production.
In
precapitalist agrarian society, the
home was the site of
production.
Entire families farmed, raised
livestock,
spun and weaved, and produced
the goods the family needed
for daily use.
In addition, families often
produced goods
for exchange at the market.
With the rise of the factory and
wage-labour system,
home production of this sort
gradually declined. While
there remains some controversy over
the extent to which
the family and home was emptied of
its economic functions 60
,

it is clear that in important ways
the home did lose its

status as the center of production
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.

Women, of course, continued to perform domestic

household tasks, such as cooking, cleaning, and
caring
for their families.

But as the wage-labour system developed
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outside of the home, the
domestic labor of women
came to
be defined as separate
from and qualitatively
different
than "outside" labor done
for a wage.
Women's household
tasks were systematically
undervalued,
then, as the idea

of "work" came to be
defined strictly in terms
of wagelabour done in the public
sphere-physically and ideolog-

ically separated from home.

Conclusions
A

number of explanations could
be put forth to
explain why- these women worked
at home: that their husbands
prohibited their employment outside
the home; that manufacturers preferred not to employ
married women; that forms
of child care were not available
to them; that they preferred
homework because of the lack of
direct supervision and/or
because they felt that their presence
in the home was necessary for family unity and the
maintenance of cultural norms.
While none of these explanations are
mutually exclusive,
it is necessary to develop a more
comprehensive and coherent

explanation for why these women worked at
home.
At a more fundamental level of analysis,
one needs
to understand how the ideology of motherhood
served to

shape women's options for work.

Women, especially once

they were married, were primarily identified as
mothers --

whether or not they actually bore children.

Married women

were expected to be supported by husbands and to dedicate

bulk of their time to
household and childcare
duties.
Expecting to fulfill this
cultural prescription,
women
Often voluntarily left the
workforce upon marriage.
But
the working class immigrant
in particular material
reality would not allow them
to live up to cultural
expectations.
While the ideology of
motherhood and the day-today needs of the family
required that they remain
at home,

economic necessity pushed them
towards wage-earning. The'
economy, itself based on the
assumption that women with
children would remain at home,
was not structured

to absork

women with familial responsibilities.

The length of the

working day, the lack of childcare
facilities, the market
preference for full-time, year-round
workers in the factor
all served in very explicit
ways to limit the options of
mothers for work.
Homework was one of the few systems
of work that could form any
sort of compromise between
these competing pressures.
The logic of capital alone cannot
explain the level
of exploitation of homeworkers.

It cannot explain why

single women in the factory (in the flower
industry, for
instance) were paid 40% more than married
women at home
doing exactly the same work. This disparity
in wages can

only be explained in reference to women's
identification
as mothers.

The sexual division of labor which formed

the basis for women's identification as mothers
not only

kept them home, but justified their extremely low wages
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once employed at homework,

while women in factories
sys-

tematically earned less than
men, homeworkers, one
step
removed from the production
process and public view,
earned
less than factory workers.
A mother, as such,
was not

supposed to be the primary
wage-earner for the family
(or
for herself for that
matter.)
The payment of low wages
would insure that she could
not.
Manufacturers testifying
before the New York State
Commission conveniently allowed
themselves to believe that
homeworkers worked for
"pin

money," despite the mass of
evidence to the contrary 62
The ideology of motherhood,
as it helped to create,
justify, and perpetuate the
homework system, defined women
a juriori as outside of the
wage-labour system. Consequently,
when women did enter it, they would
remain always
.

in a

subordinate position.

Women's position in the industrial

workforce, then, was intimately related
to her relationship
to the patriarchal family.

Industrial capitalists reaped

the benefits of this ideological
committment by the payment
of low wages and the maintenance
of large "peripheral"

workforce existing at the edge (or more
accurately, at the
bottom) of the mainstream of workers.
The association
of home workers with the private sphere
rendered them invis-

ible from both contemporaries and historians as
a large,

exploited sector of the workforce.
Historians have characterized the Italian immigrant
family as among the most strictly patriarchal.

Women were

forbidden to go out alone,
husbands and fathers were
suspl
clous of single women working
in factories without
direct
family supervision, and wives
were rarely allowed to
go
out to work.
Although recent studies have
found that
Italian wives went out to work
more often
than assumed,

it is still clear that
Italian women were viewed by
their

husbands- -and often view themselves—
as the "heart" of
the family.
For these women, the homework
system was
suited to the irregular demands
of household and family
responsibilities. Ostensibly, women
could cook, clean
launder, and care for the family
at the same
time they

earned a wage.

And the low wages they earned
meant that

they could earn an income without
threatening their husband
identification as primary wage-earner.

From tne point of view of the needs
of the patriarchal family- -where father was the
breadwinner and mother
the caretaker of the family— the homework
system provided
a way to integrate traditional
norms with the reality of

modern capitalism, without threatening the
power base of
the husband.

stay at home?

But did homeworkers themselves prefer to

After all, many other working class mothers

were in the labor force during this time period.

This

is a more difficult question and one that probably
can

never be definitively answered.
as every historian must,

But we can conjecture,

from the evidence at hand.
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First,

it would be somewhat
misleading to think

Of the circumstance of
homeworkers as one of "choice."

Ideological constraints, the
structure of the labor
market,
the very real pressing
daily needs of the family,
traditional patriarchal norms, and
manufacturers' preference
for young single women all
served to restrict options
for
paid work outside the home.
For homeworkers and most
working class women, life was
ruled by necessity and not
choice.
While these women may have
preferred to stay home, „ e may
rightfully ask, at what cost would
they do so? Piecework
rates demanded that these women
work at an intense rate
just to earn 6c an hour. Mothers—
and their children—

worked from dawn until late in the
evening.

Homeworkers
were subject to the most extreme
demands of the "double
day." These women workers vacillated
between intense

periods of irantic work and periods when
no work at all
could be found.
The insecurity engendered by such
irregular
work must surely have taken its toll on
these
women.

Cer-

tainly, this system of work exacted certain
costs to family
lif e
On the other hand, homeworkers could maintain
the

psychological, cultural, and material unity of the family
by remaining at home.

As Virginia Yans-McLaughlin has

pointed out, the Italian family has been described as
father-dominated, but mother-centered."^^

Italian women

may well have viewed their predominance within the family--
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over care of children and
husband-as an important source
of power.
Their hesitancy to relinquish
this central positron in the family by going out
to work may reflect a
realistic assessment of their
situation.
After all, in
the labor market women could
barely earn a living wage
and were under the constant scrutiny
of bosses

or foremen.

Moreover, the possibilities of earning
an independent wage
were limited even at the peak of
their wage-earning years
and steadily declined as they passed
marital age. Retaining
the stability of the family represented
a kind of longterm security that the market could
never provide.
Children,
who were taught at an early age that they
were responsible
for the economic survival of the family,
could be expected
to (and did)

support parents in old age.

In addition, women often worked together
at home

with neighbors or relatives.

^

Homework provided a way

to establish and maintain extended family ties
that must

certainly have been important for the survival of individual
family members.

Going out to work might have disrupted

or threatened these extended networks, either through a

violation of cultural norms or simply by being absent from
the home for long periods of time.

This need to maintain

reciprocal social relationships with friends and family
may have played a significant role in keeping women at home.

Given the benefits to manufacturers and to the

patriarchal family of this system of work, homework evolved
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as the one viable alternative
for these women.
Had it
not been for the sexual
division of labor in the family,

which placed sole responsibility
for childcare and household duties on women, and the
logic of capitalist wagelabour, which drove down the
price of labour to a point
approaching slavery, the homework
system may have been
an attractive alternative for
these women.
Given these

considerations, homework remained an
exploitative form
of work almost without parallel
during this time

period.

Certainly the ability of homeworkers
to negotiate the
conflicting pressures of their situation
is a testimony
to their strength and the importance
of their contribution
to the very survival of the working
class

immigrant family.

CHAPTER
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NO PLACE FOR WOMEN: PROTECTIVE

LABOR LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN,
NEW YORK,

1

900-1 925

Introduction
It is often in times of great
social upheaval that

dominant ideas about the nature of our
social order become
most visible and explicit.
The rapid industrialization
and urbaizat ion of the U.S. combined
with the influx of

women into the industrial workforce to
serve as

a

catalyst

for just such a period in New York at
the turn of the

century.

it is in this context of social,

political, and

economic transformation that the development
of protective

legislation must be understood.

If women's entrance into

the industrial workforce in large numbers was
not to disrupt

women's primary identification with the home, then
efforts
would have to be made by

a

vairety of actors, each compelled

by different motivations, to insure that women's work
lives

were somehow consonant with v/omen's duties as wife and

mother
When social convention weakens,

lav;

often steps

in its place to reinforce traditions viewed by the state
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as necessary to the maintenance
of social order.
in this
chapter, protective labor legislation
for women will serve
as a case in point.
Laws to prohibit women's work,
for
instance, in mines or iron foundries
or to keep women from
working all through the night at
paid labor outside the
home, did not become necessary
until social convention

weakened enough to allow women into
these occupations in
the frrst place.
Though the state was limited by a
variety
of forces, each of which will be
explored throughout this
chapter, it could at least place serious
obstacles in the
way of women who either out of conviction
or necessity
engaged in "men's" work. Through a review
of protective
legislation in New York from the turn of the
century through
the 1920's I hope to illustrate how the
state responded
to what was perceived as a threat to the
patriarchal social

order
As

I

have argued in the preceding chapter, women's

primary identification with the private sphere of the
home
played an important role in the formation of state policy

regarding homeworkers.

The question to which we must now

turn in order to fill out the picture is how this association
of women with the private sphere affected her position

in the more visible public world of work.

In particular,

how did state policy both reflect and help to perpetuate

women's primary role in the home and secondary position
in the labor market?
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The questions

will raise through my study
of
protective labor legislation for
women will be intimately
related to questions raised in
the preceding chapters.
As we have seen, dominant
ideology drew a sharp distinction
between "home and factory."
addition, at least in the
ideal, mothering and wage-earning
were viewed as antithetical
Ihis conflict between "women as
mothers" and "women as
workers" will be developed more fully
in this chapter.
In addition, my project will also
address the question
of what affect women’s status as
mothers had on her standing
as a ci tizen
In other words, could women's primary
association with and responsibility for the
privatized family
be consistent with her formal rights
within the classical
I

m

.

liberal tradition (as
a

I

have outlined in chapter one) as

free, autonomous individual?

Or is there a necessary

antithesis between women's identification with the
private
sphere and her standing as a full citizen (that is, as
an autonomous individual who has full rights and
privileges
in the formal political sphere)?

If such an antithesis

exists, then we will be forced to question whether state

policy based on women's role as mother (and aimed at rein-

forcing this role) has reinforced her political, economic,
and social inequality as a whole.
As a contrast to the state's exemption of home-

workers from all forms of protective labor regulation,
I

will review in this chapter the state's willingness to

.
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enact protective labor leaisl aH nn
„
g faiation for
women working outside
the home in New York from
900 through the 1920'
s.
As
we shall see, efforts to
restrict the labor of women
1

gen-

erally took two forms during
this time period.
The first,
outright prohibitions on women
from working in certain
industries or at particular jobs,
was the most extreme
form of restriction and while
less common helps to illustrate the logic underlying all
forms of protective labor
legislation for women in New York.
I will begin this
chapter
then with a discussion of prohibitive
legislation
for women.

This study will establish a "paradigm"
case of the logic
underlying protective legislation upon
which less restrictive
but by far more common laws were
enacted.
The second type of legislation, by
far the most

predominant and important in terms of its impact
on women's
work, was the limitation of the hours
women could
work,

or "regulatory" legislation.

I

will illustrate the general

outlines of such legislation through both

a study of New

York laws and a look at the one precedent-setting
U.S.

Supreme Court case, Muller vs. Oregon, which in 1907
upheld
the constitutionality of the ten hour day for women and

acted as a powerful catalyst to protective legislation
in New York and nationwide.

Prohibitive Legislation
From the turn of the century through the 1920's

86

the state would be convinced
time and again that the
only
way to "protect" the health
of working women was to
prohibit
them entirely from certain
occupations. Beginning in
1899
all females were prohibited
from "operating or using
polishing or buffing wheels" which
were generally used in a
variety
ot industries to sharpen
the tools of labor.
This act
marked the first time legislation
explicitly prohibited
the employment of all women
in an industrial occupation
in New York.
In 1 906 women were excluded
from working
for or in connection with mines
and quarries, in 1912 they
were prohibited from working within
four weeks after childbirth in any "factory, mercantile
establishment, mill or
workshop" and in 1913 after a lengthy
study by the New
York Factory Investigating Commission
(F.I.C.), women were

excluded from work in the core-rooms of
brass, steel, and
iron foundries.
Young women also found themselves excluded
from

certain occupations, often undercutting
opportunities to
gain the experience needed to move into certain
skilled

jobs once they reached maturity.

Women under

prohibited from cleaning moving machinery in
1

91 8

1

21

887,

we re

and by

from working as messengers for telegraphs or messenger

companies in the distribution, transmission, or delivery
of goods or messages.

In 1919 they

vie re

barred from working

in connection with the operation of "elevated railroads"

or street subways and could not even sell or accept fares
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or admissions in any
railway station, car, or
train.
Though the categorical
exclusion of women from
particular industries was not
widespread, and perhaps
never
directly affected the great
number of women working
in
industry, the logic and
controversy over such legislation
is illustrative of all
legislation enacted to "protect”
women.
Because the exclusion of women
from work in corerooms of foundries inspired
much public debate and
controversy, I Will focus here on
the enactment of these laws
and assess the effects of this
legislation on women's
position in certain sectors of the
workforce.
As we shall
see, public debates over
prohibitive legislation slip all
too easily from a discussion of
the health and safety of
1

women workers to debates about
women's "proper" position
in the labor market and role
in the
family.

m

particular,

often heated arguments over women’s
work in core-rooms
belie a logic more attuned to a dominant
"ideology of

motherhood" and the protection of male workers
from female
competitors, than to a concern for the health
of women
workers
In March of 1911

the disastrous fire at the Triangle

Shirtwaist lactory, in which 146 women died, sent
more
than 100,000 working women and their supporters into
the

streets of New York to demand improvements in the conditions
of working women.

The outrage inspired by this event over

the health and safety of women workers led to the establish-
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the factory Investigating
Commission of New York
and marked 1 91
as a hallmark year in
struggles over pro1

tective legislation for women.

The Commission, composed

of members of state
government as well as
representatives
from organized labor, engaged
in a broad range of
investi-

gations and made recommendations
to the state legislature
for mture legislation.
In its second report the
F.l.c.

focussed attention

on the work of women in the
core-rooms of foundries throughout New York.
The fear of tuberculosis, as
in the case
or homeworkers, again acted
as a catalyst for legislation.

Approximately three hundred women were
employed in the
core-rooms of foundries in upstate
New York.

Concern over

the health of these workers focussed
on the hazards of
the inhalation of gases and fumes
from the ovens in which

cores were baked.

2

Women's recent entrance into foundry

work, where they typically replaced
boys under 18, their

underpayment by manufacturers in this industry,
and a social
and political climate sensitive to the
high tuberculosis
rate in this industry all led to an extensive
investigation
of women working in core-rooms by the F.I.C.

High death

and illness rates from tuberculosis, rheumatism,
and kidney

diseases were common among all those who worked near coreroom ovens.

But women, the Commission argued, were espe-

cially vulnerable to these ailments because of their more
fragile physiology.
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The political divisions
spawned by the Commission
s
investigation of women foundry
workers would be reproduced
.

n-any

times in the years to follow
over subsequent debates
over protective legislation.
Manufacturers opposed any
legislation which would curb
their
uneir riaVuright 4-^
to contract "freely"
with women workers. Organized
male workers, fearful of
competition from "cheaper" female
labor, were adamant in
their support of prohibitive
legislation,
Both owners
and male workers were
well-represented in testimony before
the Commission,
And 01 the hundreds of
witnesses called
to testify before the
Commission only three were women
foundry workers. and these were
dismissed after only cursory
testimony
The thousands of pages of
testimony before the
f.I.C. leave us with a rich
record of the arguments both
for and against legislation.
Organized male workers,

represented by the Moulder's Union of
New York, based their
opposition on a mixture of ideas about
women s proper place
'

in the home,

fear that women workers would lower
wage stan-

dards, and a dubious concern over the
health of these "future

motners of the race."

As one core maker stated,

"i think

(the boss) would do us a great favor, and
everybody else
in New York,

if he would let these girls go home,

and take

care of the home, and not work in the shop but
take care
of the homes where they should be ." 3
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Another member of the
Moulder's Union expressed
concern, tempered by
ethnocentrism, over the
state
of

motherhood: "„e must also
realize that these women
of today, even though they are
the Slavs and Poles
and the Italians,
they are the mothers of
the future American
citizens ." 4
while male foundry workers
softened their arguments
with
a concern for motherhood,
the bottom line was
economic.
Women pieceworkers systematically
earned only half to onethird of what their male
counterparts earned. And the
blame for such underpayment was
laid on the heads of women
workers who, the Union argued,
didn't have either the courage
or choice to demand higher
wages.
As W. T. Provert
of

the Brooklyn Moulder's Union
argued,

here m
have the coura 9 e of their own
convic;;;!
a !u
10ns and
the right to demand it, the
girls
are
nor in that position, and they
will stay there
wnether they like conditions or not;
they don't
have the courage to jump on a
freight and go somewhere else.
they have to make the best of
conditions given to them in those shops.
They
y
have no choice.
.

.

.

(

)

Needless to say, the attitude of union
men didn't help
the sltu aLion of these women workers
any.

Not only were

women barred from the union, but the
constitution of the
International Moulder's Union threatened to
expel any

member who "devotes his time in part or in
whole to the

instruction of female help in the foundry or at
any branch
of the trade.

Manufacturers recognized the increased profitability
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Of hiring women workers
who were not only
"cheaper" to
employ than men but cheaper
even than boys.
And certainlv

sexually divided workforce
could do the Union no
good.
In response to Union
accusations, foundry owners
defensively argued that women were
employed either because
they
couldn't get boys to do the
job, or because women
were
handier, more skillful, and
more regular in their work"
(though apparently owners
weren't willing to compensate
women for these superior
qualities .) 7
a

Manufacturers accused male workers
of discrimination
against women and argued that
no account should be taken
of sex in the core-room.

Owners argued that they wanted

"equal rights" for both men and
women and urged the Commission not to make foundry work a
"matter of sex ." 8 Some

went so far as to argue that any
legislation should apply
equally to both men and women, certainly
with the knowledge
that such restrictive legislation
for men would never be
tolerated.
They argued that core-room work was
not a threat
to health and that it paid better
than other occupations

available to women, such as work in canneries,
laundries,
or work as a scrubwoman (a point not without
merit .)

9

But as one report of the Women's Bureau stated,

employers' opposition to protective legislation was
"appar-

ently just as altruistic as that of the moulders.

They

wished to give women the "opportunity" to work in corerooms

When push came to shove in testimony before

the F.I.C. employers
reluctantly admitted that
women were
mployed simply because they
were cheaper to employ.
Clearly, concerns about
"equal opportunity" and
"dilcrimination" acted only as a
veneer over their more
fundaments!
commitment to profit-making.

Though the battles between
owners and male foundry
workers were clearly based in
economics, with a guise of
concern for the health and safety
of women workers, the
Commission's final assessment
rested exclusively on strict
assumptions about women's "proper"
place in the family
and the workforce, and the
state’s obligation to "protect"
the future of the race.
In its conclusion
the F.I.C.

's

report bluntly stated that "the
foundry is no place for
women" and that everyone would have
been better off if
women had never been allowed to enter
an occupation which
was "never intended for them ." 11
When faced with arguments
made by manufacturers in the name of
"equal rights," the
Commission invoked the eternal rules of
Nature 12
:

Nature itself has made distinctions which
foundry owner has said should not be made. the
Instincts of chilvary and decency as well as
concern for the preservation of the race,
demand
that we should not permit women to engage
in
work detrimental to their health, that overtaxes
rheir strength, and impairs their vitality as
wives and mothers.

Concluding that every obstacle should be thrown in the
way of women foundry workers, the F.I.C. recommended
the

gradual elimination of the three hundred women employed

in foundries in New
York.

Such harsh conclusions
are es-

pecially interesting when
understood in the context
of
the fact that the Commission
itself admitted that it
had
failed to prove that work
in the core-room was
detrimental
t0 W ''"'“ n 3 health or
that women were more
susceptible
to illness than male
workers in the same industry.
’

Remembc

also that the prohibition is
based not on health concerns
lreCt1^ related to reproductive
capacities, but to gases
and fumes which irritate the
mucous membranes, eyes,
nose
and throat, and bronchial
passages.
Strictly physiological
evidence alone, therefore, could
not provide the basis
for gender-based legislation.
Rather, the Commission stood
on the grounds that the foundry
was simply "no place for
women." When one manufacturer argued
that men and women
were no different in their
susceptibility

~

to illness,

the

chairman,

replying with sarcasm and incredulity,
laid out
in no uncertain terms the true
basis of their reasoning: 13
You really think they are no different.
You
know there is a particular interest we
have in
a girl.
The girl of to-day is the mother of
to-morrow.
She produces our children, and we
have got to preserve her a little better
if we
are going to have good future citizens.
At the recommendation of the Commission,

the state

passed a law in 1913 that prohibited women's
employment
in the oven rooms where cores were baked
and regulated
14
the size and weight of cores on which women could
work.

While not directly prohibiting women from work in brass,

steel, and iron foundries
(which would have forced
the
state to take direct
responsibility for throwing
three

hundred women immediately
out of work) these
restrictions
were effective enough to
eliminate women from work
on cores
within a few short years.
EVen given the strong
language of the F.X.C.’s
final assessment of women's
foundry work, it would
be somewhat misleading to view the
Commission’s work as a simple
attempt to force women back
into the home.
a very real
sense both Commission members
and legislators responded
with shock and honest concern
over the health hazards of
this kind of work.
Members of the F.I.C. were led
on tours
through foundries and factories
and, perhaps for the first
time, had a real life taste
of the degradation wrought
by industrial work.
It is plausible that their
harsh reaction to the employment of women
in core-rooms, for instance, was due at least in some
part to the impression
left on them by conditions of
core-room work in general:
men and women literally "spent" a
lifetime working in the

m

nauseating heavy blue smoke that "just
seemed to lay there"
after oven doors had been opened 15
Unwilling
.

to inter-

fere in the "freedom of contract" of male
workers, commis-

sioners turned their ire towards efforts to
at least protect the "weaker sex." Ironically, in their
haste to

improve the condition of women workers they failed
to make
any recommendations for protecting the health
and safety
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of the remaining male
workers.

In the end, fathers
were
sacrificed in the name of
protecting motherhood.
The debates over women
foundry workers set a
pattern
that would be followed in
all subsequent struggles
over
protective legislation for
women.
Unionised male workers,
arguing that women's physiology
ill-suited

her for indus-

trial work, supported
legislation out of fear that
women
workers would either drive down
wages, displace male
workers,
or both.
Manufacturers, arguing on the
grounds of equal
opportunity, fought legislation
in order to advance
profits
through the exploitation of
women workers. And the state,
receptive to dominant beliefs
about women's physical inferiority and proper place in the
home, felt compelled
to

protect women on the grounds that
the state had an obligation
to preserve the future of the
race by restricting the work
lives of the mothers, or future
mothers, of its citizens.
This pattern is repeated time and
again in all
subsequent attempts to restrict women's
labor.
But in
regard to less severe restrictions on
women's work, such
as the limitation of the total hours
worked in a day or
week, or the prohibition of night work
for women, the issues

become more complicated.

For one thing, working women

themselves joined the battle--both for and against--protective legislation.

In addition, hour and night work

laws held the promise of improved working conditions
for

many women and, in some cases, paved the way for higher

standards of work for
Reg ulatory Legislat n n
Night Work Laws
i

industrial workers.

—

The second form of
legislation designed to
regulate
women's work came in the
form of the restriction
of night
work for women and laws
limiting the maximum hours
women
could work in a given day
y or week
Hiahi- work and
Night
maximum
hour laws often came hand
in hand, primarily
because it
was extremely difficult for
inspectors to determine the
total hours a woman worked
without a definite closing
hour,
after which all work was
illegal.
Also, without night
work laws women could be required
to work two continuous
days back to back, one before
midnight and the other after,
thereby undercutting the intent
of hour laws.
In this
section, I Will briefly review
night work laws before going
on to a discussion of the
charged political battles over
the establishment of the ten-hour
and nine-hour days for
women
.

.

In 1899 the first law was enacted
in New York which

prohibited the work of all women in factories
between
9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. 16

while previous legislation had

prohibited the night work of women under

21

(and males

under the age of 18), this was the first
effort made by
the state to restrict the night-time
employment
of all

adult women.

From 1899 through 1907 these laws went un-

challenged in New York State.

But in one of the few court
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decisions of the time which
explicitly argued women's
essentia! eguality with
men in terms of a
woman's freedom
of contract, the New
York Court of Appeals

ruled in 1907
in New York vs.
Williams that all night
work laws for women

over

21

were an unfair abridgement
of women's freedom
con-

tract

»

In its decision the
Court stated that
» ward of
ls
,

^s-ss

Following on the heels of the
1905 U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Lochner vs. New
York (which struck down
a tenhour day for men) the New
York Appeals Court declared
that
this restriction went beyond
the state's legitimate
police
powers because the regulation
was not based in the
pro-

tection of women's health and
safety.

Labor legislation

which restricted freedom of
contract could only legitimately be justified if the intent
of the law could be
explicitly tied to health and safety
measures.
Up to
this point in time, therefore,
laws could only be upheld
for occupations categorized as
"overhazardous"

(as in the

case of miners in the

1

898 Holden vs. Hardy decision) or

if a certain class of workers,

such as children or women,

could be deemed overly vulnerable to the
hazards of work.
When the Factory Investigating Commission
of New

York was reconvened in 1913 their first
task was to rees-

tabllSh

^
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Validlty ° f ni ^ ht

l-s

on these grounds.

for »o»e„ precisely

Encouraged by the 1908
u.s. Supreme
court decision in Muller
vs. Oregon, which
had upheld a
ten-hour day for women and
presumably reversed the
trend
set by the Williams case,
the F.I.C. in 1913
recommended
passage of a new night work
law for women.
The arguments
used by the Commission
were two-pronged.
First,
night

work threatened the health
of women and the children
they
were responsible for.
The reoort
report oi
nf the n
Commission documents
the most extreme degradation
wrought by women's
"double

day."

In their study of one
hundred women working at
night
in upstate New York the
Commission found that these
women
on the average slept only
four and a half hours per
18
day.
Most of these night workers,

who were Polish immigrants

between the ages of 20 and
30, were married and had young
children to care for. For women
with primary responsibilities for infants and toddlers,
night work provided
a solution to the conflict
between income-earning and
mothering.

Almost all of the women interviewed
by the
F.I.C. stated that they preferred
night work because it
freed them to nurse infants, cook,
clean,
launder, and

watch over their families during the
day.
say,

Needless to

such a schedule left little time for rest
or sleep.

In addition to the health hazards
to women working the

graveyard" shift, the Commission also argued that
the
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absence of night work laws
led to the overtime
wort of
women.
In the bookbinding
trade, for instance,
women were
found working shifts often
as long as 16-24 hours
a day. 19
In addition to the
health hazards created
by overwork, the Commission
this time introduced
a

new theme into

arguments for protective
legislation, pointing out
that
"it has universally been
found that such work
renders women
liable to unusual moral
dangers and temptations." 20
Returning home in the dark of
night left women vulnerable
to harassment or attack
on the streets.
In
addition, the

Commission pointed out that no
"respectable" boarding house
would allow women to return
home after work past midnight,

m

short, night work threatened
the public welfare because
it was "destructive of the
vitality of women as wives and
mothers" not only physically, but
also morally.
As a result of the Commission's
recommendations,
in 1913 and 1914 night work
laws were passed which forbade

women's employment in factories and
mercantile establishments arter 10 p.m. or before 6 a.m.
By
1917 and 1918

these restrictions were extended to
include women working
in restaurants, on street railroads,
as women messengers,

elevator operators, and women working as
printers in news21
papers.
Laws of this nature were always accompanied
by exemptions, particularly in industries
where women

presumably could not be replaced by men, or in industries
where owner or worker opposition was strong.

Sales clerks

1

were exempt during the
Christmas rush; women
working in
canning factories were
exempt during harvest
seasons;
singers, performers and
cloak room attendants
in hotels
were exempted entirely
from the law.
As in all forms of
protective legislation, night
work laws improved
conditions
in some industrial
occupations in which women
already
predominated (such as sales
clerks in stores) and
excluded
women entirely from other
higher-paying work
(such as train

conductors and printers in
newspapers.)
As in prohibitive
legislation, night work laws

were often initiated by
organised male workers who
feared
competition from women. Male
waiters in New York City,
for instance, were well-served
by night work restrictions
on women.
Members of the Magnolia Association
of Waiters
had repeatedly made requests
to the New York Department
of Labor asking that women's
work hours be restricted because, they argued, waitresses
were undercutting pay rates
in their occupation. 22
Waitresses unsuccessfully protested
the extention of night work laws
to their profession,
arguing that it often prevented them
from working shifts
when tips were heaviest and pointing
out the irony of the
law in that it allowed women singers
to perform after
10 p.m.

in the same restaurants where waitresses
were
23
prohibited.
Without organization and funding the wait-

resses would lose their battle against night work
restrictions

.

00

Women printers, who were
included in the 19,3
law,
were also harmed by night
work laws.
Because newspapers
were run on two night
shifts (one beginning
at 6 or 7 p.m.
and the other at 2 a.m.)
and only one day shift,
night
work laws severely restricted
opportunities for women to
work in this industry.
In addition, weekly
wages were
higher during the night than
during the day, ranging
from
$55 during the day to $58
and $61 at night.
Prohibition
of night work also
threatened the seniority
status of women
printers.
These working women, already
anomalies in the
highly-paid male-dominated newspaper
business, found themselves either at a serious
disadvantage or were thrown
out of work entirely.
Partly as a result of their
ability
to finance a campaign against
night work laws, these women
were able to win an exemption
for women printers
’

in 1921

after spending $10,000 on eight
years of political work. 24
While night work was clearly
detrimental
to the

health of the many women who earned
an income throughout
the night and returned home to
domestic duties during the
day,

the logic used to pass these laws
did little to expand

che options of these women for work.

Legislators never

felt obliged to discuss how the children
of working mothers

would be cared for if these women had to work
during the
day.

In addition,

legislators assumed that these women

were ignorant of the health hazards of night work
and

therefore were themselves responsible for their own
degrada-

tion

As the F.I.C. stated in
1913,

"Ignorant women can
scarcely be expected to
realize the dangers not
only to
their own health but to
that of the next generation
fro,„
such inhuman usage." 25 The
fault of such "inhuman
usage"
was thus placed squarely
e neaas
* on the
head<=; ol
of
ignorant" mothers.
With the enactment of night
work laws the state
fully elaborated the logic
underlying all subsequent

hour
first, women were both
physically and morally unable
to bear the strain of
night-time work and therefore
needed
the state's special protection
"for their own good;" second,
the state had an explicit
interest in protecting motherhood,
per se-and women who worked
all through the night certainly
could not also be "good" wives
and mothers during the day.
Legislation was enacted, therefore,
on the grounds of the
state s direct interest in the
private sphere of the home.
Any paid labor that women did
that interfered with her
laws:

'

presumed functions as
to the

a

mother would be ruled

a threat

general welfare" of society and the state.

The

same logic would be used to push through
the nine-hour

and ten-hour day for women only.

Regulatory Legislation-Hour Laws
Struggles over the establishment of the shorter

working day for women must be understood in the context
of earlier attempts to shorten the working day for
men.

While prohibitive and night work

lav/s

were designed explicitly

for women, and no attempts
were ever made to extend
such
laws to men, maximum hour
laws had been a long
sought after
goal of predominantly male
unions prior to the turn
of
the century.
Hour laws did not become
explicitly genderbased until after 1899, and
the movement to extend
such
laws to women in all factory
and mercantile occupations
in New York did not gain
full steam until after
1910.
As previously noted, laws
restricting freedom of
contract, at least for men,
could only be upheld if they
were viewed as necessary for
the health and safety of
„ork ei
Organized labor throughout the
nation was dealt a harsh
blow by the now- famous U.S.
Supreme Court case, Lochner
VS. New York, in 1905.
In this case the Court ruled
as

unconstitutional the limitation of
bakers to ten hours
per day, or sixty hours of work
per week.
In its decision
the court stated that such
restrictions constituted
"an

unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary
interference with
the right and liberty of the individual
to contract
in

relation to his labor

"

26

Ihe decision in the Lochner case brought
to life

some of the most fundamental commitments
of the classical

liberal tradition: as independent individuals
men were

entitled to freedom from state interference in their
rights
to contract "freely" with others.

Specifically, capital

and labor, on equal footing within the marketplace,

were entitled to bargain freely over wages, hours, and

the conditions of labor
without the interference
of the
state.
Organized labor found the
going rough in attempts
to threaten or even modify
what was then perceived
by legis
lators, courts, and
businessmen as the cornerstone
of the
laissez-faire political and
economic system.
Finding the
courts unsympathetic to their
cause, unions and social
reformers turned their efforts
towards the limitation of
women's labor.
If they could not win
the ten-hour day
for men, they could at least
do so, with the help of
wellentrenched beliefs about women's
inferiority, for women.
In New York state, hour
laws for women had followed
the same historical pattern
as night work laws.
In 1899
all women were prohibited from
working more than ten hours
a day or sixty hours a
week in any factory.
But allowances
for overtime work (up to twelve
hours a day) in order to

make a shorter day at the end of
the week made this law
almost totally ineffective.
Such exemptions made it almost
impossible for inspectors to determine
the total number
of hours each woman worked in a
given week.
In addition,

state officials were reluctant to prosecute
violators for
fear that the law could not stand up
to a challenge in
court.

In 1907 the law was amended to restrict
labor to

six days a week, but again the law remained
gutless because
of the continuation of overtime provisions.

Where the U.S. Supreme Court had been reluctant
to tread in the case of male workers,

it reversed its stand-

mg

just two years later when
addressing legislation
explicitly designed to restrict
the work of women.

m

a

case that would set the
stage for protective
legislation
nationwide and change the
current of judicial thinking
on legislation for women,
the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled
in 1908 in the Muller vs.
Oregon decision that a
ten-hour
day for women was constitutional.
The reasoning of the
Muller decision would inform
such legislation for the
next
twenty years, and so deserves
special attention.

Josephine Goldmark, of the National
Consumer's
League, and attorney Louis
Brandeis teamed up to produce
the brief that would convince
the Court of the validity
of special legislation for
women, in spite of the Court's
previous ruling in the Lochner case.
Citing

only two pages

of law and over one hundred
pages of "scientific" evidence,

Brandeis and Goldmark argued women's
special vulnerability
to overwork and, hence, her need
for the special protection
of the state.

The ability of the Court to override
the logic
of the Lochner decision rested first
in the task of proving

that women's health differed from men's.

Brandeis and

Goldmark's brief began, then, with arguments that
women
were physically inferior to men, and therefore were
subject
to greater health and safety risks than men.

the logic of the brief, the Court argued that
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And the Court concluded
that "this difference
justifies
a difference in
legislation." As the Court
pointed out,
natural differences between
men and women placed
women
at a distinct disadvantage
in the "struggle for
subsistenc.
and therefore required her
protection by the state. That
this disadvantage was rooted
in nature and not social
convention was clearly evident
in their ruling.
Not only did women's "physical
structure" conspire
against her in the marketplace,
but her maternal function
Played an important role in undercutting
her bargaining
power and justifying the regulation
of her labor.
The

Muller decision made explicit the
direct interest the state
had in reproduction and, therefore,
in women's work.

Reluctance to interfere with women's freedom
of contract
couldn't hold a candle to concerns over
the maintenance
of women s position as wives and
mothers.
As the decision
put it,
As healthy mothers are essential to
vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of women becomes
an object of public interest and care in
order to
preserve
the strength and vigor of the race. 28

Reproduction, or more accurately, the potential for reoro

auction, thus became a
matter of explicit state
interest.
The Muller decision
reaffirmed, in essence,
women's
status as wards or
of thp
Q
the state,
and served as a catalyst
for the passage of
protective legislation for
women only
nationwide. As one justice
stated in an Illinois
court
decision that followed in the
footsteps of Muller,
"what
we know as men we cannot
profess to be ignorant of
4-

judges." 29

as

The judge could not have
been more accurate

in his assessment of the
reasoning behind Muller.
in the eight years that
followed the Muller decision,

forty-one states enacted new or
improved protective laws
for women.
In New York, a new spirit
in favor of legislation
was rekindled.
The force of the Muller
decision combined
with the Triangle Fire, the
establishment
of the F.i.c.

and the concerted efforts of
unions (both male and female)
to push the nine-hour day for
women through the legislature
by 1913.
The American Federation of Labor
had begun its
fight for protective legislation
for women nationwide by
1900.

rearing competition from women workers,
unions saw
legislation as one way of controlling
women's labor.
As
Alice Kessler- Harris has pointed out,
the AFL was opposed
to protective legislation for men,

fearing that it might

undercut attempts at unionization, "But for women,
whose
stay in the labor force was expected to be
brief,

legis-

lation could provide an attractive alternative to
the

expense of organizing while
it controlled the way
in which
women could enter the labor
force and compete with
men." 3 °
organizations such as the AFL
were clearly self-interested
in their pursuit of
legislative restrictions of
women's
work
Although predominantly male
unions had attempted
to pass the 54-hour week
for women every year
since 1901
in New York, they were
not successful until they
were joined
tneir efforts by the Women's
Trade Union League
and

the Consumer's League of New
York.
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Organizations such
as these viewed protective
legislation as the most effective
means of improving conditions
of work for wage-earning
women.
The Women's Trade Union League,
which had formed
1904 with the explicit intent
of improving conditions
for women working in unorganized
industries, made the passage
of the 54-hour law their first
legislative priority.
Toward
this effort, the WTUL formed the
Joint Labor Legislative

m

Conference in 1911 which was

a

coalition of unions from

Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the Bronx, the
United Hebrew
Trades, and the Socialist Party.

Regardless of their intentions, the arguments
used
to pass legislation rested heavily on
assumptions about

women

s

inferiority.

Rose Schneiderman

,

then-Vice-President

of the WTUL, argued explicitly that women
"can't do the

same work as a man" and fought repeals of protective
legis-

lation on the grounds that "equal rights cannot keep
(women)

in work for which they
are physically unfit."
In addition,
she argued women who
wanted to work at the
same rate of
Pay or at the same hours
as men would run the
risk of
,

"putting their own brothers,
or sweethearts, or
future
husbands out of a gob."”
The suppQrt Qf
therefore rested on both a
rne corical concern for
rhetorical
c
the protection of motherhood as well
as a fear that unorganized
working women would drag
down the price of labor.
If unions
could not raise standards of
work life in predominantly

^

^

female occupations, then
manufacturers could be forced,
through the use of the state,
to comply with certain
minimum
standards of labor.

Unionists also argued that

a

reduction in hours

for women and children would
inevitably lead to the reduction
of men's hours.
While little hard data is available
on
this question, evidence from a
U.S. Women's Bureau report
of 1921 does indicate that
hour laws for women did have
this effect in certain factories
where women already predominated.
Manufacturers often found it impractical
to

substitute an entire shift of women with
men after 10 p.m.
and the lower cost of women's labor
made it unprofitable
to wholly replace women with men in
industries
such as

textiles, where women predominated

Though organized labor often based their arguments
in economic concerns,

the ideological vehicle used to pass

legislation was always founded in arguments about women's

,

physical inferiority and
proper place in the home
and workforce.
Unions and social reform
organizations argued that
women's capacity for motherhood
placed her at a natural
disadvantage in the workplace.
While the immediate
effect
Of legislation might be
to improve working
conditions
for

at least some women in
some industries,

the broader effect
of such arguments was
to reinforce dominant
ideological

norms about women's "proper"
role in the family as
mothers
and to reinforce women's
segregation and underpayment
in
the labor market.

While the WTUL and its allies
put pressure on legislators, Josephine Goldmark
again emerged with the
scientific
foundation for these political
battles.
After her success
with the Brandeis brief (never
referred to as the Goldmark
brief) in 1908, Goldmark went on
to publish her definitive
work on the hazards of overwork for
women, Fatigue and
Efficiency in 191 2. 35 Goldmark's work
argued the "special
susceptibility to fatigue and disease
which distinguishes
the female qua female" and argued
that this special vulnerability required their special protection
,

by the state.

Her work, which had already been used
to successfully defend

ten-hour and eight-hour laws for women in Illinois,
Michigan,
Virginia, Louisiana, Ohio, Washington and California,
found
equal success in New York. 36

Josephine Goldmark, along with then-Secretary of
the National Consumer's League, Florence Kelley, presented

forceful testimony before
the F.I.C. and
successfully
convinced Commission members
to present the 54-hour
week
to the state legislature.
The concern over women's
reproductive capacities,
Which was voiced by all those
in favor of legislation,
was clearly not limited to
women who were actually
mothers.
As one doctor stated in
support of Goldmark's
work,

13

he em P lo y nlent of women from
girlhood all
Inr
through
married life, and through the
period of
chi ldbeanng--the continual
stress and strain
f
work and hours and general
conditions
prevailing
in women's labour-that is
9
exerting itfblnefi?
influence on the individual and
on the home. 37
J;

Concern over reproduction began
well before puberty and
extended well past women's child-bearing
years.

And when

direct evidence of health risks to
women were exhausted,
reformers and legislators turned to the
effects of working
mothers on their children. Massive
reports were produced
proving' the higher infant mortality
rates of children
of working mothers. 38

Causal relationships were drawn

between sick and criminal children and the
work of mothers.
While such studies might rightfully point
out the
ill-

effects (on women and children) of exploitative
working
conditions, they were more often used to justify
prohibitive
or restrictive lav/s for women.

Such laws, therefore, were

justified not only on the grounds of women's health,
but
on the grounds that this was the only way to protect
the

children of working mothers.

The force of such arguments
convinced the legislature
to pass the nine-hour
day for women in 1912
and by 1913
the law was extended to
include all women working
in mercantile establishments as well 39
Over the next fourteen
years, hour laws in New York
would be expanded to include
women working in restaurants
(1917), as messengers
,

.

(1918),
to women working on street
railroads and as elevator
operltors (1919).

from the late teens through
the early 20' s in New
York, the WTUL and its allies
would find itself rn opposition not only to manufacturers
and conservative legislators,
but also to organizations
composed of working women who
were opposed to protective
legislation.
In light of the
growing strength of opposition, the
WTUL established the
Women's Joint Legislative Conference
in 1918 in order to
advance and protect their efforts for
protective legislation.
This powerful coalition was composed
of groups

well-experienced in legislative battles, such
as the New
York State Women's Suffrage Party, the
New

York State and

City chapters of the Consumer's League,
and the Young Women's
Christian Association, among others J 9
In

1
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uhe Women

s

Joint Legislative Conference,

with the ardent support of then-Governor Alfred
(a

former member of the F.I.C.), submitted

a

E.

Smith

package of

to the legislature which included extensions of night

work laws to women employed in offices, on elevators

and on transportation
lines, a health insurance
plan for
women, an eight-hour day
and a bill which would
establish
a minimum wage commission
41
for women.
This package of
bills, dubbed "welfare bills"
by opponents, found
the going
rough.
Hour laws were one thing,
but health insurance
and minimum wages quite
another.

First of all, manufacturers
and private insurance
companies organized strong
opposition through the establishment of the New York League
for Americanism.
In addition,
under the Chairmanship of Senator
Clayton
R.

Lusk,

the

Joint Legislative Committee to
Investigate Seditious Activities was formed in the aftermath
of the war. 42 With the
help of Senator Lusk, who accused
proponents
of the bills

of being

oolshevists and German propagandists"
the health
and minimum wage bills died in
committee, with the force
of a Red Scare and the lucrative
support of businessmen
behind him, Lusk declared that advocates
of such welfare
bills "advocate the overthrow of the
government. .. (and)
would overthrow marriage." 43

while Lusk's tactics pre-

vented the eight-hour day, minimum wage, and
health insurance bills irom getting through, the 54-hour
week was upheld
and night work laws were extended to cover
women working
on elevators,

in offices and in transportation in 1919.

Despite opposition, hour laws stood unaltered until
1927,

when women's hours were further reduced to eight hours per
day and forty-eight hours per week. 44

Though the opposition of
businessmen was motivated
by the protection of
profits, other groups
opposed legislation on very different
grounds.
By 1920 organizations
composed of working women voiced
strong protests over protective legislation.
It is to these protests
and the divisions they created among the
working women of
New York

that we can now turn.

Working Women Divided:
Protection"

vs.

yiif,,L

By 1920 bu sinessmen opposed
to protective legis-

lation were joined in their efforts bv
us oy organizations composed
of working women who had been
adversely affected by night
v/ork and hour laws.
The first of these to be established
was the Women's League for Equal
Opportunity (1915), who
argued that women workers had been
displaced by the thousands
in New York City following enactment
of the 54-hour
and

night work laws.

Composed primarily of women printers,

who, as previously discussed, had been
seriously affected

by night work laws, this organization
aruged that such

legislation protected men and not women, and called
for
the repeal of all sex-specific labor legislation.

Ella

M.

As Miss

Sherwin, a Brooklyn printer and first president

of the organization stated,

Welfare legislation, if persisted in, will protect
women to the vanishing point. Whatever its intent,
it can have but one outcome.
It will drain women
out of all highly paid and highly organized trades,
because the lav/ will prevent them from doing the

same work that men do and
the unions will pronibit them from working
for a lower wage than
the men.

Another group which shared
the sentiments of the
Women's League for Equal
Opportunity was the Equal
Rights
Association, founded in 1917 with
the motto
Give a Woman
a Man's Chance--Industrially
46
The Equal Rights Association, also headed by a woman
printer, joined with industrialists
advocating the repeal of all
protective legislation.
.

m

By far the largest and most
powerful organization
to oppose protective legislation
for women was the National
Woman's Party, led by Alice Paul.
Following the ratification
of the 19th Amendment, the Woman's
Party set out to eliminate
all remaining "disabilities and

inequities" which women

suffered

on account of sex.

When the Women's Joint Legis-

lative Conference again submitted the
eight-hour and minimum
wage bills in 1923, they were defeated
by the combined

efforts of these three organizations in
alliance with

industrialists and conservative legislators.

In a savvy

political move, and one that reflected the radical
nature
of the organization,

the National Woman's Party supported

the bills, but only with the condition that the
word "women"
be changed to

persons" in all legislation.^^

In that same year the National Woman's Party sub-

mitted the Equal Rights Amendment

(known then as the

Lucretia Mott Amendment) for the first time to the U.S.

House and Senate, demanding
that "Men and Women shall
have
equal rights throughout the
U.S. and every place
subject
to its jurisdiction."

The Amendment was
perceived as

direct threat to all gender-based
forms of protective
legislation, and the WTUL adamantly
opposed it, along with
most other women's organizations
nationwide, on the grounds
that it would invalidate all
the gains won through the
enactment of special legislation
for working
a

women.

By 1924 the battlelines
were drawn.

For the first

time since the gender-based
legislation was introduced
in New York in 1899, working
women had a well-organized
and well-funded forum for expressing
dissent over protects
legislation.
The Woman's Party pointed to the
absurdity of pro-

tective legislation in that it applied
to only certain
women in certain jobs. The N.W.P. called
attention to

restrictions on waitresses as one case in point.

As pre-

viously seen, it was only after waiters found
themselves
being displaced by "cheaper" female labor that
night work
laws were extended on the grounds that night
work was no

longer safe for women.
at 10 p.m.

night.

,

And while waitresses were dismissed

singers could remain employed all through the

While waitresses, along with all female industrial

workers, were subject to these laws, no one was willing
to restrict low-paying "women's" work such as domestic

work, nursing,

stenography, telephone operating, or theatri-

1

cal work because, they
argued, no men wanted
these jobs.
"Who is prepared to say" one
editorial asked, "that for
the welfare of the race.
.no charwoman may be
employed
after dark, in the City Hall,
or the Capital or an
office
.

building ?" 49

Because advocates of legislation
based their arguments on women's inherent frailties,
no
logic on their

own terms could justify such
distinctions.
N.W.P. argued,

In fact,

the

if the safety of women was
truly the issue

then all women should be banned
from the streets at night.
Or, better yet, efforts should
be made to make the streets
safe for women after dark.
In addition, those opposed
to protection pointed to the irony
of the fact that "no
one got excited about the strength
capacity of a woman
as long as she was doing the unpaid
labor of the home."
And opponents asked, "why the whole
world should be con-

cerned over her welfare just because she is
getting paid
50
for her labor ."

Members of National Woman's Party argued that the
Equal Rights Amendment would not nullify protective
legis-

lation but would require that such

lav/s

include all workers, male and female

51
.

be extended to

They attacked

uhe physiological arguments used as a foundation for pro-

tective legislation, and argued that the most insidious

aspect of these laws was to
were mothers

treat all women as if they

In a sweeping critique of restrictive laws

1
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constant corollary to womanhood motherhood as
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if we are to take the words
of the opposition
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that all women in'
industry are pregnant nearly,
if not all, the time. 52
On classical liberal grounds,
the Woman's Party pleaded
for women's right to freedom
of contract regardless of
her sex or capacity for
reproduction.
in addition, opponents argued that the use of
protective legislation as

W

.

.

either a substitute or complement
to unionization was
fallacious. As Ada Wolff, head of the
Equal Rights Association argued, women often included
in such legislation
v/ere

not competing with organized male
workers.

"On the

contrary, they are competing in the labor
market with

unorganized and unorganizable men, and so
legislation which
might be truly 'protective' if applied to
workers becomes
a

cruel handicap when applied to women only."^

Despite the well-financed efforts of the National
Woman's Party and industrialists, all efforts to repeat

protective legislation were unsuccessful.

The strength

of support for protective laws was attested to by the
fact

that even efforts clothed
in patriotic rhetoric
failed
to win suspension of
women's labor laws during
World War
I.
Along With the failure
to repeal night work
and hour
laws for women, the N.W.P.
also suffered losses
in their
attempts to pass the ERA.
The unified opposition
Qf
every women's organization
combined with the opposition
of many major unions to
thwart the efforts of the
N.W.P.
to pass a federal amendment.
Opponents of the Amendment
argued that the ERA threatened
all protective legislation
and "accused" members of
the N.W.P. of being
"theoretical"
feminists who would sacrifice
concrete gains for working
women for the "abstract" cause
of equality 54
Despite
arguments made by the N.W.P. that
the ERA would extend
protection to all workers, opponents
argued that such an
Amendment would at least throw every
hour law in the country
into long and expensive legal
battles.
.

In the end,

battles fought over labor legislation

for women would generate some
strange political alliances.
Working women harmed by these restrictions
found their
bosses to be their strongest allies;
powerful women’s trade
unions found themselves tied to male
unionists who would
have preferred to see women "stay home,
where they belonged."

And while industrialists argued for women's
equality with
men,

progressive social reformers argued for women's inherent
frailty.
Whether out of true conviction or sheer political

sense, arguments in favor of protective legislation
for

1
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women only served to
reinforce
eintorce fhn
the grounds upon
which women's
secondary status in the
labor force was based.
it was
only with the help of
patriarchal ideology, which
already
permeated the thinking of
judges and legislators,
that
advocates of protection could
win their battles
against
the powerful efforts of
businessmen.
Even after the suffrage
was won oy women, and
even on strictly liberal
grounds
that women were entitled
to the same "freedom
from interference" accorded men in the
marketplace, opponents of
protective legislation could do
nothing
to sway the tide

Of logic in favor of
protection.

Effec ts of Legislation

Given the confluence of social
forces affecting
women's participation in the
paid labor force, it is always
difficult to determine what effect
any piece of legislation
has had on women's position in
the workforce,
and by ex-

tension, women's inequality in
society as a whole. With
this qualification in mind, certain
conclusions can still
be drawn about the effects of
protective legislation in
New York at the turn of the century.
And as the legislation, political climate, and working
conditions of women
in New York mirrored circumstances
in states across the

nation during this time period, my conclusions
here will
hold some validity for national trends during
this time

period

Any study Of the effects
of hour laws must be
placed
in the context of
tendencies already set in
motion by the
turn of the century
towards a shorter working
day for all
workers.
Pressures from well-established
unions and the
threat of spreading
unionization combined with
growing
beliefs about the increased
efficiency of a shorter
working
day to create a climate
where manufacturers might
"voluntarily" institute an eight
or nine hour day without
the
force of law.
In a
923 study made by the New
York Bureau
Of Women in Industry it
was found that 56% of the
women
working in manufacturing and
mercantile establishments
worked 48 hours or less already,
and that only 9% „ er e
scheduled to work the legal maximum
of 54 hours per week. 55
In addition, one New York
State study indicated that a
majority of men also worked 54 hours
per week or less. 56
Though unions such as the AFL had
opposed hour laws that
restricted men’s work, their long history
of pressuring
industrialists into a shorter working day
did reduce hours
in some highly organized industries
and certainly
1

had a

strong impact on public opinion in general.

In addition,

Josephine Goldmark's work in Fatigue and
Efficiency convinced many that an overworked laborer was
an inefficient
worker, and that a reduction in hours could
mean an increase
in profits.

Studies such as Goldmark's coupled with the

growth of principles of scientific management during
this
time period to reduce owner resistance to the shorter
working

day.

The impact of legislation
must, therefore, be
viewed
thin the context of a
social setting already
slanted
tor a variety of reasons
towards the shorter
working day.
Though hard evidence is
scarce, one study made
by the U.S. women's
Bureau in 1928 indicated
the positive
effects of hour and night
work legislation for
women.
AS a result of political
in-fighting between the
National
Woman s party, in alliance
with organizations
representative
of well-educated career
women, such as the Business
and
Professional Women's Clubs, on
the one hand and the
Women’s
Trade Union League, the AFL
and the National Consumer's
League on the other hand, the
Women's Bureau was commissioned
to do a study of the effects
of protective labor legislation on women.
With Mary Anderson (a long-time
supporter
of protective legislation)
at the helm of the Women's
Bureau

the report concluded that not
only women's but men's working
conditions had been improved by such
legislation. 57

Though the findings of the report
are politically
suspect, as it was headed by a strong
supporter of protective
legislation, previous studies made by the
New York Commissioner of Labor indicated that the effect
of legislation

pertaining to women working in mercantile
establishments
had effectively restricted store hours
to
ten a day.

In

general this meant that both men and women working
in this

predominantly female occupation benefited from legislation. 58

In an interesting
study of the census
data in New
YOrk in 1910
d
920 Eliz
Fau

“

legislation
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“

lkner Baker found
that

have had a more negative
effect on women
working in factories. While
the total number of
women
employed in New York State
increased 15.4% from 1910
to
1920 (in proportion to the
increase in the female
population), the number of women
working in factories
during
the same period rose only
1%.
And while the proportion
of women to men in the
workforce increased, the
proportion
of women to men working
in factories decreased. 59
„ hile
it is obvious that many
factors must have contributed
to
this shift, Baker points out
that across the river in New
Jersey, where little protective
legislation had been enacted,
the proportion of women working
in factories kept pace
with the increase in the population
of women and men, as
well as with the increase in
women's employment in the
„,ay

workforce as a whole.

While it is impossible to tell
what

part legislation played in this
relatively small shift
of women out of factory work in
New York, her study does
indicate that legislation may have played
some role in
moving women into certain unregulated
occupations, such
as clerical work.
The largest proportional increase in

women working in an occupation according
to the state report
was in clerical occupations, where women's
employment

increased by 12% over the decade.

addition to shifts in women's
occupational categories it is important to
note that a reduction
in the
legal working day for
women in factories often
meant a
reduction in pay. Though
manufacturers sometimes
increased
pay to compensate for lost
time, a Women's Bureau
study
of 1920 indicated that
only half of the industries
studied
nationwide increased pay rates
after the introduction
of

hour laws.

Pieceworkers were particularly
vulnerable,
as owners would often speed
up work in an attempt
to increase
productivity.
Without wage increases, therefore,
a

shorter

working day often translated
into a cut in pay or a work
speed-up.
in industries such as the
men's clothing trade,
no doubt homeworkers were
used to make up for time lost
in
the ractory.

Though the National Consumer's
League and
the WTUL had pushed for minimum
wage laws, the U.s. Supreme
Court ruled against a District of
Columbia law in
1923

(Adkins v. Children's Hospital) arguing
that minimum wage
laws constituted "price fixing" and
violated women's "freedom of contract." 01
In a decision that might seemingly
undercut all

protective legislation, the Court argued that
women had
acnieved equality with men through the 19th
amendment and
therefore no longer needed special protection under
the
law.

Qualifying their argument just enough to validate

maximum hours and night work

lav/s

for women, the Court

argued that while physical differences between the sexes

were substantial enough
to warrant protective
legislation
they were not great enough
to Justify the
regulation of
wages.
The Court thereby slipped
through the cracks
in its own arguments
and successfully
prevented minimum
wage laws for men or women
for nearly the next
two decades.
Wherever factory workers
retained wage levels at
pre-hour
law rates they did so without
the help of the
courts,

through their own organized
efforts.

While protective legislation
improved conditions
of women working in
predominantly female occupations
such
as sales and reinforced
tendencies towards a shorter
working
day for women in factories,
it is also clear that
protective
legislation translated into serious
setbacks for women
working in predominantly male
occupations. As has already
been noted, prohibitive legislation
threw women
out of

work in foundries, mines and
quarries, and effectively
excluded women from work in machine
tool operations (because
of the prohibition on work with
buffing and polishing

wheels.)

In addition, women printers and
transportation

workers also experienced the worst effects
of this legislation
In transportation the end of World War

I

combined

with the 54-hour law and night work prohibitions
to throw

almost 1,000 women employed in transportation
services
(as conductors,

guards, ticket agents, and in "related

occupations") out of work.

A study made by the New York

Bureau of Women in Industry
made in 1 91 9 indicated
the
adverse effects of doth
women's displacement
by men returning
home from the war and
night work and hour
restrictions.
While the end of the war
accounted for over
one-third of
tne women dismissed,
many women were dismissed
after the
effects of the war had passed,
with the extension
of laws

to include this occupation
in 1919.

By

1

920 the law was

amended to exempt all those
women working in transportation,
excejat those women working
as conductors or guards
(of
course, the highest paid
women.)
the end the effect
of legislation was to
permanently ban over 500 women
conductors and guards from the transit
63
lines of New

m

York.

Even by its own count, the
Women's Bureau report
of 1928 entitled, The Effects
of Labor Legislation on the
64
ESEloyment of Women
estimated that 60,000 women had
lost
their jobs nationwide as a result
of protective legislation.
Assuming the benefits to the remaining
eight million working
women in the United States, the
report concluded
that the

gams

of restrictive legislation far
exceeded the sacri-

fices of these 60,000 women.

Clearly, the impact of protective
legislation far

exceeded the women directly affected by
these laws.
As
Alice Kessler-Ilarris argues, women who were
hardest hit
were often at the cutting edge of new economic
opportunities
for women and their dismissal held serious
implications
for challenging a sex-segregated labor market. 65

The numbers

or women dismissed
couid not accurately
reflect the future

opportunities for work lost
by women as a whole.
Pushed
out of higher paying and
higher-skilled Jobs into
"women's'
work, their bargaining
power in the marketplace
would be
reduced.
In a self-fulfilling
prophesy, their weakened
position could then be used
to justify additional
"protection" by the state on the
grounds that women were
naturally unfit tor work
"never intended for them."
rne overall effects of
protective legislation must,
therefore, be understood in the
context of a broader sexual
division of labor: as long as
women remained employed at

women

work," protective legislation
would improve their
working conditions or leave them
entirely free from regulation; for women who challenged
this sexual division of
labor, protection would translate
into restriction.
And
restrictions placed on a minority of
women who had forced
their way into "male" occupations
could have a broad effect
on future possibilities for working
women.
Eliminated
s

from these occupations, these women
would be denied the
chance to challenge one of the most
well-entrenched foun-

dations of women's inequality--a
sex-segregated job market.
Conclusion- -Motherhood
and the State
Had the simple aim of legislation been the
improve-

ment of the health of women of child-bearing age
one might
have expected the state to enact legislation for
adequate

maternal leave

ohxld care or campaigns
to improve working
conditions themselves,
rather than eliminating
women from
certain jobs. Or if the
aim of legislation
was to protect
the "future of the raop"
race the result might
have been concern
for the health of fathers
as well as mothers.
After all,
the health hazards working
women were exposed to
also affected working men
and had little to do
with direct
threats to the female
reproductive system. But
clearly
the aim of legislation
went beyond the health
and safety
of mothers.
Instead, laws were designed
to reinforce
women's position in the home
by restricting the kind
of
work she could do outside of
it.
nr*

r'h-i

While state policy could not
insure that women
reproduced, it could at least
encourage women to maintain
a particular kind of
relationship to home and factory.
In an article entitled,
"Safeguarding the Mothers of Tomorrow," then-U.S. Secretary of
Labor, James L. Davis, drew
a clear picture of this
relationship, while he argued
that women have the right to earn
a living,
"at the same

time all will agree that women in
industry would not exist
an ideal social scheme.
Women have a higher duty and
a higher sphere in life, 6 6
As John Stuart Mill had argued

m

it

decades before.
It does not follow that a woman should
actually
support herself because she should be capable
doing sot in the natural course of events
she will not. 67

Though women might have
an abstract right to
compete in
the marketplace, this
right was undercut by
her more concrete
primary responsibilities
in the private
sphere of the home.
Not only did her real
responsibilities for domestic
labor
Place her at a disadvantage,
but the identification
of
au women as mothers (or potential
mothers,
by the state

provided the justification
for restricting women's
access
to paid labor outside the
home.
The logic of protective
legislation was a result not
of the fact that women's
"maternal function places her
at a disadvantage
in the

Struggle for subsistence" but
that the state had
interest in making sure, insofar

a

distinct

as it could, that women

- 1£llled

thiS eternal function.

It was not,

therefore,
for womenls interest in health
that protective legislation
was enacted but because of the
state's interest in women
as mothers.

Opponents of protection fought
legislation on the
simple grounds that women should be
accorded

the same liberal

rights as men.

As one working woman expressed it,

The clamor for food and self-expression
is
sharp and hurts.
It should and must be satistied so long as it doen t interfere
with the
rights of others .... Don t suggest to me
that the
law is for our good which says it is
better for
me to stay home and starve than to work
after dark 68
'

'

.

While men were defined within the classical
liberal tradition
as free individuals who ideally had the
right to freedom
i-rom

state interference in their work and family lives,

1

when's rights
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such as the working
woman guoted above,
argued, women should
bg
earn any income "so long
y as it
L doesn
doesn'tt interfere
t
with the
rights of others." But
the hey to protective
legislation
was precisely this:
Working women did in
essence "interfere
wrth the rights of
others" by subjecting
themselves to
the "hazards" of work,
precisely because the
state had
a special interest
in protecting motherhood.
Women's ability
to reproduce therefore
put her in a peculiar
relationship
to the state.
Women, from the point
of vi ew

^

•

of the state
were not free individuals,
but were mothers and
as such
they were a resource, an
asset, which the state
intended
to preserve.

,

Women's potential for
reproduction made her "physical
well-being" and "object of
public interest." As
then-Governor Smith (of New York) so
aptly put it, "the future
mothers
of this state are a resource
that we should conserve."
And as Smith later added, "I
can think of no greater asset
to the state than healthy
women and children.
The life
of the state is dependent
upon them ." 69 Women's ability
to reproduce, tnerefore, was
perceived as vital to the

state's interest and was explicitly
tied to the general
welfare of the social and political order.
As one member
of the Factory Investigating
Commission had put
it,

have got to preserve her

a

"we

little better if we are going

131

~

to have good future
citizens
-n-xzens.

"

70

M
Women's

^

role aas aa rep roj-uxe
Of Citi 2ens therefore
undercut her own
rights to

citizenshi p

<5

.

That the state viewed
its relationship
to women
differentiy than its
relationship to men was
made explicit
thS U S SUPrSme C° Urt
that finally upheld
a shorter day for
working men. Bunting
vs. Oregon «in
19,7,
As Anne Corinne Hill
had argued, while the
Muller decision
validated protective
legislation for women on
the grounds
that overworked women
made poor mothers, the
Bunting decision
rested on the grounds that
overworked men made poor

"

'

-

oiti-

While the Muller decision
inspired a plethora of
legislation for women nationwide,
the Bunting decision
went virtually ignored by
state courts, no doubt
because
male unions preferred
organization to legislation in
their
industries . 71
In any event, this
ideological distinction
between male citizens and female
mothers acted to reinforce
a sexual division of labor
between men and women through
which men are associated with
the public sphere and women
with the private sphere.
The antithesis between women's
role as mother and
her status as a citizen was
founded in the state's view
that the full and equal participation
of women in the paid
labor force was a threat to women's
role as "mother."

Given this logic, the increasingly
visible movement of
women into the paid labor force was viewed
by the

state

1

as a threat to both
good mothering
ana, by
y and
bv extension,
to
the genera! we! f are
of society
Constrained to some
degree
y rhetoric of women's
freedom to work,
fearful of taking
esponsibility for throwing
many women out of
work, and
also aware of both
pressure from industrialists
for the
need for women's cheap
labor, as well as
the need of the
working class families for
women's wages, the
state could
not simply enact laws
which excluded women
entirely from
industrial work.
instead, laws were designed
to reinforce
work patterns that were
perceived as consonant with
women's
role as "mother:" As women
moved farther away from
the
home, the heavier the
state's hand would be in
regulation.

This pattern becomes
especially clear when we
contrast
State policy regarding women
working outside the home

to

state policy on homeworkers.
In homework, where women’s
paid labor was viewed

as entirely consistent with
her duties as mother and
wife,
the state would decree that
it lacked the legitimate
police
powers to interfere in the "private"
activities of women
working at home.
In laundry work, for instance,
women

working outside the home were subject
to both hour laws
and night work laws.
But the law specifically

stated that

it was not to apply to women
doing laundry at home "for

family trade."

Women in the garment industry or working

in feather and flower-making factories
were subject to

regulation, while their homeworking sisters
were not.
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As already discussed,

undercut protective

such exemptions
p ions always served
to

deviation

by al lo„in women
g
who worked
faCt0rlSS t0 brlnS
h °- at the end
of the day and
continue working9 after ipdoi u
legal nours.
The logic of
protective

"

legislation was more attuned tn
to where women worked
than
to how Iona they worked.
Once in the ho me
where they
presumably belonged, they
would be free from
,

regulation.
from the point of view
of the ultimate
effect of
protective legislation-the
reinforcement of women's
primary
association with home lif
e--reg
U lati nn 01
of women working
emulation
at home was not necessary.

Indeed,

The interrelationship of
the public and private
worlds comes to the fore in
the study of protective
legislation for women.
And this is precisely what
both advocates
and opponents of legislation
failed to see.
The choice
really was not between
"protection" on the one hand and
"equality" on the other, but a
question of the relationship
between women’s private position
in the home and her public
position in the workforce. Reformers
failed
to see the

interdependence between these two spheres
and hence tried
to argue for women's primary
identification
as mothers

at the same time they demanded
improved conditions for

her outside the home.

In particular, arguments from such

powerful social reformers as Florence Kelley
and Josephine
Goldmark were based on assumptions about women
that grew

directly out of her association with home life.

As Alice

1
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Kessler-Harris points out,
reformers held that
the attributes
women developed in the
home, "compassion,
nurturance, a
better-developed sense of

morality-unfitted her for
com-

petitive economic struggle ." 72

Suc h arguments are
rerain

iscent of Mill's
conceptualization of the
ne ai&
distinct!
t
tinctly feminine
characteristics women developed
in private life
and provided
powerful fodder for arguments
justifying women's
protection
outside the home. But though
Mill questioned the
"naturalfoundation of these feminine
characteristics when he argued
that they were the result
only of women's confinement
to

the^home, progressive era
reformers went to great
lengths
to "scientifically" prove
the natural foundation
of these
qualities.
a very real sense, women's
position as mothers
did place her at a disadvantage
in the labor market.

m

As

discussed in chapter two, the very
structure of the labor
market was designed to accommodate
only single
workers

witout childcare responsibilities.

But to base this disad-

vantage in nature and not social
convention was to reinforce and broaden existing inequities
by further limiting
the options of women for work
and to reify

as natural social-

ly constructed sexual inequality.
In most accounts of protective
legislation,

the

state "disappears" into the background
and attention is
drawn to the social organizations, the

unions, the bosses,

and the social reformers who pushed through
legislation.

While state policy certainly didn't develop in
isolation

from the pressure of
these competing
interests, it would
distortion to view the
state as simply a
neutral
mediator, served only with
the task of mediating
conflict
and finding a satisfactory
compromise for all. As
we have
seen in this chapter,
the state had its
distinct interest
ln thS re9Ulati °" of
women s labor, one
thafc was
rectly to the maintenance
of a particular kind
of patriarchal social order. The
"protection" of women was
founded,
first, in the definition
of all women as
"mothers" and,
second, in the assumption
that women's full-time
employment
outside the home threatened
dominant definitions of
"motherhood." While many progressive
social reformers failed
to see the connections
between women's standing in
the
private world of the home and
her position in the public
world of politics and work, state
policy-makers explicitly
drew connections between these
two spheres.
At least,

m

^^

1

potentially,

they understood that the
entrance of women

into the

public" industrial workforce
threatened to disrupt
the "natural" order of things in
"private" family
life.

The state's interest in motherhood,
as it is reflected
in protective legislation, was
based on a more fundamental

interest in maintaining "proper" patriarchal
relations
in the private sphere of the home.

In the end,

legislation for women only would translate into

protective
a

reas-

sertion of women's primary identification with the
private
sphere of the family, an identification that would
preclude

1

her full and equal
participation in either the
public world
Of politics or the
public world
of work.

36

CHAPTER

IV

CONCLUSION: DEVELOPING A
FEMINIST

THEORY OF THE STATE

Scholars of every persuasion
have documented the
expansion of the liberal state
since the turn of the
century.
Whether condemning or
applauding this development,
the
Central questions to which
all analysts

of the liberal
state address themselves is
this*
Lais, fnr
tor wi-,
what purpose and
in whose interest does
the state serve? The
answers offered
to this question are as
varied as the political
perspectives they represent.
In this chapter I win
extend this
question to the issue of gender
relations.
More specifically,
what role has the state played
in relation to women's
inequality? And to what extent
and in what

ways,

if any,

has state policy reinforced
women's primary role as mother
and secondary position in the
market place?

Before going on to offer my specific
analysis,
which will contribute to the development
of a feminist
theory of the state, it is first
important to review the
oasic perspectives offered by the major
theories of the
state and political power.

While this is not intended

to be an exhaustive review of the literature,

I

hope to

outline some major questions and issues which will
serve
1
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as guide-posts for my
own analysis.
of this chapter

m

the first section

wall review a representative
composite
Of welfare liberal views
of the state before
moving on
to an assessment of the
major critics of this
view.
My
purpose will be to judge the
insights each perspective
can offer when applied to
my historical research.
In conclusion, I will develop my
own perspective and
address
some of the more fundamental
questions left unanswered
in previous chapters.
I

The G rowth of Welfare Liberalism,

Prior to the rise of welfare
liberalism, the classical liberalism of eighteenth
and nineteenth century
society
posited a sharp distinction between
political and economic
activities and argued for a distinctly
laissez-faire view
of the state.
Agruing that the economic system
was ruled
by a set of natural and immutable
laws, economists
such

as Adam Smith concluded that
state power to regulate eco-

nomic activity should be strictly
limited.
they argued, both the economy and
society as
self -regulating.

Left to itself,
a

whole were

Equilibrium (though not economic equality)

would prevail only if all artificial
political constraints
on economic relations were removed.

Left to themselves,

the citizens of the polity could negotiate
and contract

ireely over the means of their subsistence.

Concurrent with this division between the state

and the economy came

closely related set of
princioles
Which would, ostensibly,
rule the services and
functions
performed by the state.
In the laissez-faire
view of things
the state was to be decidely
"dis-interested" in the affairs
of its citizens.
As I have discussed
in chapter one, the
ends of political life were
decisive! v lowered with
decisively
the
development of classical liberalism.
No longer would the
State promote the ethical and
moral precepts which it
embodied in previous eras.
Instead, the state would
be transformed from "an ethical
association for the attainment
Of virtue" to an "instrumental
relation" designed only
to protect the life, liberty
and property of its citizens
Toward this end, the state would
be limited in its positive
action to the protection of society
from the invasion of
other independent nations, and the
protection of individual
citizens from the interference of
others through a strictly
defined legal system.
a

i
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Central to this view was the assumption
of the
state's neutrality.

Classical liberal thinkers posited

the state as "above" the conflicts of
society, and offered
an ideal of the state as free from the
influence of priv-

ileged groups or classes in society.

Laws would be enacted

which protected the fundamental rights of citizens
and
each citizen would be judged equally under the law.
Though there are few who would argue that the state

achieved in practice what the laissez-faire view preached,

by the turn of the
twentieth century it was
clear to ,„any
groups that the classical
literal view was
inadequate

The development of
large-scale corporations,
the erosion
Of a familial-based
patriarchy, class struggle
and massive
igration all forced to the
surface renewed debates
over
the proper role of the
state in society.
Corporate elites
pressured the state towards
more positive action in
order
to stabilize the marketplace;
social reformers and labor
organizations demanded that the
state take action to ameliorate the worst effects of
industrialization; and the growth
not only of the Progressive
movement but of the Socialist
Party and the International
Workers of the World threatened
to radicalize party politics.

The impetus behind the expansion
of the state at
the turn of the century was
rooted not only in an increasing
ly volatile class conflict,
but also in a growing concern
over the stability of family relations.
Progressive era
reformers brought family issues to the
center of reform
politics and spread the fear of the
breakdown of "traditional” American family forms.
In addition, the immigration
of

(particularly) southern European immigrants
to the United
States and the internal migration of blacks
roused nativist
fears of "race suicide ." 2

In the face of all of these

pressures, the state, with the aid of political theoreticians v/ith pens ready, took positive steps to reinforce
and reconstruct the class and gender order.

One of the best known
and influential
thinkers
Progressive era, Herbert
Croly, laid out most
clearly
the principles underlying
what would become
generally accepted as welfare liberalism.
What Croly provided
was
a view that synthesized
the need for state
social and
economic regulation with an
acceptance of both the new
corporate economy and of a
distinctly liberal commitment
to
democratic values.
in his influential work.
The Promise of American

Life

909), Croly begins by asserting
some of the basic
principles of classical liberalism
and then going on to
(

1

modify them.

Ideally, political privileges
are to be
abolished through the democratic
system: "If any citizen
or any group of citizens
enjoys by virtue of the law
any
advantage over their fellow-citizens,
then the most sacred
principle of democracy is violated." 4
While advocating

political equality, Croly is quick to
point out that he
is not advocating economic or
social equality:
"Such an

organization may permit radical differences
among individuals
in the opportunities and possessions
they actually
enjoy;

but no man would be able to impute his
own success or failure
to the legal framework of society."

13

They key to demo-

cratic political rights was found, therefore,
in the neutrality of the law and the state. The restriction

of state

power to providing only the basic political rules of
the
game was essential to the idea of equal opportunity.

In

1

i SSQZ

f cl 1 3T G

l"PrmQ
terms,

42

the_ purpose of
government was strictly
limited: "The power to
co legislate
leaisla^ implies
t
the power to
discriminate; and the best
way consequently
for a good
democracy of equal rights
to avoid the danger
of discrimination will be to organize
the state so that
its power
for ill win be rigidly
restricted, "6
4- 1—

-i

According

fco

fche

Classical liberal model,
therefore, government
must be
made "feeble and devoid of
independence."
But Croly perceived that
the growing class
conflict
in the United States
required more than this.
Working

Class dissent over the
accumulation of wealth and
the power
maior corporations had gained
over the federal government
led Croly to assert a new
role for the state.
As Croly
argued, "The national public
interest has to be affirmed
by positive and aggressive
action.
The nation has to
have a will and a policy as
well as the individual; and
this policy can no longer be
confined to the merely negative
task of keeping individual rights
from becoming in any
way privileged." 7 Perceiving
that the practice of state
non-interference is "just as selective in
its effects as
the practice of state interference"
Croly argued for the

development of a balance in government
between "selection
by non-interference" and "active
selection."

In a time

when economic opportunities were shrinking
for the great
mass of people, the state would have to actively
insure

its own survival through the assurance that
equal opportunity

W3. S

Still Qf foctiv^
tective.
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solution was for the
state to
offer more "positive
services" inn order to
maintain the
"loyalty of the economically
less independent class ." 8
in this way the state
could strike a balance
between individual political liberty,
the maintenance of
a modified
tree market capitalism,
and the democratic
distribution
of political, if riot
economic,
,

,

power.

central to the welfare liberal
view was the presu rai
tion that the state would
take on a new relationship
to
the conflicts of society,
while the classical view
ideally
Placed the state "above" the
conflicts of groups and individuals in the civil order,
welfare liberals placed the
state at the heart of such
conflicts. But instead of promoting a more broadly defined
social
interest,

was to play the role of neutral
mediator.

the state

Emptied of its

moral associations and consigned
with the task of the most
basic protection of individual rights,
the state would
oversee the negotiations of conflicts
between individual
citizens or groups of citizens.
In its presumably neutral
umpire status the state would enforce
the basic
rules of

the game and provide the arena through
which social com-

petitors could meet, negotiate, and find
compromise.
Essential to the growth of the state was

a con-

tinuing redefinition of those activities rightfully
viewed
as subject for state regulation.

In other words,

the

expansion of the state required an expansion of the

definition of the boundaries
of "public life."
In a campaign speech of 1912,
Woodrow Wilson explicitly
brought
this issue to the foreground.
Arguing that "America
is

not now, and cannot in the
future be, a place for
unrestricted individual enterprise"
Wilson proposed a
redefinition
Of the proper spheres of
9
state power.

Wilson begins by pointing
to the transformation
Of housing in urban areas
that has resulted from
industrialization and immigration.
In the past "every family
had
its own little premises,
[and] .. .every
lanu
everv famii,,
lamily was separated
in its life from every other
family." 10 B ut
'

j

now families

are "piled layer upon layer"
in the tenement districts.
Changing circumstances thus require
new responsibilities
for the state.
In Glasgow, he argues "they
have made up
their minds that the entries and
the hallways of great
tenements are public streets" and the
state now has the

responsibility of protecting citizens there.
stated it,

As Wilson

"These are the highways of human movement,
and

wherever light is needed, wherever order
is needed, there
we will carry the authority of the city." 11
He then
goes

on to draw an analogy between this example
and that of

the state's regulation of the Steel Corporation.

Corporation, he argues, is "just as much

a

The Steel

public business

as a great tenement house is a public highway" and
"therej-ore,

whenever bodies of men employ bodies of men, it ceases

to be a private relationship." 12

The state, therefore,

has the responsibility
Y to act as
foster father" in
order
to safeguard the lives
of its citizens.
But from the liberal
point of view the
question
remained as to how increased
state power could
remain
compatible with an older ideal
of political power
as demo-

cratically decentralized.

if the state was
to act,

the

question remained, in whose or
what interests would it
do so? In short, how would
the positive state
remain
accountable to the interests of
all citizens?
terms
the welfare liberal paradigm,
the pluralist model of
the distribution of political
power would supply the
answer.
Thus in order to continue the

m

discussion, it is now necessary

to look more critically at
the pluralist definition
of

political power and the major
criticisms of this perspective.
In addition, I will begin
to apply this more theoretical
work to the historical case studies
I

have laid out in

previous chapters.
lheories of Policital Power
Pluralism
As the early twentieth century
economy increasingly

came to be seen as lacking self-regulation

,

an evolving

pluralist ideology of a self-regulating political
market
developed, one that was offered as

failing economic market.

a

substitute for the

Of this competitive political

market, Bentley wrote, "when we have a group that
partici-

pates in the political system we always have another group

1

facing it in the same
plane."

1
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the state did not express
an independent
interest of its'
own, and neither
discriminated in favor of
nor against
any particular position
in the political
marketplace of
Weas. Rather, its responsibilities
remained contained
to the insurance that all
significant interests gained
a fair hearing in the
decision-making arena.

The underlying definition
of political power
which
informed this pluralist
perspective defined power as
simply
"the capacity of "A" to get
"B" to do something he
otherwise would not do ." 14 Power
relations, therefore, are
most explicit in cases where
overt conflict exists between
identifiable individuals or groups
of individuals and where
a particular decision on
a given issue is at stake.
Extending this model to an understanding
of state politics, legislators are lobbied and influenced
by a variety of actors
and pass laws which are perceived
to be in (at least the
compromised) interests of all those
concerned with a given
issue.
From this point of view, no one individual
or group
(except perhaps those on the very fringe
of an issue) are

entirely excluded from the political process.

As the ability

to influence the legislative process
is available to all

citizens, power is assumed to be widely distributed
throughout the social order through this democratic
process of

competition, negotiation and compromise.

From the pluralist-liberal
point of view, the struggle over protective labor
legislation in New York
would
stand as evidence of the
democratic distribution of
political
Power.
A variety of distinct
interest groups pushed
for
their own interests and
formed alliances with
other groups
who shared their policy
preferences: Organized women
workers
fought for shorter hours and
better working conditions;
manufacturers opposed the restriction
of their ability
to freely trade with labor,
male or female; organized
male
workers sought protection from
the competition of women
workers; and social reformers
pressured the state to protect
motherhood and what they saw as a
disintegrating family life.
Through the democratic pluralist
system, each group has
an opportunity to express such
preferences.
Legislators
who are responsive to such groups
enact laws which best
serve the compromised interest of
all-enacting protective
legislation for some women workers,
exemptions for others,
and leaving the door open for future
amendment of the law.
Those groups viewed as on the fringe of a
political issue,
such as the National Woman's Party, would be
unable to

generate enough popular support (from other women's
groups,
for instance) and would lose on that particular
issue.
In the case of homework,

the state would also develop

policy in response to pressures from

a

variety of groups

and take the middle ground of indirect and limited regulation
of homev/ork through the licensing system.

Through the

licensing system the state
could address the concerns
of
the National Consumer's
League over the spread
of disease,
and the concerns of the
National Child Labor
Committee
over the use of child labor
by homeworkers.
And through
the licensing system the
state could strike a
balance
be-

tween manufacturers' demands
for no regulation and
the
demands of organized labor for
the abolition of homework.
In both cases, the state
would play no active role
in the
formation of policy but would be a
"dependent variable"
of the combined interests of
all those parties concerned
with both protective labor legislation
and the regulation
of homework.

While the pluralist model might help
to explain
part of the process by which
legitimized and well-organized
interests gained access to the decision-making
process,
it would be inadequate to address
the question of how and
why certain issues and groups are excluded
from this process
Recent reforms of this pluralist model can
go some distance
in addressing this question.

Theories of Political PowerRef ormism

Ihe pluralist model has come under attack from
a

number of different directions.

Authors such as Schatt-

schneider and Bacnracn and Baratz, addressing themselves
to more contemporary problems, but gleaning insights which

are at least as applicable to my study, have pointed to

what they

caU

the "bias of the
system."

Political powef
exercised, Schattschneider
ar gues not only
through
the overt conrlict or
interests represented
by the liberal
definition, but by excluding
certain groups or issues
from
the political process
entirely,

-

,

^
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Bachrach and Baratz shifted
the focus of analysis
onto what they terra the
"second face of power." 16
Rather
than focussing exclusively
on those specific

issues which
were addressed through the
formal political process,
they
argued that it was equally
important to critically analyze
the "nondecision-making process."
Not only

was it importan

then to look at who wins and
who loses on the political
battleground, but it was essential
to understand which
groups and what kinds of issues and
concerns were excluded,
suffocated, or derailed before gaining
entrance
to the

decision-making arena.
In sum,

what

I

will refer to as the "reformist"

model, argues that power is exercised
not only in the

strictly behaviorist sense of directly
observable decisions
and their effects, but also when the holders
of power prevent
an issue from entering the public arena.
As Bachrach
and

Baratz state, "to the extent that a person or
group--con-

1
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sciously or unconsciously-creates or reinforces
barriers
to the public airing
of policy conflicts,
that person or
group has power ." 17
Clearly, the insights
offered by the reformist
model speak to the history
of the state's
regulation of
women's labor, and to questions
about the limits to the
ways in which working women
could influence the
nature
of that regulation.
Host obviously, women's
lack of the
vote and her formal status
as a ward of the state
certainly
undercut the potential impact
women could have on the

development of legislation.

But as we have seen,
women's

disenfranchised status didn't entirely
exclude women from
the law-making process.
Through strong organizations
women
could and did have some impact on
the decision-making

process.

But the question remains as to
which organizations and
what kinds of issues were allowed
entrance into

this process.

Certainly, a vast number of women who
had

a

stake in pro-

tective legislation, for instance, had
little access to
the public arena of debate.
Unorganized women
workers,

those in the ghettoized female sectors of
the economy such
as domestics, occupations which employed
predominantly

non-white women, and women in non-traditional "male"
occupations had little to say, even though some of these
women
had the most to lose with the enactment of restrictive
and prohibitive laws.

As we have seen few of these women

(such as the women foundry workers

)

were even called before

the Factory Investigating
Commission in New York
or the
legislature to give testimony.
in addition,

the position offered by
the National

Woman's Party-that protective
legislation should apply
equally to male workers-was
never given serious
consideration in the formal political
process.
Members of the
National Woman's Party were never
called before the F.I.c.
to present their position,
and so were denied the
formal
routes of entry into political
debate.
Groups which did gain direct
access, such as the
Women's Trade Union League in
alliance with other organizations in the Women's Joint
Legislative Conference were
also limited in the kinds of
proposals they could make.
For instance, after attempting to
introduce minimum wage
and health insurance measures, they
were subject to the

red-baiting tactics of conservative
legislators in alliance
with staunchly "free market" manufacturers.
Such
tactics

could and did serve to undercut proposals
that went beyond
the established grounds for debate.
Proposals which sought
to extend protection to both sexes, or sought
to raise

the income-earning power of women, therefore,
were explicitly

excluded from formal consideration.
In addition,

it is also important to point out

that manufacturers who advocated the abolition of all laws

restricting women's labor were given limited hearing.
Changing attitudes towards the state's responsibility for

IOr thS

heaUh and Safety
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wor kers and, acre
fun-

damentally, State regulation
of potential class
conflict,
left little room for
arguments in favor of a
more tradi-'
tional laissez-faire stance
by
Lne state.
y the
state
a
Again,
as Woodrow
Wilson had expressed in,
America was no longer
a place
for 'unrestricted individual
enterprise." what is
important
for us to question is the
nature and extent of state
restrictions, not only in terms of
regulating capital, but in
•

terms of regulating women's
labor.

The case of homework

can help to draw this question
to the foreground.
As we have seen in chapter
two, homeworkers themselves were never called upon
to express opinions about
the regulation or conditions of
their work, and no organization existed which expressed the
interests and concerns
of these working immigrant
mothers.
Questions and issues
that might have served in the interests
of these women,
who needed to both care for children
and earn a living
wage, therefore, were never adequately
addressed, either

through formal or informal routes.

In addition, most home-

workers were recent immigrants and confronted
language
barriers to the expression of their interests
through

political system unfamiliar to them.

a

Since both labor

and reform organizations advocated the abolition
of homework,

and attempted to rescind the homework licenses of families

who were found to employ their children or contain members
v/ith

infectious diseases, most homeworkers tended to avoid

all contact with such
organizations.

But clearly the

problems involved in the
development of homework
legislation transcend the question
of homeworkers'
participation
an the formal political
system.
And this question can
lead us to examine some
of the fundamental
inadequacies
of the reformist model
of political power
relations,

it
is not just that homeworkers
lacked the organization
to

express their interests as

a

class, but that the terms

Of the debate were such
that the issues they were
concerned

with were excluded from debate.
Beyond the important corrective
the reformist
perspective offers to the pluralist
model of power relations,
it remains commited to a
view of political power
relations
that stresses overt conflict
between articulated
interests.

Even though the reformist
corrective can expand our view
to include those issues and
interest excluded from the

political process, it focusses too
exclusively on those
interest, both inside and outside the
political arena,
which are already fully articulated. As
Bachrach and
Baratz state, the critical investigator

must determine if those persons and groups
apparently disfavored by the mobilization
Oj. bias nave grievances,
overt or covert ... overt
grievances are those that have already been expressed and have generated an issue within the
political system, whereas covert ones are still
outside the system.
^

Although Bachrach and Baratz focus attention on potential
issues instead of those which are already explicitly repre-

sented in the decision-making
process, their emphasis
still
lies on those grievances
which are articulated,
whether
inside or outside of the
formal political system.
The
exercise of decision-making
and nondecision-making
power,

therefore, is only identifiable
when conflict, either
overt
or covert, exists over
articulated interests. when
no
such conflict exists, consensus
must be assumed.
Bachrach and Baratz's modification
of, ye t fundamental ties to the pluralist
model leaves them with an
approach which is inadequate to
account for the ways in
Which power can be used to prevent
the very articulation
of interests which run counter
to the status
quo.

Part

or this problem lies in their
narrow definition of interests

and grievances.

As Steven Lukes has argued:

S lere aSSUn ed that if men
feel no grievances,
Jhen
then tt
they hhave no interests that are
harmed by the
Power
But this is highly unsatisfactory,
the first place, what, in any case
is a grievance-an articulated demand, based on
political knowledge,
an undirected complaint arising out
of everyday
experience, a vague feeling of unease or
sense of
’

'

.

deprivation?
In short,

1

the reformist model cannot account for
the more

subtle ways in which power is exercised.
Lukes offers a radical critique of the reformist

position--one which attempts to clarify the ways in which
challenges to the structure of power in society are thwarted.
First, he argues that the most insidious exercise of power
is rooted in the ability of powerholders

to prevent people, to
whatever deqree from
f
having grievances by shapina
fh P ir
cognitions and preferences ? n J l Perceptions,
they accept their ro^
7
^n the existing
'

no'alternati^e^rir or^ ^

806

^

^9^°'

6
natural and unchangeable
^rbecaus^the
rt as divinely ordained
^nd
,

bene?icL^^

What one must focus on,
therefore, is not just
overt or
covert conflicts of interest,
but latent conflict
between
the interests of those who
hold power and what Lukes
calls
the "real interests" of
those excluded from
power-holding
positions.
Lukes thereby defines power
as the ability
of "A to affect B in a manner
contrary to B's interests." 2
While pluralists define "interests"
in terms of explicit
policy preferences or wants, and
the reformist model graft:
onto this definition those wants or
preferences "deflected,
'

submerged or concealed," Lukes offers
a definition which
includes that which one would want or
prefer if able to
make a choice.

The restriction of choice, either
by ex-

cluding certain individuals or groups from
the political
process altogether, or the systematic or
organizational
limitation of the kinds of issues which are
allowed entry
into public politics, or the limitation of
the expression
of interests in more subtle ideological ways
would all

constitute, for Lukes, the exercise of power.
the problems raised by Lukes'

insight will be developed

by me in my concluding section.
to develop the rest of Lukes'

Some of

First,

critique.

it is important

Lukes also argues
that the reformist
model is too
individualistic to account For- n
for the more
fundamental ways
in which the "mobilization
of uias
bias" it, enforced.
on
While
the reformist model can
n address the ways
in which individual
decision-makers, either consciously
or not, limit the
access
Of Challengers of the
status guo to the
decision-mating
arena, it cannot adequately
address the "socially
structured and culturally
patterned behaviour
-F

of groups,

and

practices of institutions,
which may indeed be
manifested
by individuals' inaction ." 22
An analysis, therefore,
of the individual or
groups
involved in the development of
protective labor legislation
or homework regulation, or
even an analysis which
considered

those groups excluded from formal
political debate, would
remain inadequate.
Rather, one needs to question
the broader
social limits within which debate
took
place.

For instance,

viewing the struggle over protective
labor legislation
for women only as a struggle
between "protection" on the
one hand and "equality" on the
other

would be insufficient.

Rather (as
L°

I

have argued in chapter three) it
is necessary

understand this debate in the context of
both

a

sexually

segregated marketplace and the ideological
identification
of all women as potential mothers.

homework,

And in the case of

it would be important to understand not
only

the state's reluctance to interfere in the
private lives
of nomeworkers

,

but to analyze the fundamental commitment

0. power-holders to
, pertiouler

“
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both bo.e
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mothers as legitimate
wage-earners.
Recent works by marxist
theorists have offered
critiques of the pluralist
model along
the same lines.

Political power relations can
not be understood, they
argue,
in isolation from the
broader economic and socral

constants

Which shape and limit power
relations in the formal
political arena.
As we shall see in the
following section,
such an approach can shed some
light on-and create new
problems for— an understanding
of women's
labor policy.

the ories of Political Power
Marxist Perspectives
In sharp contrast to both the
pluralist and reformist

perspectives, most marxist analysts view
power as concentrated at the top of a highly stratified
social order.

The state, rather than serving the
interests of all citizens, or playing the neutral role of
umpire, plays an active
and necessary role in maintaining this
highly stratified

order by resolving the social, political, and
economic

comlicts inherent
inequalities.
a

in a society built upon fundamental

While most marxists view state policy as

reflection of the interests of those at the top of the

class order, marxists differ widely over the process by

which economic privilege is translated into political power.
In this section

I

will highlight the insights and limitations

1
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of the instrumentalist
and structuralist
marxist views
Of the state and draw
out the implications
of both for
a feminist theory of
the state.

The orthodox marxist view
of the state
characterizes
state policy as "an instrument
in the hands of the
ruling
class for enforcing and
guaranteeing the stability
of the
Class structure itself 22
In its crudest
.

^

instrumental view points to the
class background of key
executive, legislative, and
administrative leaders, as
well as to those elite
organizations which are viewed
as
influential in the design and
implementation of state
policy.
In particular, emphasis
is laid on the ability
or economic elites to set
the broad limits to political
debates through the influence of
policy research groups
and the constant exchange of
personnel between the top
of the political and economic
orders.
From this point
of view, control at the top is
solidified well enough to

thwart challenges from those excluded
from political and
economic power. Weinstein's study 24 of
the National Civic
Federation
transforming, coopting and incorporating

m

working class demands during the Progressive
Era stands
as one example of this instrumentalist
perspective.
io bring the discussion back to my own
analysis,

what might an analogous instrumental feminist theory
of
the state look like, and what might be the problems
with

such an analysis?

Undoubtedly, such a perspective would

focus attention on the gender
of those in power and
argue
that state policies which
reinforce sexual inequality
are
result. Or

the

act

that those in power are
male,

state
policy, therefore, represents
the direct translation
of
the interests of those males
in power.

While no feminist analysis would
argue the irrelevancy of the fact that almost all
powerful political leaders
in the U.S. have been male,
this perspective would still
leave many questions unanswered.
First, such a perspective
would necessarily view the solution
in terms of changing
the gender of those in power.
But as Margaret Thatcher
and Jeane Kirkpatrick can attest to,
femaleness often has
nothing to do with feminism. An
instrumentalist approach
would be poorly prepared to address this
problem, primarily
because such an approach fails to adequately
account
for

the role of ideology and the pressures of
broader systemic

limits to the development of state policy (both
of which
I

will address shortly.
Second, an instrumentalist feminist perspective

v/ould

undoubtedly define the "patriarchal class" as "all

males" without regard to the question of the different

interests economic class or racial divisions internal to
this class might entail.

Political struggles over protective

labor legislation can bring this problem into focus: while
it was in the interests of unionized male workers to have

women

protected right out of their jobs," male manufacturers

sought to eliminate all forms
of protection for women
workers so that they might better
exploit both female and
male workers.
This division, I would argue,
was not simply
a reflection of the underlying
class conflict between male
workers and male bosses, but reflects
a division based
on the patriarchal interests of
both.
One could tentatively
suggest (though this is an issue worthy
of another dissertation) that the struggle over this
issue represents a
larger struggle over the transformation
of patriarchy from
a familially- based to a more
socially-based form: while
male workers preferred to see women
remain at home and
completely outside of the workforce,
manufacturers wanted
to be able to exploit women's labor
in a way they could

only do

m

a

patriarchal society, where women's labor is

systematically undervalued.

Here we can see how class

and gender interests converged to form the
foundations
of a political battle which reflected

the different inter-

ests of working class and upper class males.

Subject to pressure from both of these fronts,
the state found the solution in the enactment of legis-

lation which allowed women into the marketplace, but which

reinforced

a

sexually segregated labor market.

Women's

labor could be exploited, but only if it did not fundamen-

tally interfere with her primary responsibilities in the
home, place her in direct competition with male workers,

or encourage women to enter more highly-paid occupations.

It is clear,

then, that at least in
this case,

the state'

s

legitimacy rested on the
accommodation of two conflicting,
though not irreconcilable
tendencies of a patriarchal
social
system.
More sophisticated marxist
analyses have offered
critiques of the instrumentalist
view, which would be equally
applicable to the feminist version
I've just laid out.
Marxists have argued that the
instrumentalist approach
is too individualistic and
behaviouralist, and in this
sense shares many of the problems
of its pluralist target.
By focussing attention on the
conscious and intentional
rule of individual power-holders,
this perspective fails
to consider the role of ideology in
power relations as
well as as the structural constraints
on the state which
transcend the intentional will of individual
decision-makers.
First,

it has been argued that divisions
internal

to the ruling class preclude the state's
direct control

by one sector of that class 25
.

Any understanding of state

policy, therefore, would have to be set within
the broader

context of the state

s

responsibility for the more general

reproduction of social order and the maintenance of the
fundamental requirements of the class system.

Block has statea,

As Fred

instrumentalism fails to recognize that

to act in the general interest of capital,

the state must

be able to take actions against the particular interests
of capitalists ." 25

The state's responsibility for systemic

stability, therefore, meant that
it must play a "relatively
autonomous" role in the construction
of long-term social
order.
And managers of the state would
continue to develop
policy in the interests of the
capitalist class not necessarily out of an explicit class
consciousness (as the instrumentalist view posits) but because the
power of political
elites was systematically dependent
upon the continuing
maintenance of the economic order. The
pursuit of state
policy in the interest of capital is
dependent not only
upon the class consciousness of individual
power-holders,
out also on the structural requirements
of the capitalist
system, which ties the legitimacy of the
state, for instance,
to the tax revenues available only in a
"healthy” economy.
Second, marxist critics have argued that the
func-

tions the state performs are not just economic,
but are

ideological.

Specifically, though the state might act

in tne interests of those at the top of the
economic order,
it must at least appear to be democratically influenced

by and concerned with those excluded from power in order
to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of most citizens.
In order to clarify both the structural pressures on the

state and also address some of the problems raised by a

deterministic view of ideology it is necessary to briefly
review the structuralist variant of marxist theory.

Structuralist marxist theorists have taken

a

position

at the opposite end of the spectrum from instrumentalism

and have argued that the
state is systematically
limited
by the needs, constraints
and contradictions inherent
in
capitalist accumulation. The
primary function of the state,
therefore, is to attempt to
ameliorate the conflicts
created
by these.
In contrast to instrumentalism,
state policy
is determined by the structural
constraints of the capitalist
social order rather than simply
by the control or participation of economic elites over the
state.

According to the structuralist
perspective, the
maintenance of an economic infrastructure

(such as trans-

portation and research and development),
expenditures for
military protection for capital expansion
overseas,
and

the expense of supporting, through
welfare programs, the

casualties of

a

capitalist economy would all constitute

structural requirements that set limits to
state policy

regardless of who is at the helm of the state.

Indeed,

from the structuralist point of view,
participation by

ruling elites in the political system is neither
necessary
nor desirable.

As Poulantzas states,

"it can be said that

the capitalist state best serves the interests
of the

capitalist class only when members of this class do not

participate directly in the state apparatus ...." 28
While the structuralist perspective is suggestive,
its fatal flaw lies in the fact that in overstating the

case it leaves us with

human agency.

a

perspective that is devoid of

As Miliband has stated in response to

Poulantzas
What his exclusive stre^o on " A u
1 *'
tions” suggests is thlt
f,hat
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7
otner words, that the structuralrelations"! "
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compelling
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From the structuralist point
of view, therefore,
relations
Of domination are relatively
"fixed." state policy
reflect,
the systemic needs of the
capitalist order, while the
state's legitimacy is maintained
through a mystifying
ideology which paints the illusion
that the state serves
in the interests of all citizens,
the ideology of liberal
pluralism.
In the end, the allegiance
of those
at the

bottom of the social system is
maintained only through
the mystification of the state's
true functions.

Even

though the state must play a relatively
autonomous role
in order to perform its functions
adequately, it remains
in the last instance captive of the
interests of the ruling

class
The problem with this perspective is that it
is

built upon
a

a

concept of dominant ideology that both lacks

sense of human agency and eliminates any concept
of social

struggle.

From the point of view of instrumentalism, only

those at the top have human agency, that is, have the

ability to effect social change; from the structuralist
point of view, even those at the top are devoid of agency,

Of an ability to
translate will into action,

since their

actions are in large part
determined by "the system."
neither account is the ability
to challenge the
structure
of power given legitimate
consideration. Working class
interests, or from a feminist
point of view, the

m

true

interests of women are rarely
given consideration through
the formal political system,
and policy which appears
to
be in their interests in
reality only serves to
reinforce
structural inequalities.
Such a perspective has led to
a reinterpretation
of state policies which on
the surface appear to serve
the interests of dominated
classes.
Welfare policy, for
instance, has been viewed not only
as the result of a humanitarian impulse on the part of the
state or as the result
of demands from the poor, but
as a tool of social control
aimed at quelling working class dissent.
When taken to
an extreme, the interpretation of all
state policy from
the point of view of dominant classes
can lead to some
P rett Y unusual political judgements.

If we accept that welfare is controlled
by
capital and acts against the welfare of working

people, then why should we fight the cuts? We
should welcome them... as a direct cut in the
power of the ruling class over the working class 30
.

Analogously, are we to assume that protective legislation was the result only of the needs of
social order?

a

patriarchal

And if so, how are we to explain the strength

and longevity of tne support of women's organizations for

protective labor legislation?

Or the preference,
however

qualified, of homeworkers to
remain at home? Clearly,
we need a more complex
approach here, and one that
does
not rely exclusively on a
definition of ideology as false
consciousness, or explain the support
of women for legislation in terms of their being
"dupes" of those in power.
Still, some variation of a
structuralist feminist
analysis has strengths which the
individualistic approaches
of pluralism, reformism and
instrumentalism do
not.

my concluding section

I

In

will draw some of these out,
together

With the idea that any feminist
theory of the state that
can do justice to women's history
must employ a concept
of social struggle.
Summary and Conclusion
Though the pluralist model can shed some
light
on the process by which well-organized
interest groups

parlay for influence within the formal decision-making
arena, the pluralist model is inadequate to account
for
the ways in which gender inequality both informs
and is

reproduced by the state.

First, the pluralist perspective

assumes both the neutrality of the state and the political

equality of all citizens.

Each citizen, it is presumed,

has ample opportunity to express his or her interest, to

influence the construction of state policy, and each citizen
is treated equally under the law.

Crucial to the assumption

Of the state's neutrality
and of a generalized
political

equality is a second fundamental
assumption rooted in pluralist theory: the neutrality
of the state is built
upon a
presumed disjuncture between
political and economic
power.

From this point of view,
both class and gender
inequality are viewed as ideally
irrelevant to political
power.
For instance, while economic
power may be relatively
concentrated, political power remains
relatively decentralised and dispersed throughout the
polity.
Indeed, pluralists
argue that the best insurance against
a class-based politics
is through the establishment of
a representative and
politically democratic order, where the
state serves in the

interests of all citizens.
While the reformist model can broaden
our perspective
to include an understanding of the ways
in which certain
issues, groups and interests are excluded
from formal

political consideration, it remains committed
to some of
the same fundamental assumptions proposed
by pluralism.
In other words,

the reformist model offers a corrective,

but not a fundamental critique of pluralism.

The reformist

model, therefore, points to the ways in which the
political

process has failed to live up to its ideal, without questioning the veracity of that ideal.

Marxist analyses have offered

a

more fundamental

critique of the liberal assumptions upon which pluralism
is built.

By challenging the liberal disjuncture between

political and economic power,
marxist scholars have
argued
that the structure of
political power is a
reflection of
more basic class relations,
whether through the direct
control of economic elites
or through more subtle
systemic
pressures, marxists have argued
that the state represents
not the interests of all
citizens, but the interests
of
those at the top of the economic
order.
From this point
Of view, pluralism operates
as a (false) ideological
mask
over the class basis of state
policy.
other words,
the division between political
and economic power is illusory
and that illusion is maintained
at least in part by

m

the

promulgation of pluralist ideology.
By focussing attention on the
interconnections

between economic power and the
structure and nature of
state power, the marxist perspective
can begin to provide
the kind of framework of analysis
more appropriate to an

understanding of the state's relationship
to gender inequality.

Yet still, this perspective is inadequate.

While

the pluralist perspective presupposes
a rather indulgent

view of the distribution of political power
and popular
control over the formation of state policy, most
marxist

perspectives tend to view power as both concentrated
and
unified at the top of the political order.

I

will argue

that what is needed is a perspective that can view the

development of state policy as
specific social struggles.

a

product of historically

In addition,

I

will argue that

the state is limited
by an underlying
committment to a

broadly defined patriarchal
social system in much
the same
way as marxists have
argued it is limited by
the broad
requirements of capitalist
class relations.
Put simply,
thS f ° ll0Win 9 secti °" I
will confront the
question of
What it means to say that
the state is patriarchal.
In contrast to the
perspectives offered so far,
I would argue
that the state operates
as an arena for the
resolution of conflicts created
by the needs of both
capitalism and patriarchy.
This is not to argue that
the state

is a neutral mediator
of conflict,

nor is the state consti-

tuted by a simple reflection
of the needs and interests
of those at the top of the
stratified social order. Rather
I would argue,
the purpose of the state is
to resolve
conflict within the broad confines
of its commitment to
both capitalism and patriarchy.
in this sense, the state
is not free to act in the interests
of all citizens equally,
but is limited by certain systemic
pressures upon which
its legitimacy is based.
Given my historical case studies,
what might one identify as the
distinctly patriarchal pressures or commitments of the state?
First,

I

would argue that the purpose of state

policy has been to reinforce a sexualized
division between
a public male world and a female
private world.
As

I

have

discussed in chapter one, the foundations of the
liberal
state were built upon a critique of the paternalistic

authority of an aristocratic
social order.
The voluntarist
View of state power required
a fundamental
critique of
a social order where
political authority was
based explicitly
upon traditional patriarchal
familial relations.
Liberal
thinkers proposed a different
sort of social order
where
hierarchical relations of duty,
obedience to paternal
authority and obligation would
be supplanted by an
abstract
individualism where political
authority would rest

on the
free consent of the governed
and state authority would
be strictly limited.
in short, individualism
would replace
Paternalism as the ruling paradigm
for economic and political
life

Central to this critique was the
assertion of a
new definition of the relationship
between public and private life.
Freedom from the arbitrary use of
state power
necessitated the establishment of an
inviolable private
sphere of life which presumably would
remain outside the
state's spectre of power.
While the drawing of this boundary
has always remained problematic for
liberal thinkers, the
division between family life and a public
political order
has consistently informed this division.
The threshold
of the home,

therefore, provided one important limit to

the authority of state power.

The family, once the para-

digmatic organizing principle of public life thus
retreated
from public view into a newly created, specifically
private
sphere.

In sum,

not only was the polity stripped of its

f amilial

basis; the family, by
necessity, was also "depoliticized.
It is important to
understand that while the
liberal

division between public and
private life was intended
as
a critique of patriarchalism,
it also incorporated
and
allowed for the continuation
of traditional patriarchal
relations inside private family
life.
With

few exceptions,
most liberal thinkers continued
to view family life as
natural, necessary, and exempt
from the voluntarist critique
Of public authority.
a sense, then the division
between
the public state and private
family life reconstituted
in liberal terms an already
well-established hierarchical
division between the male and female
worlds, and in doing
so rendered patriarchal family
relations immune from the
critical political language of self-sovereignty
and liberal
rights.
As Mary McIntosh has most bluntly
stated

m

it,

"the

state frequently defines a space, the
family, in which
its agents will not interfere but in
which control is left
to the man.

,.31

With these concerns in mind we can now turn
back
to my historical studies.

Specifically, how has the division

between the public male and private female spheres
informed
the state

s

regulation of women's labor, and what are the

implications of women's primary identification with the

privatized family for her standing in the public world

While on the surface state
labor policy was intended
to protect the health and
safety of women workers
within
the perceived limits of the
police powers of the state,
at a deeper level of analysis
it is clear that state
policy
was guided first and foremost
by the attempt to keep
women
in a particular kind of
relationship to the home and
factory,
public and private life. With
this underlying commitment
in mind, the logic of state
policy can best be captured
through the dual concepts of
"selective non-interference"
and "repressive benevolence."
On the one hand, 1 will
argue, when women conform to
dominant ideals about women's
primary position in family life they
are exempt from state
regulation. On the other hand, the
principle of repressive
benevolence is invoked when women begin
to move into the
public world of work in a way which is
perceived as a threat
to her central position in private
family life.

While the state appears to have had less
direct

control over the labor of homeworkers, it is
clear that
the exemption of these women from state
regulation had
as great an impact on the conditions of their
work as direct

regulation might have.

In the case of homeworkers,

the

state's non-interference in private life reinforced women's

invisibility and underpayment in the labor force.

Dominant

ideology defined women, and especially mothers, as primary

child-rearers and non-wage-earners, and assumed women's
economic dependence on

a

male breadwinner.

Homeworkers

often had young children
to care for and
husbands
present at home were perceived
by state policy-makers
as
conforming to this dominant
ideal.
In addition, the
paradigm
definition of work that grew
out of the industrial
capitalist
system established ideological
barriers to any recognition
of homework as "real"
wage labor.
As the wage labor system
developed outside of the home,
the paradigm idea of work
came to be defined strictly
in terms of wage labor
done
in the public sphere—
ideological. iy and physically
separated
from home.
As I've discussed in chapter
two, while the ideological distinction between home
and work reflected material

transformations in the nature of industrial
production,
it also my stified the economic
importance of women's work
at home-paid or unpaid.

Therefore, even though homeworkers

might actually be wage-earners their
work was still perceived
as entirely consonant with their
role as
"mother."

though

a

Even

dominant ideology of motherhood posed an
anti-

thesis between mothering and wage-earning,
homework was
never perceived as a threat to patriarchal
family relations

because of women's continued presence in the
home.

In

addition, state exemption of homework from
regulation would

insure the continuation of women's underpayment and
therefore her economic dependence upon a male breadwinner.

As

long as these working mothers remained at home, therefore,
the state would opt for a policy of selective non-interference

As long as patriarchal
family
iy relaHnnc
relations were perceived
as stable and
self-sufficient
=.0
nd as
long as women remained
'

i

essentially confined to private
ie life
F
life, iho
the state would find
no need to regulate women's
+.

+.

labor.

The underlying logic of
women's labor policy becomes
acutely clear when we examine
the state's regulation
of
women's paid labor outside the
home.
It is clear from
the nature of protective labor
legislation that the farther
women move from her identification
with the private sphere
of the home, the heavier the
state's hand would be in regulating her labor.
Given the antithesis between
dominant
views of motherhood and wage-earning,
the increasingly
visible movement of women into the
paid labor force was
viewed by the state as a threat to
both good mothering
and, by extension, to the general
welfare of society.
The regulation of women's labor, I
have argued in chapter
three, was based not on the protection
of women's health
(though no doubt this was a heartfelt
concern of many who

advocated protection), but on an attempt to
reinforce women's
identification with the home by restricting the kind
of

work she could do outside of it.
At a more fundamental level of analysis,
protective

labor legislation institutionalized a sexual
segregation
of the labor market.

Women who worked in predominantly

female occupations would be either exempt from all protection
(such as domestics) or have their conditions improved (such

as in textiles) by protective
legislation.

Women who
worked in predominantly male
occupations would be either
prohibited entirely or have their
positions seriously undercut by protection (such as in
foundry work or the printing
industry.)
And restrictions placed on a
minority of women
who had forced their way into
"male" occupations could
have a broad effect on future
possibilities for working
women

Constrained to some degree by rhetoric
of women's
freedom to work, fearful of taking
responsibility for
throwing many women out of work and also
aware of both
pressures from industrialists for the need
for women's
cheap labor, as well as the need of working
class families
for women's wages, the state could not
simply enact laws

which excluded women entirely from industrial
work.

Instead,

laws were designed to reinforce work patterns
that were

perceived as consonant with women's role as "mother"
and
which reinforced women's economic dependence on a
male

wage-earner by limiting her employment to the most poorly
paid sectors of the labor market.
The contrast between the state's selective non-

interference with homework and the state'

s

repressive

benevolent stance towards women working outside the home
can throw into sharp relief the inadequacy of an analysis
of state policy which relies solely on the liberal principle

of state non-interference into private life as an explanation

of the exemption of homeworkers
from protection.

As Michelle

Barrett has stated,
AlthcDugh the state is formally
only interested
such 'private' matters as
sexuality
only in
50 far as they affect the
'public' good
it is
clear that the degree of state
involvement
in
sexuality and procreation renders
the public/
1C/
P

m

private split untenable. 32

Arguments for protective legislation
drew direct
connections between women's private
standing in the home
and her proper public role in the
work force
Through
protective legislation all women were
defined as mothers,
.

or potential mothers, and this
"private" identification

constrained the ways in which she could
enter the "public"
work world.
As such, the state claimed a direct
interest
in regulating the conditions of
women

'

s

labor.

Women's

ability to reproduce, therefore, was perceived
as vital
to the state's interests, and was explicitly
tied to the

general welfare of society.
In sum,

identify as

a

state policy was guided by what

I

would

number of fundamental structural constraints

within which the limits of policy were set.

First,

labor

policy was designed to reinforce a particular variant of
the public/private split whereby women are defined as primary

childrearers

,

non-wage-earners, and are assumed to be

economically dependent on

a male.

And second, once women

do enter the labor force, they are restricted in both

explicit and implicit ways to sectors of the labor force

Which are systematically
underpaid.

Women's secondary

position in the marketplace then
reinforces her primary
role at home, while women's
central role in the home is
then used to justify her
continued underpayment

and ghetto-

ization in the work force.
Yet a crucial question remains:
if state policy
is viewed as only an attempt
on the part of the state
to

reinforce women's oppression by
reasserting women's primary
identification with motherhood and secondary
position in
the labor market, then how could
one explain the support
of women's organizations for
protective labor legislation?
Were the Women's Trade Union League
and its allies merely
misled into believing such legislation was
in
the interests

of working women?

Clearly the support of women (of almost

all classes and sectors of the work force

)

for state protec-

tion was not simply the result of false
consciousness on

their part.

Just as welfare legislation is not only an instru-

ment of social control established in the interests
of
a

ruling class, so protective labor legislation for women

does not only serve in the interests of patriarchy.

At

least in part, protective legislation must be seen as a

result of the positive demands made upon the state by worki
women, however limited these might have been.

Legislation

was not simply repressive, but constituted a qualified

victory for those women whose
working conditions were
improved by regulatory laws-those
women in predominantly
female and organized occupations,
such as
textiles.

But the benefits of protective
labor legislation
to women working in certain
sectors of the labor force
is still insufficient to account
for the strength and

breadth of support of women's
organizations for such legislations--^ support that was often couched
explicitly in
terms of women's frailty and primary
identification as
mothers.

The tenacity of this support can be
better under-

stood in the context of an understanding
of the ways in
which alternative approaches to the improvement
of women's

working conditions wre either thwarted, derailed
or reconstituted to conform to the needs of a patriarchal
social

system.

In addition,

I

will argue shortly that women had

reasons of their own for advancing arguments which reinforced

women's primary identification with private life, even
3-£>

they attempted to improve women's public standing.
As

I

have already discussed, not only were certain

organizations and perspectives excluded from the formal
political process, but also the demands of groups who supported legislation were shaped and limited by more subtle

political means.

The recognition that only certain kinds

of arguments would be accepted and effective in influencing

those in power must certainly have played a part in limiting
the tactical arguments used by women to advance support

for legislation.

while the intent of
organizations such
as the WTUL was to
improve working conditions
for all women
they also perceived that
arguments based on women's
frailty
and proper place in the
home as mothers would
carry the
weight with legislators.
It is important to point
out that the issue of

the improvement of women's
working conditions was
accepted
into the formal political
arena only once it was
couched
in the dominant terms of
debate which viewed women
as
mothers, not workers.
And the fight for women's
rights
as independent wage-earners
was transformed through this
process into a plea for the special
protection of women
as the mothers of the race.
Only by reinforcing women's

association with the private sphere
could reformers get
protective legislation passed. The gap,
I

would argue,

between the original intentions of these
women (to improve
women's standing in the labor market) and
the final result

of a form of protective legislation
which was constructed
in a way that supported women's
secondary economic position

represents a subtle exercise of power over and
cooptation
of these women reformers.

But even reasons of political expediency are
not

sufficient to explain why such

a

broad range of women's

organizations supported legislation which appears at least
in hindsight to have limited the options of women for
equal

employment with men and to have reinforced dominant assump-

1

tions about women.

Returning now to

a

80

question raised

earlier by Lukes, is it possible to argue that
the power
of dominant ideology was forceful enough
to prevent

these

women from conceptualizing of the issue in any
terms which
challenged patriarchal assumptions? As Lukes has
argued,

the "most insidious exercise of power [is] to
prevent

people ... from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that
they

accept their role in the existing order of things....
In order to address this question it is necessary

to take a closer look at the concept of "ideology."

Deter-

ministic approaches to marxist analyses have all too often
viewed ideology as

a

set of beliefs about the world which

are produced by those in power in order to mystify social

relations of dominance and subordination, and legitimize
the privilege of those at the top of the social order.
As Raymond Williams has aptly characterized this approach:
A dominant class

'has' this ideology in relatively
pure and simple forms. A subordinate class has,
in one version nothing but this ideology as its
consciousness (since the production of all ideas
is, by axiomatic definition, in the hands of those
who control the primary means of production) or,
in another version, has this ideology imposed upon
its otherwise different consciousness, which it
must struggle to sustain or develop against
'ruling class ideology'. 34

Relations of domination and subordination are sustained in part through the acceptance of

a

dominant ideology

which mystifies those relations by either denying their

very existence or painting them as natural
and necessary
to any social order.

While social reformers clearly adopted
some of
the basic assumptions embedded in the
dominant patriarchal
ideology by arguing for women's continued primacy
in private
family life, I would argue that they did so not
because
they were determined in some abstract sense by
a hegemonic

ideology but because they recognized, however implicitly,
the positive values of women's association with private
life.

In other words,

I

would argue that while the sex-

ualized division between the public and private spheres
is one important foundation for women's oppression,

at

the same time it has historically placed women in a position
to offer a fundamental critique of the kinds of relations

held up as the ideal in the public world.

Women's exclusion

from public life (in itself never complete) forms not only
the basis of women's oppression, but has the potential,

however latent, to serve as

a

"platform" from which

a

radically different vision of the world might be constructed.
From this point of view, the preference homeworkers expressed
for remaining at home (however qualified by the demands
of husbands and children or the limited options for other

work) and the reassertion of women's position in home life
by women's organizations take on new significance.

Both

resisted attempts to sever women's connections to private
life and to integrate women entirely into the public world.

At least in part this resistance
must be attributed

to the perception by both that the
odds were better for

women inside the family than outside of it.

For many women,

the limited promise of long-term security
available to
them through their central position in family
life was

simply not available to them in the public
marketplace.

After all, patriarchy and the ideology of motherhood
is
not simply an abstract idea about what women should
do

or be that is imposed upon and internalized by both
men

and women.

It is written into the laws of the state and

the laws of the marketplace and places concrete obstacles
in the way of working women.

The economy, itself based

on the assumption that women with children would remain
at home is not structured to absorb women with familial

responsibilities.

The length of the working day, the lack

of child care facilities, and the market preference for

full-time year-round workers all serve in explicit ways
to limit the options of women, and especially mothers,

for work.
As in the case of homeworkers at the turn of the

century, women may well have viewed their central position
in the family over care of children and husband as an impor-

tant source of power.

The hesitancy of homeworkers in

particular to relinquish this central position in the family
by going out to work may have reflected a realistic assess-

ment of their situation.

After all, in the labor market

working class women could barely earn

a

living wage and

were under the constant scrutiny of bosses
or foremen.
Moreover, the possibilities for earning an
independent
wage were limited for most women even at
the peak of their
wage-earning years, and steadily declined as they
passed
marital age.
In contrast,

relations represented

retaining the stability of family
a

kind of long-term security that

the market could never provide.

Children of homeworkers

who were taught at an early age that they were responsible
for the economic survival of the family could be expected
to (and did)

support parents in old age.

And men who were

taught that they were responsible for the support of wife
and children could be expected to and often, though not
always, did--even as such support could be at the same
time wielded as power over wife and children.

For reasons

not entirely of their own making, but not simply imposed

from "above" by a dominant ideology, women actively re-

asserted their central position in the private sphere,
even as they sought their fair and equal treatment in the

public world.

Though the historical economic limits to women's
full independence must have played an important role in

shaping the kinds of challenges brought to bear by women
on the state,

I

would speculatively argue that women had

other more positive reasons for reasserting women's primary

identification with the public sphere.

Progressive reformers

viewed women's association with home
life as a strength
and sought to bring the maternal
sensibilities women developed there to bear on the public world.
In seeking to expand
the state's responsibilities for the
health and welfare
of its citizens,

progressives advocated not only protective

labor legislation, but declared the "Decade
of the Child,"

pushed for public education and promoted national
health
care programs for mothers and children (through
the Sheppard-

Towner Act of 1921.) 35

Attempts to bring to bear the

concerns of the private on public life represented not
simply an adoption of dominant ideology, but an
alternative

challenge to it, even though such a challenge in the end
would be coopted.
In this context it is important to understand that

relations of domination are never fixed nor total.

dominant ideology is never simply imposed.

And

At any historical

moment, challenges and alternatives to dominant ideology
exist.

Despite an ideology of motherhood which defined

women as non-wage-earners, some women have always worked.
And despite the dominant conception of women's inferiority
to men,

few women have fully adopted the dominant view

of themselves as intellectually or physically inferior

(though some have tried.)

In other words,

just as women's

oppression is real and can be pointed to in the structure
of the economy,

in our intimate relations with others and

in the laws of the state,

so too resistance to domination

always exists whether it be in the
hearts of women, in
the arduous struggles of isolated
women to break into "male"
professions, or in the respectful and
mutually affective
relations women struggle to establish in
their intimate
relations with others. Dominant ideology
never fully

captures the minds of those it is intended to
denigrate
because lived experience always provides the
fodder for

alternatives to it.
the power of dominant ideology should not
be underestimated:

it infuses the very language we learn

when we first learn to speak, our intimate relations
with
friends and family, and in its most powerful form it shapes
our perceptions of ourselves, our consciences.
this is not easy, but is always possible.

To challenge

For a dominant

ideology must always carve out parts of life, ways of living
as valid and legitiamte and exclude others.

As such there

are always areas of human experience which can form the

basis for a challenge to it:
It is a fact about modes of domination that
they select from and consequently exclude the
full range of human practice.
What they exclude
may often be seen as the personal or the private,
or as the nature or even the metaphysical ^6
.

Though private family life is no haven in
less world,

a

heart-

immune from the hierarchical power relations

of public life,

it is often a place where human needs left

unmet by our stratified social order can push to the surface

and sometimes find satisfaction.

m

As such, women's experience

private life has the potential to provide
the basis
from which to critique the competitive,
individualistic
and exploitative relations of public
life.
The commitment
of progressive reformers to maintaining
women's central

place

m

the home, the preference of homeworkers
to remain

at home, and indeed, even the more

contemporary defensive

stance of right-wing women against what is seen
as the

feminist assault on women's role as mother can all be
better

understood in this light.

In this sense, women's reluctance

to abandon private life can be at least tentatively
seen
as an expression of the value placed on the relations of

mutual dependence and nurturance, of

non-instrumental

a

sensitivity to the needs of others that "motherhood" has
come to embody.
The problem with using women's experience in private
life as a basis for a critical or alternative view of the

world is that it all too easily slips into

a

naturalist

argument about women's inherent moral qualities, and an

idealization of women's experience in family life.

This

is a problem which continues to plaque the women's movement.

As Andrea Dworkin has written in a more contemporary vein,

"this is a frequent feature of ... environmentalist and anti-

militarist movements.

Women are seen to have an inborn

commitment to both clean air and peace,
that abhors pollution and murder."

a

moral nature

Women's natural

position as "mother" is invoked in feminist
critiques of
nuclear weaponry with slogans such as "Take

the toys away

from the boys" and "You can't hug your
children with nuclear
arms." But naturalist arguments fail to
see the social

character of women's oppression and in

a

"natural" sort

of a way lend support to regressive political
claims which

equate women

s

difference with women's inequality.

This

is precisely the problem that progressive reformers
fell

victim to.

Women's full and equal participation in the

public worlds of politics and work could never be won on
the grounds of women's natural attributes as "mothers."

Even so, to abandon the kinds of insights that can be cul-

tivated from women's experience in private life and used
to form a more social and critical analysis of society

would be to waste one of women's most important political

resources
If the key to any feminist analysis must be the

politicization of private life, by which

I

mean a full

understanding of the social foundations of women's role
as "mother," then there are special risks involved in a

feminist politics which do not confront other progressive

movements in quite the same way.

All feminists must better

understand the repressive potential of the use of organized
state power to achieve their goals.

As we have seen in

the case of progressive era politics, reforms that are

intended to improve women's status can further institution-

alize women's oppression and extend state
power over the
lives of women.
Yet at the same time such caution must
be qualified by the understanding that
the state is always
vulnerable to pressures from alternative movements—
movements
which can struggle, with both eyes now open,
for a radically

different social order.
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